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SUMMARY 
 
 
This thesis is concerned with the relationship between R&D (research and development) 
alliances and firm performance. It investigates whether SMEs (small and medium-sized 
enterprises) have performance improvements through participation in government-
sponsored R&D alliances and attempts to understand the extent to which they are capable 
of turning alliance outcomes into performance. The thesis analyses simultaneously the 
alliance performance and firm performance and looks at the influence of the initial 
conditions and implementation process on both. Complementary to this, the study 
addresses the issue of organisational learning from alliances. 
 
The empirical evidence is based on the experience of a sample of Portuguese 
manufacturing SMEs from several traditional sectors who participated in the collaborative 
programme CRAFT (1994-98) sponsored by the EU (European Union). The data were 
collected through face-to-face interviews, using a structured questionnaire for guiding 
them. The study aims primarily at capturing the firm’s perspective, with the CRAFT 
programme regarded as a source of resources the firm uses in pursuit of its objectives. 
 
The successful cases, though quite few, illustrate the potential performance benefits SMEs 
can achieve with the CRAFT model of partnering, if the projects are technically successful 
and provided the conditions to exploit the alliance outcomes can also be met. Alliance 
success however does not necessarily imply better firm performance. In general, the real 
impact on the firms’ performance indicators fell below the initial expectations and more 
than 60% of all firms in the study did not have a significant impact on performance. 
Nevertheless, that does not necessarily mean alliance failure or dissatisfaction with the 
alliance performance. Turning alliance outcomes into firm performance is not an automatic 
process and the thesis identifies several internal and external factors which may impede the 
successful exploitation of alliance outcomes. The thesis also distinguishes several barriers 
to learning which had an influence on the ability of firms to learn from alliances. 
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 1 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
1.1 PURPOSE OF THE THESIS 
 
This thesis is concerned with the relationship between certain types of R&D alliances, 
namely government-sponsored R&D alliances, and firm performance. It attempts to 
understand whether small and medium size enterprises (SMEs) experience performance 
improvements by participating in such alliances, and the extent to which they are capable 
of turning alliance outcomes into economic benefits. Why is this an important issue? The 
full answer to this question has three important components. First, there is enough evidence 
to claim that the number of new alliances formed each year increased significantly as from 
the late 1970s and early 1980s, which were characterised by a multiplicity of alliance 
forms, involving an increasing number of sectors and activities. This holds for alliances in 
general and R&D alliances in particular. Currently, alliance formation is not increasing at 
rates registered over the last decades, but alliances are widely used by firms as a 
competitive strategy. Second, governments have been actively promoting and supporting 
cooperation, joining together firms, universities and research institutions, aiming at 
fostering industrial competitiveness and, in the case of R&D alliances, correcting market 
failures that result in private under-investment in research and development activities. 
 
There is, thus, a “favourable environment” for firms to engage in cooperative projects, 
which is supported by the numerous studies alleging the potential benefits of inter-firm 
cooperation, in particular technology-based cooperation, putting pressure on firms of all 
sizes and sectors to seek external relationships. This leads to the third component of the 
answer: the number of studies that have analysed empirically the relationship between 
alliances and firm performance is rather small. Furthermore, these studies examined 
alliances in different contexts and employed a number of research methodologies, often 
 2 
achieving inconsistent results. As a result, the impact of alliances on firm performance is 
still very much unexplored, despite its importance for understanding what advantages 
alliances can really offer. There are some well-known cases of success, but what is of 
concern are the several studies reporting a high failure rate of alliances. The thesis aims to 
contribute to the debate over the advantages of alliances for firm performance, especially 
for R&D alliances involving SMEs.  
 
Is it appropriate to analyse the impact of R&D alliances on firm performance? It may be 
difficult or even inappropriate to assess R&D alliances formed with the purpose of carrying 
out fundamental research, given the uncertainty about the outcomes and the large period of 
time it may take before achieving any economic benefits. This is less likely to be the case 
here. All the R&D alliances under the EU’s CRAFT programme examined here were near-
to-market R&D projects and the outcomes were to be exploited straight after the research 
phase, perhaps with the exception of one case. The firms involved in such alliances are 
SMEs from non-technology-intensive sectors, and only exceptionally could they afford to 
invest in basic research. Therefore, it does seem appropriate to examine the impact on 
performance. 
 
This thesis differs in many respects from previous research on this matter. A substantial 
number of previous studies attempted to find associations between alliances and firm 
performance, often using statistical methods, but were unable to prove the underlying 
cause-effect links. Here, the causality between alliances and firm performance is addressed 
and is fundamental. The thesis analyses simultaneously the alliance performance and firm 
performance, and attempts to understand the influence of the initial conditions and 
implementation process on both. Furthermore, the thesis examines the ability of firms to 
exploit the alliance outcomes, i.e. the ability to materialise the potential benefits generated 
together. Empirical research bridging (technology) alliances with firm performance, by 
focusing on the ability of firms to exploit the alliance outcomes, is scarce indeed. The 
thesis also has some limitations, in particular at the methodology level. The methodology 
employed to collect the data is a compromise between the interview and questionnaire 
methods, which turned out to benefit from the advantages of both and produced interesting 
results. However, the process employed to assess the performance variations and the cross-
sectional analysis are the main methodological limitations (see Chapter 4). 
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The findings of this thesis are relevant at three different levels. Regarding the theoretical 
perspectives on alliances, this study addresses an issue largely neglected in the literature 
and sheds some light on the actual performance benefits that SMEs achieve with R&D 
alliances and the risk of failure that the exploitation of alliance outcomes involves. The 
perceived importance of R&D alliances for firm performance is not unequivocally 
supported by empirical studies. For this reason, the findings are highly significant for firms, 
especially SMEs, who are considering the R&D alliance option. The findings are also 
relevant at the policy level, namely for the design of collaborative programmes, even 
though this is not a major concern of this thesis. 
 
1.2 BOUNDARIES OF THIS STUDY 
 
This thesis examines the relationship between technology alliances and firm performance 
in a rather specific context. It looks at the experience of a sample of Portuguese small and 
medium-sized manufacturing firms (with less than 500 employees) who participated in the 
cooperative research (CRAFT) programme sponsored by the European Union (EU). The 
choice of this particular sample of firms may suggest a deliberate intention to analyse the 
effectiveness of the EU policy in encouraging cooperation, but this is not entirely the case. 
The main reason for not taking this direction has to do with practical considerations. It is 
always difficult to get information about the involvement of firms in cooperative research 
projects, particularly in the case of SMEs, and information about the projects such as the 
alliance partners, alliance objectives, beginning and the ending dates of projects. Besides 
that, it is very difficult to find a set of alliances sharing a number of characteristics. The 
CRAFT programme was designed for SMEs, the projects were selected according to the 
same criteria, and the essential information on projects for this study, such as the partners’ 
name, duration and objectives of projects, addresses, etc., is easily available. 
 
Figure 1.1 represents straightforwardly the wider context in which the CRAFT R&D 
alliances fit. Government-sponsored R&D alliances, which are characterised by 
government intervention in their formation, represent a subclass of R&D alliances, which 
in turn are a subclass of inter-firm alliances. The major distinguishing features of CRAFT 
R&D alliances as a subclass within the R&D alliances group, besides being designed for 
SMEs, is that part of the research costs are covered by public funding and the alliances are 
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formed under the rules governing the programme. All the essential characteristics of an 
R&D alliance (see Chapter 2) can be found in the CRAFT alliances.  
 
Figure 1.1 The wider context of CRAFT R&D alliances  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
 
Since the alliances under analysis took place in the context of an EU-sponsored 
programme, the results can be interpreted from the firm’s viewpoint, from the European 
Union’s viewpoint, or by analysing both perspectives simultaneously. Firms regard public 
funding as a source of resources they can use in pursuit of their objectives and, as profit-
seekers, firms are expected to use such resources to achieve benefits that will ultimately 
affect their performance. Firms enter alliances because they need the resources of others to 
achieve their objectives or because they are not willing to take the risk of an alternative 
strategy. The decision to enter an alliance is based on a cost-benefit analysis, very much 
like any other project; public funding certainly shifts the balance of that relationship by 
reducing the costs even if not raising the benefits, and hence minimises the risk of projects. 
On the other hand, policy-makers are interested in assessing the effectiveness of their 
policies; for instance, by comparing the CRAFT programme’s objectives (see Chapter 4) 
and the general objectives of such policies (see Chapter 3) with the actual outcomes. It can 
happen that a mismatch arises between the intended objectives and the actual outcomes, 
calling into question the efficacy of public policies to promote inter-firm cooperation. Such 
an assessment goes beyond the boundaries of the firm and involves political and social 
dimensions. 
 
 
 
Inter-firm 
Alliances 
 
 
R&D 
Alliances 
Government-
sponsored 
R&D 
alliances 
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This study has been designed primarily to capture the firm’s viewpoint, and therefore the 
unit of analysis is the firm and to a less extent the R&D alliance. Despite the 
“environmental pressure” to engage in external relationships, it is the firm which decides to 
enter alliances and it is also the firm that is the prime beneficiary of their outcomes. The 
study is not designed to provide a comprehensive assessment of the CRAFT programme or 
EU RTD (research and technological development) policy. However, the feedback from the 
firms directly involved in the programme and the research findings do have policy 
implications. Based on this feedback, some observations and recommendations for policy-
makers are presented in the concluding chapter. 
 
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTION AND METHODS1 
 
Previous research generated different conclusions about the impact of alliances on firm 
performance, and the different nature of the studies further complicates the understanding 
of this issue. The study focuses on the following research question: Do (successful) 
research alliances cause better firm performance? This question addresses the issue of 
causality between technology alliances and firm performance, aiming at understanding the 
relevant factors linking the two and testing the accepted assumption by the programme 
sponsor and in the literature on alliances that (technologically) successful alliances lead to 
better firm performance. The literature greatly emphasises the necessary conditions for the 
success of alliances2 and satisfaction of partners, and policy-makers believe that promoting 
technology alliances between firms (and other bodies) is sufficient to strengthen the 
technological capability of firms, and consequently enhance their performance. Apparently, 
neither of them takes into consideration or is fully aware of the risk of failure that the post-
alliance period involves.  
 
This question has a number of implications attached, leading to a set of questions which 
the thesis will attempt to provide some answers: Does satisfaction with the alliance imply 
better firm performance? To what extent can firms turn technology alliances into 
performance? What are the factors behind the unsuccessful exploitation of alliance 
                                                 
1
 Chapter 4 develops thoroughly the issue of research design, methodology and the limitations of the research 
approach which is used in this study. 
2
 However, the success of alliances is itself difficult to define (cf. Chapter 2).  
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outcomes? and To what extent do the initial conditions and the alliance implementation 
process affect the alliance outcomes? Complementary to these questions, the study 
attempts to examine the issue of organisational learning from alliances. 
 
This study is based on the experience of 41 Portuguese manufacturing SMEs (43 project-
firm groupings), who participated in 30 technology alliances under the CRAFT 
programme. The empirical data was collected through face-to-face interviews with top 
management staff or technical directors at the firms’ premises, using a questionnaire 
(consisting of a set of structured questions) for guiding the interviews. To understand the 
alliance effect on firm performance, eight indicators of performance were selected, five of 
them being traditional indicators - productivity, production costs, sales, profit and market 
share - and the remaining three non-financial indicators, which despite being increasingly 
important to firms still lack a generalised measurement system - customer satisfaction, 
product/service quality and environmental damage. A ninth variable - overall impact - has 
been used to assess the general effect on firm performance as opposed to the assessment of 
the specific aspects given by the former indicators. The executives were first invited to 
assess the impact on these performance indicators on a five-point importance scale, and 
subsequently asked to translate that impact into percentages. 
 
As mentioned above, the cross-sectional analysis used in this study can be criticised in 
terms of its limitations for addressing an issue with implications over a period of time, but 
the design of the questionnaire, the interaction with the respondents and the systematic 
approach in collecting the data considerably minimised those limitations and greatly helped 
to capture changes.  
 
1.4 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
 
The thesis falls into two distinct parts. The first part, which includes Chapters 2 and 3, is 
mainly concerned with the theoretical framework for the rest of the thesis. The second part 
of the thesis describes the research project and presents the empirical findings; it includes 
Chapters 4 to 8. Chapter 9 draws some conclusions and policy implications. 
 
The theoretical background is split into two complementary chapters. Chapter 2 is more 
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specific in scope and more analytical in approach. It addresses three major concepts which 
are important for the thesis, namely the concepts of inter-firm alliance (and R&D alliance), 
alliance success, and organisational performance. Besides underlining the core 
characteristics of these concepts, the discussion intends also to capture their evolving 
nature and the persisting disagreement concerning their boundaries. The chapter then 
proceeds with a detailed discussion of four different perspectives on examining 
performance in the context of alliances. This section tackles the question of performance 
extensively, by taking on board a range of different studies and perspectives that often goes 
beyond the context of research and development (R&D) alliances. It includes an extensive 
literature review of empirical studies on the performance of alliances and on the 
performance of firms through alliances, uncovering several different approaches taken by 
researchers to deal with the two issues. The next section addresses the issue of 
organisational learning and competence-building through alliances, which is a different and 
complementary way of assessing the impact of alliances on firm performance. Finally, the 
chapter includes a literature review on the relative advantages of alliances over alternative 
strategies, particularly the go-it-alone option. This last point is extremely important to 
understand in what circumstances an alliance might be a better choice; however, the issue 
will not be analysed from an empirical viewpoint. 
 
Unlike Chapter 2, Chapter 3 is less focused and less analytical. It is aimed at describing the 
context in which the CRAFT R&D alliances examined in the following chapters took 
place. The information provided in this chapter is important to understand the causes for 
the formation of those alliances and the consequences for the Portuguese firms, but a more 
detailed discussion of the issues addressed in the chapter is beyond the scope of the thesis. 
It begins by looking at the trends in the formation of R&D alliances and the participation of 
SMEs in this type of alliance, highlighting the fact that the existing databases on alliances 
have several structural problems and are thus not entirely reliable. The chapter proceeds 
with a characterisation of the Portuguese industry, its structural problems and dependency 
on technology from abroad. This helps to understand some intrinsic characteristics of 
Portuguese SMEs and how important a programme such as CRAFT can be for them. Since 
the CRAFT programme was sponsored by the European Union, it is relevant to understand 
the rationale for the public incentives to cooperation and the major EU instruments for the 
research and technological development within the Union (i.e., the Framework 
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Programmes and Structural Funds). 
 
Chapter 4 describes the research approach which is used in this study, including the set of 
questions that the thesis attempts to answer, the method of data collection, and the 
advantages and limitations of the research process employed here. The chapter also 
provides a more detailed analysis of the characteristics of the CRAFT programme. 
 
Chapters 5 to 8 detail the findings of the empirical research. The first three chapters have a 
“natural” sequence and each of them highlights fundamental aspects for understanding the 
alliance-performance link in three different stages of the process. Together, they cover the 
whole process of cooperation, from the inception of alliances to the impact on firm 
performance. Chapter 5 centres on the pre-project implementation stage and aims to 
capture the circumstances in which the R&D alliances were shaped, assess the strategic 
importance of projects for firms and identify potential strengths and weaknesses that may 
affect the alliance outcomes. Chapter 6 focuses on the actual cooperation process (i.e., the 
alliance implementation period). It assesses the investment issues, identifies the negative 
factors of cooperation and the benefits achieved by firms, and assesses the alliance 
performance. Chapter 7 is concerned with the post-alliance period. It assesses the impact of 
alliances on firm performance, analyses the ability of firms to transform alliance outcomes 
into performance and examines retrospectively how the initial conditions and the 
implementation process might have affected the achievement of better results. 
Complementary to this, Chapter 8 draws attention to the issue of organisational learning 
and attempts to understand in what ways firms have learned from the alliances and to 
identify the barriers to learning. 
 
Finally, Chapter 9 draws the conclusions and some policy implications. In the appendixes 
there is a copy of the questionnaire, data on the interviews, technical information 
concerning previous studies on performance, and the statistical outputs. 
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2 ALLIANCES AND PERFORMANCE 
 
 
 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The aim of this chapter is to review the literature on alliances with a view to deriving the 
theoretical framework for the rest of the investigation. It has three main objectives: (i) to 
examine the major conceptual issues which are important to link technology alliances to 
firm performance, and, in particular, identify within the large spectrum of alliances the 
specific context where the alliances analysed in the subsequent chapters fit; (ii) to provide a 
detailed analysis of different ways of addressing performance in the context of alliances; 
(iii) to examine the rationale in terms of performance indicators. The chapter tackles the 
question of performance extensively by offering the reader a range of different studies and 
perspectives which often goes beyond the specific context of the R&D alliances and 
government-sponsored R&D alliances in particular. The many different perspectives and 
concepts in the literature suggest that an approach too focused on the R&D alliances 
literature would likely be rather insufficient. 
 
The interest in studying the performance of alliances is not new, in particular joint ventures 
performance; certainly it is bound to be an important line of research given the amount and 
diversity of alliances formed recently and the urgent need to understand what advantages 
alliances can really offer and in what circumstances they might be a better alternative. 
There are, however, various onerous research obstacles on the road. Measuring alliance 
performance is complex because it involves a great logistical challenge to collect the rich 
data necessary to assess the issue in greater detail (Gulati, 1998), sometimes relating to a 
long period of time. It is difficult to empirically link alliance activity with firm 
performance due to the enormous problems in filtering variations in performance 
attributable to alliances, since many other activities contribute to firm performance. The 
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lack of a conceptual framework and appropriate research instruments to collect the data 
explain why the assessment of alliance performance and the impact of alliances on firm 
performance has received much less empirical attention than the rest of the theory on 
alliances. 
 
Despite these problems, several researchers have gone beyond the initial efforts of setting 
out the problem, and a few valuable contributions have uncovered some relevant factors 
that affect performance. In earlier studies, however, different methodologies have been 
utilised to assess performance in different research contexts, therefore reducing 
substantially the chances for comparison and generalisation of the results.  
 
This chapter is structured as follows. Firstly, it discusses the concepts of interfirm alliance 
and R&D alliance, aiming at emphasising their fundamental characteristics, the abundance 
of terminology in the literature and the lack of consensus regarding the boundaries of the 
concepts. This is intended also to contextualise the type of alliances analysed in the next 
chapters. Secondly, the chapter analyses the performance of alliances, first by discussing 
the concept and then by examining how prior studies have operationalised it. The following 
section examines the performance of firms through alliances, the notion of organisational 
performance, differentiating determinants from indicators of performance, and the 
multiplicity of perspectives and indicators authors have used to assess the impact on 
performance. The chapter proceeds with a section concerning learning and competence-
building through alliances, which is a different and complementary way to assess the 
impact on firm performance. It attempts to show that alliances are a mechanism for 
learning from partners and that the knowledge acquired may not be immediately reflected 
in performance. Finally, the chapter addresses briefly the issue of performance of alliances 
versus alternative strategies, focusing specifically on the relative advantages of alliances 
over an independent strategy. Some conclusions end the chapter. 
  
2.2 ON THE CONCEPT OF ALLIANCE 
 
2.2.1 Definitions and boundaries 
 
Over recent years, authors have used a profusion of terms to describe inter-firm alliances. 
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On the one hand, this certainly is the consequence of the increasing diversity and multi-
dimensional characteristics of alliances. Concepts should evolve to capture more 
adequately the phenomenon they are supposed to describe. On the other hand, it is also a 
consequence of a sudden interest of a large number of researchers in this matter, easily 
observable in the stack of literature on this field of study, who have been stimulated by the 
uncharacteristic importance alliances have gained recently. To Chesnais (1988: 55) such 
profusion of terms is a sign of a “high degree of flexibility in the definitions proposed”, but 
it can also be interpreted as representing, in part at least, “a degree of analytical 
imprecision.” “The numerous definitions of cooperation scholars have offered without 
making much attempt to reference other usages of the term” (Smith et al., 1995: 10) 
undoubtedly complicate the integration of all contributions in a coherent and robust 
framework. 
   
Table 2.1 contains the transcription of several definitions of inter-firm alliances 
subjectively selected from the relevant literature since the early 1980s. For each definition, 
it also includes information on the alliance duration, type of contract, characteristics of 
alliance partners and level of interdependence between them. The purpose of gathering all 
of these definitions is threefold. First, to illustrate (without being exhaustive) the profusion 
of terms one can find in the literature. Second, to underline similarities between different 
terms and stress differences between seemingly identical expressions. Third, to understand 
the evolution of the concept and ultimately identify its boundaries, by discussing some 
noticeable divergences between definitions. This is important because the use of a given 
term does not necessarily identify a specific and different alliance context. Selecting 
relevant literature for this thesis based uniquely on a terminology criterion would not be 
very effective.  
 
In filling in the characteristics that each definition encompasses, we have taken into 
account not only the definition itself, but also any complementary explanation given by the 
author and the overall information included in the reference. When clear information on a 
specific aspect could not be found, the respective cell was left blank, meaning it is unclear 
what is the author’s position on that point. With the exception of the variable “duration”, 
which if not explicitly mentioned only “long-term” was assumed here, this procedure was 
used even when the definition is so general that anything could be included in it. 
 Table 2.1 Definitions of inter-firm alliances 
Reference Definition Duration Contract Partners Interdependence 
  S L F I No. V H O JV Min C M A L 
Mariti & Smiley 
(1983: 437) 
“[...]a co-operative agreement is any long term, explicit agreement amongst two or more firms.” 
    ≥ 2          
Porter & Fuller 
(1986: 315) 
“Coalitions are formal, long-term alliances between firms that link aspects of their businesses but fall short of merger. They include 
joint ventures, licensing agreements, supply agreements, marketing agreements, and a variety of other arrangements.”     ≥ 2          
Chesnais  
(1988: 56) 
“Inter-company co-operation agreements, which are formal, and informal, agreements between two or more companies providing for 
a certain degree of collaboration between them (and) involving equity participation or the creation of new companies (as well as) non-
equity agreements.” 
    ≥ 2          
Harrigan  
(1988: 205) 
“Strategic alliances – JV, cooperative agreements, and so forth – are partnerships among firms that work together to attain some 
strategic objective.”     = 2 ?          
Jarillo  
(1988: 32) 
“I see strategic networks as long-term, purposeful arrangements among distinct but related for-profit organizations that allow those 
firms in them to gain or sustain competitive advantage vis-à-vis their competitors outside the network. Firms in the network are 
independent along some dimensions.” 
    ≥ 2          
Jorde & Teece 
(1989: 8) 
“A strategic alliance can be defined as a bilateral relationship characterized by the commitment of two or more partner firms to reach a 
common goal, and which entails the pooling of specialized assets and capabilities.”     ≥ 2          
Lewis (1990: 1) “In a strategic alliance firms cooperate out of mutual need and share the risks to reach a common objective.” 
 
   ≥ 2          
Forrest  
(1992: 25) 
“Strategic alliances are those collaborations between firms and other organizations, both short- and long-term, which can involve either 
partial or contractual ownership, and are developed for strategic reasons.”     ≥ 2          
Dodgson  
(1993b: 10) 
“There is a plethora of definitions of collaboration – also known as ‘alliances’, ‘cooperative agreements’ and ‘networks’ – including a 
huge range of activities. They are formed by firms with other firms [...] and with higher education institutes and contract research 
organizations. Collaborations take place in the research, development, manufacturing and marketing functions, and take a wide variety 
of forms.” 
 
   ≥ 2          
Håkansson et al. 
(1993: 66) 
“Strategic alliances are loosely defined as two or more autonomous firms agreeing to co-ordinate some of their resources for joint 
purposes. Thus a wide variety of formal and informal agreements – from buyer-seller relationships to mergers and acquisitions – are 
perceived as strategic alliances.” 
    ≥ 2          
Hagedoorn  
(1993: 377) 
“We define cooperative agreements as common interests between independent (industrial) partners which are not connected through 
(majority) ownership.“     ≥ 2          
Gomes-Casseres 
(1996: 34) 
“An alliance is any governance structure involving an incomplete contract between separate firms and in which each partner has limited 
control. Because the partners remain separate firms, there is no automatic convergence in their interests and actions. As a result, to deal 
with unforseen contingencies the partners need to make decisions jointly.” 
    ≥ 2          
Rosenfeld  
(1996: 248) 
“A network is loosely defined as three or more firms that cooperate in order to gain strength of numbers, solve problems, enter new 
markets, or develop and produce goods.”     ≥ 3          
Gulati  
(1998: 293) 
“I define strategic alliances as voluntary arrangements between firms involving exchange, sharing, or codevelopment of products, 
technologies, or services.”     ≥ 2          
Dussauge & 
Garrette  
(1999: 4) 
“Strategic alliances are links formed between two –or more– independent companies which choose to carry out a project or specific 
activity joinly by coordinating the necessary skills and resources rather than: i) pursuing the project or activity on their own, taking on 
all the risks and confronting competition alone; ii) merging their operations or acquiring and divesting entire business units.” 
    ≥ 2          
Nooteboom  
(1999: 1) 
“‘Alliance’ is a broad term capturing many forms of inter-firm cooperation that go beyond mere market transactions. It includes 
‘vertical’, [...] ‘horizontal’ [...] and ‘diagonal’ alliances between firms in different industries. It covers the whole range of forms from 
incidental cooperation between independent firms, through licensing, more systematic and lasting forms of cooperation, equity swaps 
and equity joint ventures all the way to mergers and acquisitions.” 
    ≥ 2          
Plunket  
(1999: 2-3) 
“La coopération interfirmes peut se définir comme une modalité de rapprochement de deux ou plusiers entreprises, juridiquement 
indépendantes, ayant pour object la mise en commun de ressources financières, humaines et de savoir-faire dans le but de réaliser 
conjointement des activités telles que la recherche et développement (R&D), la production ou encore la commercialisation.” 
    ≥ 2          
Key: Duration (Short-term, Long-term); Contract (Formal, Informal); Partners (Number of firms, Vertical alliances, Horizontal alliances, Other institutions such as Universities, Research Centres); Interdependence (Joint 
Ventures, Minority equity, Consortium, Mergers, Acquisitions, Simple Licensing agreements). Note: Emphases added, except the italic in Gomes-Casseres definition. Source: Author’s compilation. 
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Table 2.1 shows a very diversified set of terms used by authors to refer to interfirm 
cooperation but the definitions, arguably, are not essentially different. The concept appears 
to have evolved in order to capture the increasing complex and diversified nature of 
relationships, but the effort to integrate the different perspectives has not been sustained 
enough. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to find the best wording for inter-firm 
alliances, but below there is a brief discussion on some observable disagreements which 
helps to understand the boundaries of the concept. 
 
A first divergence concerns the duration of alliances and specifically whether “short-term” 
relationships should be considered alliances. Barlow et al. (1997) and Horton (1998), for 
instance, put the question in terms of a one-off project or long-term relationships (several 
projects), but their opinions diverge. Mariti and Smiley (1983: 437) understand that the 
agreement must be long-term because “a one-time purchase of goods and services is not a 
co-operative agreement, but an agreement to purchase all inputs from one supplier over the 
next ten years is.” Jarillo’s (1988: 32) argument is that “entrepreneurs use purposefully [the 
networks] to obtain a competitive advantage for their firms, instead of as a ‘metaphor’ to 
describe business transactions.” Leaving aside the always challenging difficulty concerning 
the delimitation of short-term from long-term, and keeping in mind that certain alliances 
“require” longer relationships in order to reach their objectives, both the strategic 
importance of alliances and their consequences for the partner firms are not necessarily 
positively correlated with the length of time.3 
 
A second divergence is about the simple licensing agreements. Many authors, conveniently 
or not, consider licensing agreements as alliances (cf. Table 2.1). However, Dodgson 
(1993b: 13) argues that licensing is excluded from his restricted definition of collaboration 
because it is essentially a one-way transfer of know-how. Jorde and Teece (1989: 8) say 
that agreements where one partner gets a “cash-based” retribution is not considered an 
alliance. The main argument against including them points out that unidirectional licensing 
agreements fall within the realm of market transactions. However, as Chesnais (1988) 
observes, the case is somewhat different if the contract implies some kind of further 
                                                 
3
 To Niosi (1996: 99), long-term is six months or more. In many alliances the negotiation phase alone takes 
more than six months, though. According to Harrigan’s (1988: 207) findings, “of the ventures that were 
mutually assessed to be successful by their sponsors, 4.7 percent lasted one year or less.” See also the section 
“Duration, termination and mortality rates of alliances” below. 
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interaction (e.g. communication of improvements). That is one of the reasons why 
licensing agreements are considered alliances in many studies and in many databases as 
well. 
 
A third divergence has to do with the interdependence of partners. In the context of 
alliances, some authors (e.g. Brockhoff et al., 1991; Lorange and Loos, 1992; Chiesa and 
Manzini, 1998) consider that mergers and acquisitions represent the highest degree of 
organisational dependence or integration. Many other authors, however, do not agree that 
mergers and acquisitions can be called alliances. One fundamental argument is that in a 
genuine alliance the partners must be independent from each other, i.e. be able to make 
decisions autonomously. If that is not the case, it undermines the basic nature of any inter-
firm alliance, which means both partners are under the same hierarchical structure. “The 
merger or acquisition per se implies that the original entities are answerable to a single 
chain of command [...] and that, as a result, they lose all autonomy in the choice of their 
objectives and definition of their strategies” (Dussauge and Garrette, 1999: 3). “Obviously, 
an acquisition is not an alliance” (Nueno, 1999: 319). In an alliance, the partners are free to 
exit the relationship (Murray and Mahon, 1993: 103). Therefore, for many researchers, 
mergers, acquisitions and majority equity investments (i.e. the acquisition of more than 
50% of another firm) are not alliances. Gomes-Casseres (1996: 262) concludes, “the 
requirement of separate firms is almost universal.”  
  
A fourth disagreement, not noticeable in Table 2.1, concerns joint ventures. Some authors, 
e.g. Chiesa and Manzini (1998), exclude joint ventures from their notion of alliances. To 
these authors, alliances are basically agreements between firms without involving any form 
of equity participation. Tidd et al. (1997) understand joint ventures as a type of 
collaboration but not a strategic alliance. Callahan and Mackenzie (1999: 366) are explicit 
in their conclusion: “an alliance is not a joint venture. In a joint venture, a new corporate 
entity is formed.” However, most authors include JVs in their notion of alliance (cf. Table 
2.1). They argue that it is the nature rather than the legal status that defines an alliance 
(Dussauge and Garrette, 1999: 10). 
 
The last divergence refers to the meaning of the word “strategic”. The term is fashionable, 
widely used and rather inaccurate, since the literature is characterised by a multiplicity of 
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perspectives. It is possible to identify three different approaches:  
• The literature that takes the concept as a given and does not bother to define it or even 
quote other definitions;  
• The literature that use the word “strategic” in the definition, however does not assign it 
any special meaning (e.g. Håkansson et al., 1993; Gulati, 1998);  
• The literature that uses it and provides an explanation for its meaning. Some authors 
have gone beyond that and suggest alternatives to “strategic”. 
 
Devlin and Bleackley (1988: 18) state that “strategic alliances are specifically concerned 
with securing, maintaining or enhancing a company’s competitive advantage”, and “take 
place in the context of a company’s long-term strategic plan and seek to improve or 
dramatically change a company’s competitive position”. In Mytelka (1991), “alliances are 
regarded as strategic where they seek to improve the future competitive position of the 
firm. [Strategic alliances tend to] assume greater importance in the long-term planning 
objectives of a firm than it does as an ad hoc to the opportunities for short-term gain” 
(Mytelka, 1991: 1). For the European Commission (1995: 32), an alliance is strategic if it 
demonstrates some or all of the following main features: 
(1) Its “intent” is strategic. That is, the partners mean the alliance to further some highly 
important objectives for the firm concerned. 
(2) In so doing, the alliance is likely to exist for a longer rather than shorter period of time 
– in practice several years. 
(3) There is a specific goal or goals to do with generating competitive advantage in either 
products, key activities or major markets. 
(4) Partners often “give up” something important in their own competence in return for the 
success of the alliance. 
To Dussauge and Garrette (1999: 22), an alliance can be described as strategic “when it 
contributes significantly to the strategies pursued by the partner companies, and when it 
involves pooling and combining the partners’ capabilities”. They note that “true strategic 
alliances are aimed at creating and enhancing the competitive positions of the firms 
involved, in a highly competitive environment” (p. 21). 
 
Dodgson (1992b: 229) makes the distinction between the strategic and the tactical nature of 
R&D collaboration if it focuses on issues important for the long-term development of the 
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company or not. Eventually, he concludes that there is some contradictory evidence 
concerning the strategic nature of collaboration in R&D. Hagedoorn (1993: 372) states that 
“the strategic character of the agreement relates to the expected long-term effects of the 
agreement on the product-market positioning of at least one of the partners”. He suggests 
that the alternative to strategic intent is cost-economising, which is “associated with either 
transaction costs or operating costs of companies” (p. 377), but acknowledges that there is 
no strict correlation between organisational modes of cooperation and their strategic or 
cost-economising content. Tidd et al. (1997: 199) in their model of collaboration 
understand that the motives to collaborate can be strategic (leadership and learning) or 
tactical (cost, time and risk). 
 
The notion of “strategic” has some drawbacks. As seen above, there is no consensus about 
its meaning.  The term is itself rather vague and subjective given the difficulty in sorting 
out ex ante whether or not a certain collaborative project is strategic. Frequently, the 
assessment of the “strategic” intent of an alliance is made by researchers, sometimes based 
on scarce information about the projects (e.g. announcements in specialised literature). 
Putting the question the other way round, in what situations can one say that a specific 
alliance has no strategic intent if it is established in a purposeful and deliberative way? Are 
“strategic” alliances strategic to all alliance partners? It is a flexible term as well, in the 
sense that the “strategic” nature of an alliance may change over time depending on its 
outcomes and other environmental circumstances. Is an alliance strategic that has negative 
implications for (some of) the partners involved when its initial intent was strategic? The 
discussion above suggests that the boundary between alliance and strategic alliance is 
somewhat loose and difficult to establish clearly, which helps to explain why both terms 
are frequently used interchangeably.  
 
The lack of consensus about the terminology and boundaries of alliances complicates the 
researcher’s work in selecting and analysing the relevant literature. For instance, the fact 
that the CRAFT R&D alliances have a maximum duration of two years - not a strategic 
alliance according to many definitions - appears not to be sufficient to dismiss straight 
away the literature on strategic alliances as irrelevant, because, as explained above, the 
importance of an alliance is not necessarily related to its duration.  
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2.2.2 The notion of R&D alliance 
 
Whereas the concept of interfirm alliance is still a matter of intense discussion, it is widely 
accepted in the literature that an R&D alliance is one of the many types of alliances within 
the inter-firm alliance spectrum. R&D alliances fit within the general definitions discussed 
above, having, however, proper characteristics that distinguish them from other types of 
alliances. Again, there is no consensus about the exact definition of an R&D alliance, its 
boundaries are rather unclear and the terminology is diversified as well. The following 
definitions contain the fundamental characteristics of an R&D alliance and illustrate this 
point. 
 
“Co-operation and/or technology exchange between firms (or between firms and other 
categories of research organisations) can either take place at a single given point of the R&D-
to-commercialisation process or cover the whole process. It can concern either the creation of 
new technology or the acquisition and use of an already existing one or [...] both.” (Chesnais, 
1988: 57-9) 
 
“Technological collaboration includes any activity where two or more partners contribute 
differential resources and know-how to agreed complementary aims. In this definition may be 
included the following, both privately created or promoted by public policy: (a) Collaborative 
research programmes or consortia; (b) Joint ventures and strategic alliances; (c) Shared R&D 
and production contracts. Both vertical and horizontal linkages are included [...] direct 
investment, licensing, marketing agreements and computerized networks and data-banks [...] 
are not included as they are essentially one-way transfers of know-how.” (Dodgson, 1993b: 13) 
 
[...] “strategic technology partnering, i.e., interfirm cooperation for which a combined 
innovative activity or an exchange of technology is at least part of their agreement.” 
(Hagedoorn, 1993: 371-2) 
 
“Technical cooperation among firms takes place when independent enterprises put together 
commonly defined R&D projects, often with help of universities and government laboratories. 
The spectrum of technical cooperation goes from informal collaboration (usually through the 
short-term exchange of research personnel, ideas, and/or laboratory material without any 
written contract between the parties) to strategic technical alliances (i.e. long-term – six 
months or more – written R&D agreements between firms aiming at the creation of new or 
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improved products or processes). Technological collaboration thus differs both from 
technology transfer, and from other types of strategic alliances (i.e. commercial, 
manufacturing, advertising, etc.).” (Niosi, 1996: 99) 
 
“Partnerships are defined [...] as cooperative arrangements engaging companies, universities, 
and government agencies and laboratories in various combinations to pool resources in pursuit 
of a shared R&D objective.” (Council on Competitiveness, 1996: 3)4 
 
“We define a research partnership broadly as an innovative-based relationship that involves, at 
least partly, a significant effort in research and development (R&D).” (Hagedoorn, Link and 
Vonortas, 2000: 567-8) 
 
Taking the standpoint of innovation, Freeman (1991: 502) classifies R&D cooperation in 
ten categories of “innovation networks”: (1) Joint ventures and research corporations; (2) 
Joint R&D agreements; (3) Technology exchange agreements; (4) Direct investment 
(minority holdings) motivated by technology factors; (5) Licensing and second-sourcing 
agreements; (6) Sub-contracting, production-sharing and supplier networks; (7) Research 
associations; (8) Government-sponsored joint research programmes; (9) Computerised data 
banks and value-added networks for technical and scientific interchange; (10) Other 
networks, including informal networks. 
 
The multiplicity of R&D alliance types may be also classified under four main headings 
(Gugler and Dunning, 1993: 145), as follows:  
• University-located R&D alliances that involve more than one industrial firm; 
• Private alliances negotiated and organised without the intervention of government; 
• Alliances organised through governmental agreements (e.g. Airbus); 
• National and international collaborative programmes (e.g. Esprit). 
 
These classifications of R&D alliances and some of the definitions above clearly regard 
government-sponsored R&D alliances as a subset within the R&D alliance category. The 
promotion of international collaborative programmes such as CRAFT, which is sponsored 
by the European Union through funding, is a way of government intervention in the 
                                                 
4
 Quoted in Link (1999) and Hagedoorn et al. (2000). 
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formation of alliances. The empirical research in this thesis is thus primarily relevant in the 
context of R&D alliances. 
 
2.3 ALLIANCE PERFORMANCE 
 
2.3.1 On the notion of alliance success5 
 
There is no straightforward notion of alliance success. The large spectrum of alliance types, 
their multiplicity of purposes and diversity of results, make it very difficult to find a single, 
all-embracing definition. The task gets harder when the individual perspectives of partner 
firms are taken into consideration; it is hardly surprising to obtain divergent opinions about 
the success or failure of the alliance, due to the different set of objectives they are likely to 
have. Arnold et al. (1992: 42) claim that, in the context of technological collaboration, 
projects are successful if achievements match or surpass expectations and useful 
unanticipated results and benefits can render a project successful, even if the original 
expectations are not met. However, the problems in measuring the alliance success appear 
to be rather more complex, as the following quotations show. 
 
“Each strategic alliance obviously has unique characteristics. Therefore, it is virtually 
impossible to give a prescription for performance appraisal that is valid for more than a 
limited number of cases.” (Lorange and Roos, 1992: 42) 
 
“It is notoriously difficult to define success in collaboration. The range of firms’ 
circumstances and their experiences of collaboration are so variable as to make uniform 
definitions of success and failure unwise.” (Dodgson, 1993b: 151) 
 
“Success is a concept with a multitude of facets, which makes it difficult to develop a 
measurement approach.” (Brockhoff and Teichert, 1995: 111) 
 
“It is difficult to assess the success of a collaborative venture, and in particular termination of 
a partnership does not necessarily indicate failure if the objectives have been met.” (Tidd 
Bessant and Pavitt, 1997: 228) 
                                                 
5
 Some authors use the term success, others performance, apparently with no distinction between them. Both 
terms are used here interchangeably. 
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“In the case of alliances, the very notion of success is indeed quite ambiguous; alliance 
success is usually assessed on the basis of the performance of the joint project or venture, but 
very rarely takes into account the impact that collaboration may have on the situation of the 
various partner firms. This issue is compounded by the fact that these partner firms may have 
very different reasons to collaborate and may pursue radically different strategic goals through 
the alliance.” (Dussauge and Garrette, 1999: 206) 
 
The assessment of alliances has been of concern to many researchers over the last few 
decades, particularly the assessment of joint ventures; however the progress has been rather 
modest so far because of the many difficulties referred to above. Basically, the question of 
alliance success has been considered in two different ways. On the one hand, part of the 
literature is of a prescriptive-type nature, since its main concern is to identify critical 
aspects of the relationship where partners should focus their attention if success is to be 
attained, however normally no underlying definition of success is provided (e.g., 
Perlmutter and Heenan, 1986; Devlin and Bleackley, 1988). The result of this approach is a 
“collection of good practices” aimed at guiding the partners through the whole complex 
process of cooperation in order to achieve the “best possible results” (see, for instance, 
Duysters et al. (1999) for a recent example). 
 
On the other hand, some studies take alliance success in a totally different perspective by 
concentrating their efforts on the identification of relevant variables aiming at 
operationalising the concept of alliance success. Here, the focus is the alliance outcomes 
and the way they can be assessed. At least three different perspectives can be observed in 
the literature concerning the assessment of alliances. However, despite the interesting 
suggestions for alliance assessment described in the boxes below, many of them are hardly 
operational and, consequently, ineffective. Some suggestions for alliance assessment have 
no specific restrictions attached and, thus, are general in purpose (see Box 2.1). A second 
group of suggestions to assess alliances are restricted to specific types of alliances (see Box 
2.2). Yet another group is even more specific, and suggests ways of measuring success of 
alliances aimed at reaching particular alliance objectives (see Box 2.3). 
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Box 2.1 General assessment of alliances 
 
“Partnerships are going to be viable only insofar as the value of the joint results to both partners is 
superior to the opportunity cost they incur - in particular, the cost of the loss of control and autonomy that 
follows the partnership.” (Doz, 1988: 325) 
   
“Venture performance is determined in this analysis by considering all three indicators - venture survival, 
duration, and sponsor-indicated assessments of success.” (Harrigan, 1988: 207) 
 
“To be considered successful, an alliance had to pass two tests: both partners achieved their ingoing 
strategic objectives and both recovered their financial costs of capital.” (Bleeke and Ernst, 1993b: 23) 
 
“Business dissolution is an appropriate measure [of failure] for situations in which interfirm collaboration 
plays a central role in business strategy.” (Singh and Mitchell, 1996: 101) 
 
 
Box 2.2 Assessment of specific alliance types 
 
[...] “successful joint ventures are those that survive over a reasonable period of time, generally over 
eight years, and the major parties involved - the TNC, the national partner(s), and the host government - 
perceive sufficient benefits in relation to costs.” (Dymsza, 1988: 403) 
   
[Technological collaboration] “Projects are successful if achievements match or surpass expectations; 
Even if original expectations are not met, useful unanticipated results and benefits can render a project 
successful.” (Arnold et al., 1992: 42) 
 
“We consider an alliance [Joint venture] successful if both parties achieve their strategic objectives and 
earn a return equal to or greater than their cost of capital over the life of the partnership.” (Bleeke and 
Ernst, 1995: 98) 
 
“In very broad terms we consider success to be the degree to which objectives are met (or surpassed) by a 
specific organizational arrangement (the R&D cooperation) within a set of situational variables.” [It 
takes the viewpoint of any of the partners and includes only cooperation among business firms] 
(Brockhoff and Teichert, 1995: 112) 
 
“Joint ventures are designed to meet the goals both of individual firms and of the collective undertaking, 
and will be successful when the value of collective outcomes exceeds opportunity costs incurred by 
participants, and when the distribution of both is fair.” (Park and Russo, 1996: 878) 
 
“Although the specific measurement varies in each case, the benchmark for the performance of co-option 
alliances can be summarized in terms of the improvement of the structural attractiveness of the industry 
for the alliance participants and the strengthening of their competitive capabilities.”; “Cospecialization 
alliances that rely on skills or other ownership-specific contributions [...] ought to be measured by the 
value of the new opportunities they create compared with what partners could have achieved on their 
own.”; “The success of learning alliances can be measured in terms of the intensity of skill improvement 
and the scope of learning application. Learning alliances need to be assessed on the basis of the individual 
partner’s appropriation of that learning. [...] Relative dependence within a competence-building alliance is 
another criterion against which to measure success.”; “Some alliances should be measured as options. 
R&D alliances, for instance, may be assessed in terms of the range of available options they present to 
their partners.” (Doz and Hamel, 1998: 81-3) 
 
[...] “the success of the joint venture itself - i.e., its survival, duration, growth and profits [...]”; “The 
outcomes of alliances [between rival firms] can be analyzed on the basis of three dimensions: (i) the 
evolution of the alliance over time [natural end; extension; premature termination; continuation by one 
partner; takeover]; (ii) the strategic consequences of the alliance for each partner firm [new capability 
acquisition; mutual specialization; one-way skill appropriation; no consequence]; and (iii) the impact of 
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the alliance on the intensity of competition [increased, reduced and no impact on the intensity of 
competition].” (Dussauge and Garrette, 1999: 81, 210) 
 
Note: Emphases added. 
 
Box 2.3 Assessment of specific alliance objectives 
 
[Internalization] “The success metrics of a competitive collaboration is no longer the traditional 
perspective - satisfaction and longevity -, but an alternative perspective - bargaining power and 
competitiveness.” (Hamel, 1991: 101) 
  
[...] “an alliance to establish standards can be measured by: 1. the reduction in the number of competing 
standards and/or system architecture approaches; 2. the acceleration in market development attributed to 
the standards being set; 3. the growth and profitability of coalition members compared with that of 
counterparts outside the coalition; 4. the coalition’s market share and members’ margins.” (Doz and 
Hamel, 1998: 80-1) 
 
Note: Emphases added. 
 
Three main observations can be drawn from the above ways of assessing alliances. First, 
for better capturing the complexity and evolving nature of alliance, any assessment must 
take into consideration a multidimensional and dynamic perspective (Tidd et al., 1997). 
However, the more complex the assessment is, the higher the opportunity costs involved 
and the more difficult it is to access the information. Second, it is complicated in many 
alliances, although very important, to separate the alliance performance from the 
performance of the underlying business. Third, it seems that there is a bias in favour of 
assessing the benefits and potential benefits. The assessments of costs of participating in 
alliances are less visible in the suggestions above.  
 
In the context of technological collaboration, Arnold et al. (1992: 42) say that project 
failure is often easier to identify than success. Project failure happens when: project 
achievements fall substantially below expectations; a collaboration halts prior to 
completion; a collaboration labours along unproductively because all or most participants 
have lost interest, but no one has the courage to call the whole thing off; the opportunity 
costs outweigh the benefits, that is, when the project could have been better performed 
alone, or where the resources involved could have been put to more productive use. 
However, in certain situations the assessment of project failure or success may not be 
straightforward. Tidd et al. (1997: 228) point out that “an apparent failure may result in 
knowledge or experience which may be of future benefit”, and Doz and Hamel (1998: 23) 
emphasise that “some [planned alliances] may not even be meant to succeed. Their purpose 
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is simply to forestall rival alliance negotiations or, in some cases, to catalyze the formation 
of other alliances or competitive developments.” 
 
In summary, the multi-purpose nature of most alliances suggests that success should be 
measured taking a multidimensional perspective, that of the project and of the partners. 
The measurement of performance has to be set against objectives, both the alliance and 
partners’ objectives. Flexibility in assessment is important to capture the evolving nature of 
alliance objectives and unexpected results that can occur in the course of the relationship. 
The results of any alliance are likely to include both planned and unplanned outcomes 
(benefits and costs), and other benefits that may accrue outside the alliance which are 
strategic rather than financial according to Doz and Hamel (1998). In evaluating the 
alliance success one may find, for instance, that there was a technical success but an 
economic failure, or, even when the alliance objectives are attained, some partners may not 
be satisfied. “Collaboration is not necessarily a zero sum game, but it sometimes appears 
this way” (Arnold et al., 1992). The achievement of objectives may be asymmetric. 
 
The empirical research was designed to assess both the degree to which the alliance 
objectives were attained and the partners’ level of satisfaction. It analyses both the 
technical and economic success of alliances. The level of analysis and type of indicators 
used were conditioned by the research conditions, namely time, financial resources and 
timing to collect data from a relatively large sample of firms. The study attempts also to 
understand the type of benefits achieved by firms, related or not to the alliance objectives, 
the relative financial effort of firms to participate in the research project, and the 
opportunity costs involved.    
 
2.3.2 Prior empirical research on alliance performance 
 
Prior research on alliance performance dates back to the early 1970s. Over this three-
decade period, at least two different streams of research can be observed. The first stream 
refers to the study of joint venture performance, which has been undertaken over the whole 
period, however with less visibility during the 1990s. The JV structure has been one of the 
most preferred inter-organisational forms of cooperation used by firms, in particular before 
the 1980s (Jones and Shill, 1993), but also in the 1990s. The creation of a separate 
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organisation6 favours the research because it is substantially easier to track down than other 
types of alliance. It also offers the advantage of enhanced comparability and thus more 
homogeneity in the sample (Park and Russo, 1996).  
 
Since the mid-1980s, a second stream of research has developed and is characterised by the 
study of a larger number of inter-firm relationship types. Alliances, strategic alliances or 
cooperative agreements are some of the designations authors have used to refer to a number 
of different inter-organisational forms of cooperation, including JVs. This is a consequence 
of the cooperation phenomenon that started in the late 1970s7. Diversity of forms and 
higher flexibility compared to alternative strategies made it possible to use cooperation by 
large and small firms, extending cooperation to a large number of sectors and activities. 
However, such diversity of alliance structures and purposes has significantly complicated 
the assessment task. 
 
Box 2.4 contains the overall findings of previous empirical studies on alliance 
performance. Table A2.1 in Appendix 2 contains technical information on these studies, 
including the type of alliances analysed, sample size, period under analysis, sectors, firm 
size, country of origin, performance indicators used and data collection method. 
 
Box 2.4 Previous studies on alliance performance - findings 
 
“There is some evidence that profitability of joint ventures varies inversely with the size of the foreign 
partner.”; [...] “the evidence indicates that higher levels of return were obtained from joint venture 
investments by U.K. firms with a more relaxed attitude toward control.”; “Once past the stage of 
commitment of funds and resources, the actual rate of return on the joint venture type of overseas 
investment has limited validity for evaluating performance.” (Tomlinson, 1970: 90, 147, 174) 
 
“American multinational firms’ willingness to tolerate joint-venture partners’ influence varies with 
explicit elements of their strategies and organizational implementation of those strategies.” (Franko, 1971: 
195) 
 
“The overwhelming fact present in this chapter is that shared management joint ventures have a 
dramatically higher failure rate than dominant parent ventures.” (Killing, 1983: 28) 
 
[...] “ventures last longer between partners of similar cultures, asset sizes, and venturing experience levels. 
[Ventures] last longer when their activities are related (in products, markets and/or technologies) [and] it 
appears that partner's traits and sponsor-venture relationship traits do not offer much explanatory power in 
                                                 
6
 It is widely accepted that a joint venture occurs when two or more firms pool a portion of their resources to 
create a new, separate organisation. 
7
 See, for instance, Harrigan (1986), Porter and Fuller (1986) and Hagedoorn (1990), for some figures on the 
number of alliances formed per year. 
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models of venture survival, duration, and success.” (Harrigan, 1988: 225) 
 
[...] “joint ventures between partners who have other long-term relationships are more stable.”; “Clearly, 
termination is not synonymous with failure or poor financial performance.”; “Ventures including research 
and development in R&D intensive industries tend less to be dissolved than other ventures. [...] 
Reciprocity in the potential to reward and penalize behavior among transacting parties is fundamental to 
the achievement of long-term cooperation.” (Kogut, 1989: 184-197) 
 
“Correlations were generally positive and significant between subjective and objective measures of IJV 
performance.” (Geringer and Hebert, 1991: 256) 
 
“It is appropriate to conclude that mode of ownership is associated with the behavior and performance of 
overseas subsidiaries in a fairly measurable and predictable way.” (Chowdhury, 1992: 129-0) 
 
[...] “the expected durability of a cooperative relationship tends to be positively associated with favorable 
net spillover effects, greater relative profitability, and higher overall alliance performance assessment.”; 
“[... ] the perception of opportunistic behavior has a significant, negative effect on alliance performance.” 
(Parkhe, 1993: 814-6) 
 
[...] “semistructured projects achieve better economic performance than unstructured co-production 
projects. [...] The technical quality variable was not found to have a significant influence on 
performance.” (Dussauge and Garrette, 1995: 523) 
 
“This study concluded that the objective conditions such as company’s size and its competitive 
environment do not have direct influence on the effectiveness of the alliance. On the other hand, the 
support, attitude and recognization of the alliance are the key factors towards building an effective, strong 
and successful alliance.” (Yuan and Wang, 1995: 785) 
 
[...] “cooperating with competitors is risky business. [...] Our results support the notion that while the joint 
venture, a hybrid form of governance, does indeed fail for reasons that are a hybrid of both arms-length 
and internal governance, those hazards corresponding to arms-length contracting appear to be the 
dominant predictors of failure.” (Park and Russo, 1996: 887-8) 
 
[...] “IJV termination is predominantly effected by ownership reallocations between existing parent firms 
[...] venture termination is often asymmetric, or parent-specific, phenomenon in the sense that one firm 
typically expands its resource commitment to the business while a partner simultaneously reduces its stake 
in the business.” (Reuer, 1997: 7) 
 
“Findings suggest that although initial satisfaction may be explained by relationship characteristics, 
including prior relationship with a partner and similarities between partners, a combination of partner and 
relationship characteristics offers the stronger explanation of sustained alliance success.” (Saxton, 1997: 
457) 
 
“Of the objective performance measures identified, survival was found to have the strongest and most 
significant set of correlations with overall subjective performance measures and perceptions of the extent 
to which the alliance had performed, relative to expectations across a range of individual dimensions. In 
comparison, the objective performance measures of duration and stability (in EJVs) were, in general, 
weak and non-significant.” (Glaister and Buckley, 1998: 111) 
 
 
Prior empirical research on alliance performance can be featured according to two different 
approaches. A first group of studies, which “have set the pace and been influential in the 
literature” (George and Farris, 1999), considered partner characteristics (e.g., partner 
influence, asymmetry, size.) as the causal variables of performance and examined alliance 
performance based on ex post facto measures (e.g., survival, longevity, managerial 
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perceptions, profitability). Unlike those studies, some recent works take a different 
approach by concentrating not on the overall success itself but on factors that can explain 
differences in alliance performance or differences in performance of different alliance 
structures. 
 
2.3.2.1 Perceptual measures 
 
The issue of alliance success (and failure) is likely to be one of those of most concern to 
researchers, but the various problems associated with its assessment have been rather 
discouraging. An approach that overcomes some of the problems consists in analysing the 
performance of alliances based on the partners’ own assessment (i.e., perceptual measures). 
Several studies have followed this line of research, however with some differences among 
them.  
 
Killing (1983) utilised the JV manager’s own perception to assess the performance of joint 
ventures and concluded that dominant parent ventures have better performance 
assessments. In a similar fashion, Harrigan’s (1988) concept of success is based on the 
sponsor’s opinion, with an alliance being successful when all sponsors regard it as a 
success (see Table 2.2 for some figures). Harrigan demonstrated that partner asymmetries 
were detrimental to the success of the cooperative venture. On the contrary, if partners had 
similar culture, size and venturing experience and related activities, their venture had better 
chances to last longer.    
 
Geringer and Hebert (1991) compared a range of objective performance measures (IJV8 
survival, stability and duration) with a subjective performance measure (parents’ 
satisfaction) and found out that the two types of measures are positively and significantly 
correlated with each other. Saxton (1997) also used partner’s opinion to measure alliance 
performance, not to determine the alliance success rate, but as a means of better 
understanding the contribution of certain factors in explaining it. Yuan and Wang (1995) 
assessed the alliance effectiveness using partners’ subjective judgements, and Glaister and 
Buckley (1998) attempted to replicate Geringer and Hebert’s (1991) work and extend their 
                                                 
8
 International Joint Ventures. 
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analysis to other alliance structures than IJVs. In their study on the impacts in Finland of 
the EU’s Fourth Framework Programme for Research and Development, Luukkonen and 
Hälikkä (2000) asked firms “to estimate the success of the project”, concluding that project 
success was only very weakly related to the type of network (i.e vertical, horizontal...). 
Larédo (1998) says that SME networks (EU collaborative projects) were those with far the 
highest degree of perceived failures, as judged by the respondents themselves. 
 
Table 2.2 Partners’ own assessment of alliance performance 
Type of alliance Sample size Successful Partly 
successful 
Unsuccessful Satisfaction (%) 
  
n 
 
% 
 
n 
 
% 
 
n 
 
% 
 
n 
 
% 
 
Poor 
Satis-
factory 
 
Good 
Joint ventures (a) 
  Dominant parent 
  Shared mgmt 
  Independent 
37 
13 
20 
4 
100 
35.1 
54.1 
10.8 
      36 
23 
55 
25 
22 
23 
20 
0 
42 
54 
25 
75 
Strat. alliances (b) 
  Total 
  Ongoing 
  Not ongoing 
 
895 
 
 
100 
45.2 
54.8 
  
45.3 
59.3 
    
 
 
66.7 * 
   
Networks (c) (**) 
  All firms 
  Large firms 
  Small firms 
 
275 
164 
111 
 
100 
60 
40 
 
150 
92 
58 
 
55 
56 
52 
 
111 
67 
44 
 
40 
41 
40 
 
8 
2 
6 
 
3 
1 
5 
   
Notes: (*) Considered unsuccessful at least by one of the sponsors. (**) Percentages do not total 100% 
because there were some missing observations not included here. 
Sources: (a) Killing (1983); (b) Harrigan (1988); (c) Luukkonen and Hälikkä (2000). 
 
The advantage of this process (i.e. perceptual measures) is its ability to provide information 
regarding the extent to which the alliance has achieved its overall objectives (Geringer and 
Hebert, 1991), the partners’ objectives or their level of satisfaction, even when the alliance 
objectives are not fully attained. However, Dussauge and Garrette (1995: 521) have a 
somewhat different understanding. They say that this method is not adequate in the context 
of their study because “managers’ opinions may be good indicators of the quality of inter-
partner relationships but are probably not reliable when assessing the objective quality and 
success of products they have contributed to develop, produce and market.”  To overcome 
this problem, they assessed the success of the production projects by relying on the 
judgement of industry analysts and aerospace and defence company executives from 
different countries. Company executives were asked to evaluate all the projects and not 
only the alliances in which their company had been involved. 
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Perceptual measures, although subjective, are widely used and accepted as a relatively 
efficient means to assess alliance success because they are based on the partners’ own 
assessment, who are regarded as better positioned to compare the achievements against 
initial expectations. The empirical part of this thesis relies heavily on perceptual measures 
of performance. Executives were asked to assess both the degree to which the project 
objectives were attained and the firm’s level of satisfaction with the alliance performance. 
 
2.3.2.2 Alliance instability 
 
The study of alliance instability has been another line of research pursued by researchers to 
assess the performance of alliances. Several definitions of instability have been used, in 
particular in the joint ventures literature, and the issue is still under discussion (Kogut, 
1988b; Beamish and Inkpen, 1995; Inkpen and Beamish, 1997)9. Basically, instability of 
alliances refers to major changes occurred in its ownership (e.g., changes in partners’ 
equity stakes) and its termination modes. Table 2.3 summarises the findings of a number of 
studies and illustrates different ways of examining alliance termination modes. 
 
Some authors define alliance failure by analysing the termination modes. Killing (1983) 
considered as failure all the JVs that disappeared through liquidation or suffered a major 
reorganization (new product line, new executives) because of poor performance. According 
to his definition, 31% of all JVs analysed failed, and shared management JV registered the 
highest failure rate. Park and Russo (1996) looked at the rate of failure of JVs with no fixed 
duration and considered as failure only dissolutions and the venture’s sale to a third party. 
Acquisition of the venture from one of the partners was not considered a failure. They 
observed a 27.5% failure rate. 
 
Changes in ownership (in the case of JVs) and alliance termination modes alone do not 
provide sufficient information to allow a robust answer about alliance performance, about 
the partners’ levels of satisfaction, and whether or not the alliance objectives have been 
fulfilled. However, that information in conjunction with other indicators helps to 
                                                 
9
 Kogut (1988b: 328-9) clarifies: “several authors have defined instability in terms of attitudinal data; others 
have looked at the dissolution of the venture; and still others have looked at dissolution, acquisition, or any 
change in ownership.” See these references for further discussion on IJV instability. 
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understand alliance performance. In the case of JVs, the alliance structure where this kind 
of analysis is easier to conduct, common assets need a destiny at the end of the relationship. 
Bleeke and Ernst (1995: 97) affirm that 80% of joint ventures ultimately end in a sale by 
one of the partners. The assessment of alliance performance based on alliance instability 
must be done with caution in order to avoid confusing performance with a means of ending 
a relationship. 
 
Table 2.3 Alliance termination modes 
Alliances (a) Foreign-affiliated company (FAC) (b)  
Alliance outcomes: n % FAC failures (*) - termination mode: n % 
  Acquired by a partner 
  Acquired by a third party 
  Dissolved 
Sample size 
14 
1 
3 
18 
78 
5 
17 
100 
  Sold out to Japanese partner 
  Acquired by FAC 
  Liquidated 
Sample size 
114 
12 
44 
170 
67 
7 
26 
100 
Strategic alliances (c) International joint ventures (d)  
Alliance outcomes: n % IJV termination mode: n % 
  Ongoing alliances 
  Natural end 
  Extension 
  Premature termination 
  Continuation by one partner 
  Takeover 
Sample size 
61 
18 
45 
32 
27 
14 
197 
31 
9 
23 
16 
14 
7 
100 
  Focal firm (**) acquires IJV 
  Focal firm sells out to partners 
  Focal firm sells its equity stake to third party 
  Focal firm and partners sell IJV to third party 
  Focal firm and partners liquidates IJV’s assets 
Sample size 
93 
135 
11 
8 
25 
272 
34.2 
49.4 
4.0 
2.9 
9.2 
100 
Notes: (*) No definition provided for alliance failure; presumably it includes the three termination modes. 
(**) Focal firm refers to a US-based firm.  
Sources: (a) Bleeke and Ernst (1993b); (b) Jones and Still (1993); (c) Dussauge and Garrette (1997, 1999); 
(d) Reuer (1997). 
 
In the context of EU-sponsored collaborative programmes like those discussed in this 
thesis, changes in ownership and most of the termination modes are not appropriate to 
assessing alliance performance. Only three modes appear to be of relevance: alliance 
cancellation by the EU, premature termination (partners’ decision), and natural end. The 
fact that the CRAFT R&D projects have pre-defined goals and can last no longer than two 
years, natural end is a fact that does not say much about their success or failure. However, 
in cases where the projects cannot be fully accomplished within the time available (see the 
section below), the “natural end” of alliances becomes important and allows one to 
question the project structure and its goals, the set limit of time imposed on the projects by 
the sponsor, or both.  
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2.3.2.3 Duration, termination and mortality rates of alliances 
 
How long should an alliance last to be successful? The study of alliance duration, chiefly 
JV duration, has been another way of assessing alliance performance, with Harrigan’s 
(1988) study being probably the most exhaustive ever done (see Table 2.4 for some 
figures). This question is still under discussion given the lack of consensus about the 
minimum duration that an alliance should last for. Some authors think of alliances only as 
long-term relationships, while others deem it inadequate to restrict the definition according 
to its duration.10 
 
Table 2.4 Alliance duration and termination rates 
Venture duration (a) Number of years 
Strategic alliances (n = 895) 3.5 < = 1 > 4 < = 10 > = 20 
Percentage of ventures Average 6.6 42 36.1 1.1 
 
Exit rate; Longevity (b) Entry periods 
International joint ventures 1951-
1960 
1956-
1965 
1961-
1970 
1966-
1975 
1961-
1975 
1956-
1975 
1951-
1975 
1971-
1975 
Exit 
cases 
Exit Rate (*) by entry periods (%) 
Longevity by entry periods (in years) 
24.15 
10.56 
27.05 
7.61 
20.18 
5.51 
23.52 
3.82 
25.28 
5.22 
24.44 
6.24 
26.73 
6.68 
14.66  
9.33 
 
Mortality rates (c) Years 
Joint ventures (n = 148) 1 2 3 4 5 6 > 6 
All JVs terminated (%) (**) 
   Dissolved (%) 
   Acquired (%) 
4.7 
3.4 
1.3 
9.3 
5.0 
4.3 
8.1 
2.4 
5.7 
8.7 
2.9 
5.8 
14.7 
12.0 
2.4 
14.8 
8.2 
6.6 
20.9 
11.6 
9.3 
Note: (*) Include sale, liquidation, confiscation/expropriation and legal reorganisation. (**) As percentage of 
those at risk. 
Sources: (a) Harrigan (1988); (b) Chowdhury (1992); (c) Kogut (1988a).  
 
Some studies have understood alliance success as a long-lasting partnership and thought of 
failure as an untimely end (e.g., Dymsza, 1988). In other studies, alliance duration11 and 
survival have been treated as objective performance measures. For instance, Geringer and 
Hebert (1991) found that “IJVs perceived by their parents as performing more successfully 
were more likely to remain in operation than those IJVs that were evaluated as being less 
successful. Successful IJVs also tended to remain in operation for a longer period of time, a 
correlation which received support from data on the IJV duration measure.”  
                                                 
10
 See Table 2.1 and the discussion on this point above. 
11
 Duration is normally measured based on the number of years between the alliance formation and either its 
termination or the time of data collection. This method may generate a bias in the results since different 
alliance statuses are analysed simultaneously. 
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Assessing the success or failure of a partnership according to its longevity is a common 
mistake when evaluating strategic alliances (Hamel et al., 1989), because alliance 
termination gives us very limited information about the performance per se (Gulati, 1998). 
Gulati provides two reasons: first, studying failure by looking at termination fails to 
distinguish between natural and untimely deaths; second, studies of alliance termination 
and alliance failure implicitly consider performance as an either/or condition. Harrigan 
(1988: 207) emphasises that “if exit barriers are high, successful strategic alliances are not 
necessarily indicated by long-lived ventures, and short-lived ventures can be judged as 
success from both sponsors’ perspectives if they have achieved their strategic purpose.” 
Furthermore, if alliances are designed with a finite goal or set of tasks in mind, for example 
to develop a specific product, success might imply termination (Lorange and Roos, 1992; 
Park and Russo, 1996). That is the case of the alliances under CRAFT, as mentioned 
above. 
 
2.3.2.4 Financial performance of alliances 
 
Another approach to study alliance performance has been the analysis of its profitability. 
Tomlinson (1970) examined the return on investment of 39 joint ventures (U.K. partners) 
according to the reasons for selecting a specific partner and the size of the parent 
companies (see Table 2.5). He concluded that higher profitability was associated with the 
advantages that had made a past association favourable and with positive contributions of 
the partners to the alliance. His findings also indicate that the profitability figures were 
inversely related to the size of the parent company. 
 
Table 2.5 Profitability of joint ventures 
Size of parent company 
(Value of parent assets or sales - $ millions) 
Reasons for selecting a specific associate 
 n % ROI *  n % ROI * 
 Small (<51) 
 Medium (51-100) 
 Large (101-500) 
 Very large (>500) 
Sample size / Average ROI 
8 
8 
15 
8 
39 
21.25 
19.75 
11.1 
12.5 
15.3 
 Favourable past association 
 Convenience of facilities or resources 
 Status / identity 
 Forced choices 
Sample size / Average ROI 
13 
15 
9 
2 
39 
18.5 
15.7 
11.8 
6.6 
15.3 
Note: (*) Return on investment (weighted average) before U.K. taxes. 
Source: Tomlinson (1970). 
 
Bleeke and Ernst (1993b) considered an alliance successful if both partners achieved their 
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in-going strategic objectives and both recovered their financial costs of capital. The 
assessment of the success, summarised in Table 2.6, was based on market share, sales 
volume, new product development, and other criteria specific to the alliance.  
 
Table 2.6 Alliance success rates 
Type of alliance Sample Successful Unsuccessful Mixed results 
 n % n % n % n % 
Cross-border alliances    49 100 25 51 16 33 8 16 
Source: Bleeke & Ernst (1993b). 
 
Is financial performance a good measure of alliance performance? The sole use of financial 
indicators to assess alliance performance seems not to be enough to support a complete 
answer. It appears that the relevance of achieving poor or good financial results is chiefly 
connected with the objectives of the alliance and does not have any particular importance 
when analysed out of that context. Financial performance may fail to adequately reflect the 
extent that an alliance achieved its objectives, especially those that are not financial in 
nature (Anderson, 1990). Geringer (1989: 246) affirm that “Despite poor financial results, 
liquidation, or instability, an IJV may nevertheless have attained the objectives of its 
parents - for example, of transferring a technology - and thus be considered ‘successful’ by 
one or all of the parents. Likewise, IJVs may be viewed as ‘unsuccessful’, despite 
achieving good financial results or continued stability in ownership or governance 
structures.” 
 
When risk and uncertainty are high, profitability by itself is a poor measure of the joint 
venture’s value (or, for that matter, any business’s value) (Anderson, 1990). And 
considering that many alliances are really options (they allow a parent to maintain a 
doorway into a market or a technology), financial measures are not adequate to measure 
alliance performance. As Doz and Hamel (1998) emphasise, financial indicators are able to 
capture neither the strategic benefits achieved nor the opportunities foreclosed due to the 
alliance, therefore reducing substantially their explanatory power. Costs and profitability 
can rarely be used as performance indicators for reasons of data availability (Dussauge and 
Garrette 1995: 521). 
 
The use of financial measures to assess the alliance performance falls, with perhaps some 
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exceptions, in the sphere of firm/business performance. The case of R&D alliances is 
illustrative. Their financial returns occur when the new knowledge acquired is used in the 
production of goods and services (or sold to others, e.g. licensing). Assessing the financial 
performance of alliances requires generally the assessment of their impact on firm 
performance, the object of analysis below.  
 
2.3.2.5 Factors affecting alliance performance 
 
There is a strong theoretical body of knowledge on both the partner and relationship 
characteristics that identifies the relevant factors that affect the alliance behaviour and 
outcomes. There has been, however, a lack of empirical attention regarding the impact of 
those factors on alliance performance (Dussauge and Garrette, 1995; Saxton, 1997). Only a 
few studies have attempted to assess how the partner and alliance characteristics may affect 
alliance performance.    
 
Saxton (1997) examined factors that may affect alliance performance by interacting 
simultaneously with both the partner and relationship characteristics, analysing them in a 
separate and combined manner. Reputation12 was the partner characteristic examined, 
using a multidimensional construct (product quality, management and financial 
performance). The relationship characteristics included prior affiliation, i.e., prior market 
contact (e.g., customer, alliance partner), shared decision-making and similarities between 
partners (e.g., marketing, culture, technology). The alliance outcomes, i.e., the partner 
subjective performance assessment, were a function of reputation, similarity scale and prior 
relationship. “Findings support a positive relationship between partner firms’ benefits from 
alliance participation and partner reputation, shared decision making, and strategic 
similarities between partners” (Saxton, 1997: 443). His findings also demonstrate that a 
model including both partner and relationship characteristics can better explain the benefits 
from an alliance than can one incorporating either set of variables alone. Also interesting is 
the finding that some similarities between partners, such as culture and human resources, 
were negatively related to alliance outcomes. This is surprising since it contradicts the 
accepted idea that different cultures have a potentially negative effect on alliance 
                                                 
12
 Reputation was operationally defined as the perceptions of the representative of a respondent firm of its 
partner’s characteristics. 
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performance. 
 
Dussauge and Garrette (1995) developed a taxonomy of collaboration - semistructured and 
unstructured co-production projects13 - to overcome the difficulty of comparing the 
performance of projects with different structure types. They note, “as both semistructured 
and unstructured projects lead to the production of a particular product, their performance 
can be measured on the basis of the product’s success, and thus compared” (p. 519). 
Respondents were asked to evaluate each project according to three different criteria, 
which in turn have been used as the success measure: technical quality and economic 
success (commercial success + financial results). They found that semistructured projects 
achieved better economic performance than unstructured ones and that the technical quality 
variable appears not to have a significant influence on performance, which they believe is 
due to the fact that alliance type and technical quality are not independent variables. 
 
The study attempts to understand how the partners and alliance characteristics affected the 
performance of alliances by analysing the initial conditions leading to their formation and 
assessing the extent to which a set of factors had negatively influenced the achievement of 
better results.  
 
As we have seen, there are several ways of analysing alliance performance and past 
empirical studies have produced much valuable information. The construction of a general 
framework for the assessment of alliances, however, has proven to be very complex, given 
the number of alliance structures, their multiplicity of objectives, and the relative 
usefulness of each assessment indicator, making virtually each alliance different from all 
the others. Lorange and Roos (1992: 42) argue that it is practically impossible to give a 
prescription for performance assessment that is valid for all cases. Prior research has 
demonstrated that the use of single assessment measures cannot capture the whole 
phenomenon. Optimally, the alliance assessment should be based on a multiplicity of 
subjective and objective indicators for better capturing the multidimensional nature of 
alliances. 
                                                 
13
 Semistructured projects are cooperative programmes in which development and manufacturing tasks are 
distributed among the allied firms, but marketing, sales and after-sales are carried out by a separate joint 
venture. Unstructured projects are characterised by the fact that all tasks (R&D, manufacturing and 
marketing) are distributed to the various partner firms and carried out separately by them. 
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Several studies reported relatively high alliance failure rates and in many alliances the 
results were mixed, with some partners satisfied and others not so satisfied.14 Although 
these results are very important as an indication of the alliance success rate, previous 
research does not cover the whole spectrum of alliance structures, thus considering such 
results a basis for generalisation might be misleading. Besides that, any comparability of 
the results has to be carefully made since the period of time of each study is different. 
Furthermore, and perhaps more important, a great deal of alliances set up in the 1990s are 
not covered by those studies, consequently they cannot assess how much firms have 
learned from past experience and the knowledge about alliances produced so far.  
 
2.4 PERFORMANCE OF FIRMS THROUGH ALLIANCES 
 
2.4.1 On the notion of organisational performance 
 
Defining “organisational performance” can be very difficult indeed and its measurement a 
rather complex task. The type and number of performance indicators varies from study to 
study according to authors’ preferences, their backgrounds and availability of information, 
thus influencing the underlying definitions. As Cameron (1986: 541) says, there is a 
generally accepted point that “consensus regarding the best, or sufficient, set of indicators 
of effectiveness is impossible to obtain. Criteria are based on the values and preference of 
individuals, and no specifiable construct boundaries exist.” To Cameron, the basic 
problems surrounding organisational effectiveness are not theoretical problems but criteria 
problems. However, in choosing an arbitrary set of indicators, researchers may only 
describe partially the many aspects that are likely to influence organisational performance. 
Not every indicator is appropriate to assess organisational performance of every firm. For 
instance, Woiceshyn and Hartel (1996) examined the performance of Canadian 
biotechnology firms and stressed that “traditional performance measures such as profits 
could not have been used to capture value-added progress as only a few of these firms were 
profitable yet” (p. 234). They argue the same way to reject the use of sales as the 
comparison indicator. 
                                                 
14
 Based on an extensive literature review, Duysters et al. (1999: 345) conclude that the percentage of 
strategic alliances that fail should be about 50-60%, which is a rate between the “optimistic and pessimistic 
conclusions of different authors.” 
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Gathering the relevant data to assess firm performance represents a serious research 
obstacle even in the case of using traditional quantitative financial indicators, because 
some refinement is needed to overcome possible interpretation bias given the indicators’ 
insufficiencies. The use of qualitative indicators adds subjectivity and complexity to the 
analysis and reduces the possibility of performance comparisons of firms belonging to 
different sectors. Besides the problems in accessing the information, two methodological 
aspects are of relevance. The first involves the distinction between determinants and 
indicators of performance and the second has to do with the selection of the performance 
indicators. 
 
2.4.1.1 Determinants and indicators of performance  
 
One problem associated with performance measurement relates to the lack of clarity about 
the difference between an “indicator” of performance and a “determinant” of performance. 
It is not possible to make general statements about whether a variable is of one type or the 
other because what is a determinant variable in one context may be an indicator variable in 
another context (Lewin and Minton, 1986). Two examples reflect this: “One study [...] may 
use group cohesion as an indicator of effectiveness while another may treat it as a 
predictor” (Cameron, 1986: 543); “Employee satisfaction is often used as an indicator of 
high performance organization (an output), but others classify satisfaction as a cause of 
performance (an input), and still others ignore satisfaction altogether on the grounds that it 
is neither indicator nor determinant” (Anderson, 1990: 21). 
 
Anderson (1990: 22) believes that theory and practice seem to converge on a ‘package’ 
approach, in which inputs [determinants of performance] and outputs [indicators of 
performance] are weighed to arrive at a composite index of effectiveness, which is then 
used to allocate resources. Anderson suggests a method to assess the performance of a joint 
venture15 called “The Input-Output Continuum” (see Figure 2.1). “At the output extreme 
are the ‘results’ measures that most people use to assess current performance: these are 
financial measures, of which profitability is the most commonly used. At the input extreme 
are indicators of states (e.g., high morale, coordinated action). The input extreme represents 
                                                 
15
 Anderson argues that joint ventures should be evaluated primarily as stand-alone entities seeking to 
maximise their own performance, not the parents’. 
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variables that should determine (create) measurable results. Inputs represent what the 
organisation is doing (e.g., using resources) and how it is struggling to achieve eventual 
results (outputs) (pp. 22-3).” Inputs are not themselves measures of firm’s goals, however 
they are indicators of the firm’s health and viability and they are likely to influence the 
output measures. Therefore, input measures should be considered as assessing longer-term 
effectiveness.  
 
Figure 2.1 The Input-Output Continuum for a Joint Venture 
 
INPUT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OUTPUT 
“Performance” or 
“Payoff” 
 
 
 
  The State of the Venture Organization 
   Harmony among partners 
   Morale 
   Productivity 
   Financial resource indicators 
   Adaptiveness 
   Innovativeness 
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   Unfamiliar market 
   Unfamiliar technology 
 
  Marketing Intermediate Variables 
   Relative product quality 
   Relative price 
 
  Marketing Measures of Performance 
   Market share 
   Customer satisfaction 
 
  Financial Measures of Performance 
   Profit rate 
   Cash flow 
 
 
 
 
 
Longer-Term 
Orientation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Shorter-Term 
orientation 
Source: Anderson (1990: 22, Figure 1) 
 
The present thesis borrows some ideas from Anderson (1990). The direct and indirect 
benefits firms achieve with the alliance are here interpreted as determinants of 
performance; that is, inputs such as new technology, a prototype, new knowledge about 
competitors or experience in cooperation which are expected to affect the firm’s outputs 
(assessed in terms of performance indicators). Linking inputs to outputs may prove to be a 
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rather difficult exercise in many situations. The inputs enhance the knowledge base of 
firms and are likely to have a lasting effect on performance. 
 
2.4.1.2 Performance indicators 
 
Financial measures16 are the performance indicators widely used to assess firm 
performance, typically including indicators such as Profit, Cash Flow and their derivatives. 
These are the traditional indicators utilised in evaluating and comparing firm’s 
performance, and the support for many strategic decisions. This is not surprising since the 
accounting systems have been evolving for a long period of time and are the most 
sophisticated measurement systems in providing information to firm managers. However, it 
is becoming apparent that financial measures of performance alone are being increasingly 
recognised by businesses as inadequate for the control of organisations (Stainer, 1999). 
Such measurements can provide useful information to managers in identifying the sources 
of their problems or the reasons for their success, but they do not provide the kind of 
information needed by companies that seek to create a competitive advantage (Hayes et al., 
1995). Eccles (1991) argues convincingly about the insufficiencies of these performance 
indicators, stressing that there must be a shift from treating them as the foundation for 
performance management to treating them as one among a broader set of measures.17  
 
Such limitations suggest that other performance indicators should be considered in 
assessing organisational performance. However, the reality takes time to change. Anderson 
(1990: 22) points out that “corporate managers, while they profess to weigh many factors in 
assessing performance, often simplify the job by giving a very high weight to one factor; 
from habit, sheer profitability is likely to be that factor.” Even when managers include 
other non-financial measures (e.g. quality, market share) in their set of performance 
indicators, they hardly give them an equal status in determining firm’s strategy and in case 
of conflict, financial considerations prevail over any others (Eccles, 1991). 
                                                 
16
 See also the section above concerning the use of financial measures to assess the alliance performance. 
17
 The limitations of the financial measures found in the literature include: failure to provide information to 
support essential investments in new technologies and markets for future successful performance; scope for 
accounting manipulations; differences in methods of consolidating accounts and lack of international 
standardisation of accounting conventions; they are better at measuring the consequences of yesterday’s 
decisions than they are at indicating tomorrow’s performance; they do not explain by themselves the 
underlying causes of their variability; they are not enough to distinguish excellent from ordinary firms.  
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The new competitive reality demands a different measurement system that should take into 
account firm’s objectives and characteristics and be able to provide accurate information 
about the capabilities that are key to a company’s future success. Eccles (1991) identifies a 
number of non-financial performance indicators firms may use along with the financial 
ones, including product and service quality, customer satisfaction, innovation, market share 
and human resources, complemented with a competitive benchmarking strategy. This new 
approach to measure firm performance requires the development of new information 
systems within organisations and a new attitude of managers (and investors) to be effective.  
 
The thesis aims to establish a link between a specific investment decision – the R&D 
alliance – and firm performance; it aims to assess the variation on a range of performance 
indicators, including both financial and non-financial indicators, as the result of alliance 
participation. Most of the insufficiencies of financial measures do not apply in this context 
because there are no intentions of assessing the whole performance of firms or making 
sectoral or intersectoral performance comparisons. The fact that the assessment is based on 
the interviewees’ perceptions avoids the difficulties of collecting the information, but adds 
subjectivity to the analysis. 
 
2.4.2 Previous empirical research on firm performance through alliances 
 
Research on the impact of alliance outcomes on firm performance is a rather recent issue 
despite its unquestionable importance for firms, policy-makers, academics and theorising 
about alliances. Earlier empirical studies can be divided into four different categories (see 
Table 2.7): event studies of stock-market reaction to the alliance formation announcements; 
longitudinal studies that examine the importance of alliances for firm survival; statistical 
studies that explore the relationship between alliance intensity and firm performance; and 
studies that focus on the alliance outcomes. Overall, previous works appear to privilege the 
analysis of positive consequences for firms from alliance participation. The analysis of the 
costs of participating in alliances (i.e., transaction costs and foreclosed opportunities) or the 
negative impacts on firm performance have not been paid much attention so far.  
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Table 2.7 Previous empirical studies of firm performance through alliances 
Category of studies Examples of studies 
Stock-market reaction to alliance 
formation announcements 
McConnell and Nantell (1985); Woolridge and Snow 
(1990); Koh and Venkatraman (1991) 
Likelihood of firm (business) 
survival 
Singh and Mitchell (1996); Singh (1997); Tripsas 
(1997); De Meyer (1999) 
Alliance intensity and firm 
performance 
Berg, Duncan and Friedman (1982); Hagedoorn and 
Schakenraad (1994); Mowery, Oxley and Silverman 
(1996); Schmitz (1998); Benfratello and Sembenelli 
(2000); Stuart (2000) 
Alliance outcome analysis Beta (1993); BIE (1995); Rosenfeld (1996); Human and 
Provan (1997) 
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
 
Box 2.5 below contains the general findings of previous empirical studies on firm 
performance through alliances. Table A2.2 in Appendix 2 contains technical information 
on these studies. Each study has unique characteristics in terms of type of alliances 
analysed, sectors, size of firms, country of origin and the research methods employed. 
Perhaps more important, the type and number of performance indicators vary considerably 
across studies, illustrating the complexity of studying the impact of alliances on firm 
performance and denoting a non-existent effective means to assess it. This complicates any 
comparison of results, especially when they are contradictory as sometimes happens. 
 
Box 2.5 Previous studies of firm performance through alliances - findings 
 
“The results indicate that the stockholders of companies involved in joint ventures earn statistically 
significant excess returns around the time at which intercorporate joint ventures are announced.” 
(McConnell and Nantell, 1985: 527) 
 
[...] “the stock market responded positively to the announcement of joint venture formation.” (Woolridge 
and Snow, 1990: 358) 
 
“Does the stock market react positively to joint venture formations? [...] such formations have a positive 
and significant impact on the market value of the participating firms, [...] smaller partners benefited more 
from joint venture formation than larger partners.” (Koh and Venkatraman, 1991: 887-8) 
 
“The 176 contractants of the sample received 39.4 MECU (1991). 611 economic effects have been 
measured while in addition about 300 have been identified without being quantified (mainly due to lack of 
information). 413.3 MECU will have been directly generated in the firms at the end of 1993 and 522.5 
MECU at the end of 1995. The corresponding ratios direct effects/EEC funding amount to 10.5 and 13.3 
respectively.” (Beta, 1993: 20) 
 
[...] “generally speaking, the key cooperative arrangement provides improvements to the bulk of firms, 
regardless of industry, size, age, product type and so on.” (BIE, 1995: 169) 
 
“Our research generates no straightforward relations between strategic technology partnering and 
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company performance” [...] “The results indicate that companies attracting technology through their 
alliances and companies concentrating on R&D cooperation have significantly higher rates of profit.” 
(Hagedoorn and Schakenraad, 1994: 300-1) 
 
[...] “international alliances produce less interfirm exchange of technological capabilities” [...] “We find 
that equity joint ventures appear to be more effective conduits for the transfer of complex capabilities than 
are contract-based alliances such as licensing agreements” (Mowery, Oxley and Silverman, 1996: 87-9) 
 
[...] “our findings on outcomes indicate that member firms appear to achieve substantial benefits from 
network involvement.” “Our comparison of network and market firms in the same industry demonstrates 
that interorganizational relationships within purposefully constructed SME networks are unique and that 
network involvement can yield positive results that are not likely for non-network firms.” (Human and 
Provan, 1997: 386, 398) 
 
“As a general empirical outcome, businesses with collaborative agreements will tend to outperform 
businesses that take independent approaches in complex business situations, if managers are at least 
intendedly rational in their approach to interfirm relationships.” (Singh and Mitchell, 1996: 101) 
 
“Without controlling for other factors, the simple cross-tabulation suggests that businesses with alliances 
had higher survival likelihoods than businesses without alliances at each level of technological 
complexity.” “These results provide only partial support for the widely accepted proposition that 
collaboration improves the performance of the allied firms. [...] Alliances are not necessarily valuable for 
all firms or in all circumstances. On the contrary, they may only be beneficial under relatively narrow 
circumstances.” (Singh, 1997: 353, 360) 
 
“One of the main results of the survey is the positive and significant relationship between co-operation 
and performance. Enterprises which increased co-operation improved their performance more than those 
which did not.” (Schmitz, 1998: 47) 
 
“There was evidence of improved construction performance - in some cases greatly improved 
performance - in all the case studies. However, it appears that the benefits of partnering were not 
uniformly spread among all the parties. An improvement in one are sometimes had detrimental spin-off 
effects.” (Barlow et al., 1997: 44) 
 
 
2.4.2.1 Stock-market reaction to alliance formation announcements 
 
Several researchers have studied the stock-market reaction to the alliance formation 
announcements, namely joint ventures, aiming at estimating its influence on market value 
of the parent firms. McConnell and Nantell (1985) analysed stock returns of US companies 
that entered into 136 joint ventures between 1972 and 1979, and found a significant and 
positive impact on the stock market values of the parent firms around the time of the JV 
announcement. Considering that JV formations were motivated by synergies,18 and noting 
the similarity in their findings with those of merger activities, they suggest that both joint 
ventures and mergers are carried out mainly for efficiency reasons. However, their findings 
                                                 
18
 Synergies may take the form of economies of scale, the combining of complementary resources, increased 
market power, improved production techniques, improved marketing and product distribution opportunities, 
and so on. 
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did not provide sufficient information to determine which economic factors explain the 
substantial wealth increases associated with mergers and joint ventures. 
 
Woolridge and Snow (1990) examined the stock-market reaction to announcements of 
corporate strategic investment decisions. They found that the stock-market reacted 
positively to the announcement of JV formations, one of the strategic investments 
analysed. Furthermore, their findings suggest that the stock-market appears to favour 
investments in R&D and joint ventures over those in product/market diversification and 
capital expenditures. Koh and Venkatraman (1991) did a similar analysis for the 
information technology sector, obtaining a positive relationship between the two as well. 
They also noted better results when partners’ activities were in similar sectors. 
 
Despite the likely interest of such an association, one can hardly draw any strong 
conclusion about the relationship between alliances and firm performance, because all the 
studies examined the stock-market reaction to JV formation announcements instead of the 
outcomes of those corporate strategies, which would be more appropriate for that purpose. 
That these intended strategies may never become true or they may be modified during 
implementation (Woolridge and Snow, 1990) weakens any possible inference.   
 
2.4.2.2 Alliances and firm (business) survival 
 
The studies included in this category took firm (business) survival as a proxy for firm 
performance and looked at the importance of firms’ participation in alliances for the 
likelihood of their survival. 
 
Based on data for the U.S. hospital software systems industry, Singh (1997) investigated 
the impact of technological complexity on business survival19 and how alliances mediate 
this relationship. He has demonstrated that technological complexity is a significant 
influence on the likelihood of business survival and the risk of failure correlates positively 
with the complexity of the technology that a business develops. The simple cross-
                                                 
19
 “A complex technology is defined [...] as an applied system whose components have multiple interactions 
and constitute a nondecomposable whole” (Singh, 1997: 340). Survival was measured as a firm’s 
participation in the industry. Failure was recorded when a business discontinued operations and ceased to 
operate as an entity. 
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tabulation between these two dimensions suggests that businesses with alliances had higher 
survival probabilities than businesses without alliances at each level of technological 
complexity (see Table 2.8), but medium-complexity-technology firms with technology 
alliances had lower risks of failure than other businesses. Non-technology-related alliances 
have no survival benefits for complex-technology-related challenges. 
 
Table 2.8 Cross-tabulation of technological complexity and business failure 
Technological  Businesses 
Complexity All With alliances 
Survived            Failed 
Without alliances 
Survived            Failed 
 n % n % n % n % n % 
High 
Medium 
Low 
Total 
290 
427 
256 
 
29.8 
43.9 
26.3 
 
106 
67 
40 
213 
89.8 
83.8 
80.0 
85.9 
12 
13 
10 
35 
10.2 
16.2 
20.0 
14.1 
111 
201 
132 
444 
64.5 
57.9 
64.1 
67.1 
61 
146 
74 
281 
35.5 
42.1 
35.9 
32.9 
All businesses 973 (100 %) 248 (25.5 %) 725 (74.5 %) 
Note: All percentages sum horizontally, except in the first column, which sum vertically.  
Source: Singh (1997: 356). 
 
Singh’s (1997: 360) findings “provide only partial support for the widely accepted 
proposition that collaboration improves the performance of allied firms.” Singh says 
emphatically that alliances may only be beneficial under relatively narrow circumstances. 
His findings, however, are insufficient for such a wide generalisation. On the other hand, 
they seem to be inconsistent with Singh and Mitchell’s (1996: 112) findings when they 
note “The positive main effects of collaboration are consistent with the argument that 
collaboration provides substantial advantages.” 
 
Singh and Mitchell (1996) have used the same data on U.S. hospital software systems 
industry to investigate the risk of a firm becoming dependent when their partners shut 
down or form new partnerships. They found out that businesses become more likely to shut 
down following the dissolution of a partner if they do not add a new partner themselves or 
when their partners form collaborative relationships with new partners. But, businesses 
with development or marketing relationships were less likely to shut down than other 
businesses (development or marketing collaboration). They did not detect any impact of the 
size of the largest partner on business dissolution. “Simply allying with a large business 
does not help a business avoid dissolution and, conversely, allying with a small business 
does not increase the chance of failure” (Singh and Mitchell, 1996: 111). 
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Tripsas (1997) examined the technological trajectories of three firms of the typesetter 
industry from 1886 to 1990, aiming at understanding what factors make certain incumbents 
systematically better than others at adapting to radical technological change, i.e., what 
differentiates those firms with dynamic capability20. The development of “external 
integrative capability”, i.e., the ability to identify and integrate knowledge from outside the 
boundaries of the firm, was regarded as crucial for attaining dynamic capability. This 
comprises two elements: (i) internal R&D investment that develops absorptive capacity 
(Cohen and Levinthal, 1990); (ii) an external communication infrastructure to facilitate the 
transmission of external knowledge, including both informal mechanisms such as know-
how trading and more formal mechanisms such as strategic alliances or long-term supplier 
relationships. According to Tripsas, this external communication infrastructure must be 
developed over time during periods of incremental technological change in order to be 
effective during radical periods of transition. In the typesetter industry, alliances were a 
means to extend firms’ survival. 
 
De Meyer (1999) analysed five case studies of small hi-tech companies and observed that 
“in most cases these companies chose or were forced to engage in a technology partnership 
in order to develop or survive.” Having the technology, these companies needed capacity 
and entered alliances to get access to complementary assets (Teece, 1986) and to develop 
dominant designs. Many of the alliances in which these five companies were engaged with 
included large organisations, whose main contribution was managerial resources, 
distribution systems, or capital.  
 
2.4.2.3 Alliance intensity and firm performance 
 
This group of studies looked at the relationship between the alliance activity of firms and 
their economic performance (one or several performance indicators) often using statistical 
methods, but without establishing a clear cause-effect link between the two. Berg, Duncan 
and Friedman (1982)21 found a negative relationship between joint venture incidence and 
firms’ profitability in the chemical and mechanical engineering industries. They could not, 
                                                 
20
 “Dynamic capability [is] the capacity of a firm to renew, augment and adapt its core competencies over 
time” (Tripsas, 1997: 342).  
21
 Quoted in Hagedoorn and Schakenraad (1994) and Gulati (1998). 
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however, establish the causal relationship between the two (Gulati, 1998: 309). 
 
Based on the CATI22 database data, Hagedoorn and Schakenraad (1994) investigated to 
what extent the intensity of firms’ strategic technology partnering23 affected the economic 
performance of the companies engaged in such joint efforts. The economic performance 
was measured by the net income to sales ratio or profit rate. They found no straightforward 
relationship between strategic technology partnering and company performance, and no 
generally significant effects of firms’ size on profitability. They say, however, that “for 
European and American process industries there is a positive association between R&D-
driven cooperation and profitability. [...] companies attracting technology through their 
alliances and companies concentrating on R&D cooperation have significant[ly] higher 
rates of profit” (pp. 300-1). It appears that the content and direction of strategic alliances, 
namely R&D alliances, have a greater impact on profitability than the extent and intensity 
of cooperation. Hagedoorn and Schakenraad (1994: 303) conclude by stating, “Apparently 
the crucial relation between strategic technology partnering and profitability of firms is of 
indirect character which can to a large extent be explained by the differentiation of firms 
and sectors with regard to these technological opportunities.” These results leave the 
question of causality unanswered and are not very convincing, in the view of Brockhoff 
and Teichert (1995). 
 
Schmitz (1998) looked at the relationship between firm performance and the intensity of 
cooperation in a footwear cluster industry. Using cooperation and performance indexes, 
Schmitz found a positive relation between the two and concluded that those firms that had 
improved cooperation had improved their performance more than those firms that did not. 
He stresses, however, that this is not evidence of a cause-effect relationship. Benfratello 
and Sembenelli (2000) tested whether participation in EU-sponsored research joint 
ventures (RJVs) had a positive impact on participating firms’ performance. They found that 
firms participating in EUREKA had a significant improvement in productivity and price-
                                                 
22
 The CATI (Cooperative Agreements and Technology Indicators) database is one of the most 
comprehensive existing databases on alliances, which is located at MERIT, University of Limburg. See, for 
instance, Hagedoorn (1990, 1993) for further details. 
23
 The study did not considered the number of firm’s alliances but the number of strategic linkages (dyads). 
For example, a project with three partners, called A, B and C, results in three different dyads - A-B, A-C and 
B-C.    
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cost margin, while firms participating in RJVs under the Framework Programmes did not 
show any significant change in performance. Given the different nature and co-ordination 
structure of EUREKA (near-to-market research projects, proposed and defined by the 
participants) and the Framework Programmes (pre-competitive research projects, co-
ordinated by the European Commission), they suggest that bottom-up, market-oriented 
cooperative research programmes have a more direct impact on firms’ performance than 
the centralised R&D programmes. 
 
Mowery, Oxley and Silverman’s (1996) study focused on the transfer of technological 
capabilities among alliance partners. They examined how collaboration changed the 
relationship between a firm’s technological portfolio and those of its alliance partner(s). 
Their approach to measuring the changes in alliance partners’ technological capabilities is 
based on citation patterns of their patent portfolios. A number of conclusions are drawn 
from their work. First, “there is no consistently positive pattern of interfirm learning in our 
overall alliance sample” (p. 87), the explanation being the presence of both “convergent” 
and “divergent”24 alliances. Second, international alliances (i.e., US firm / non-US firm(s) 
alliances) result in less interfirm knowledge exchange, reflecting their greater logistical and 
cultural complexities. Third, the alliance structure is important. Equity joint ventures 
appear to be more effective for the transfer of technological capabilities than contract-based 
alliances. Unilateral alliances (e.g., licensing) appear to support lower levels of interfirm 
knowledge transfer. Fourth, larger firms absorb fewer capabilities from their alliance 
partners, while relatively R&D intensive firms do not exhibit superior capability absorption 
in alliances.  
 
Stuart’s (2000) study, which examined 1600 dyadic alliances in the semiconductor 
industry, offers evidence to confirm the assumption that strategic alliances can improve 
firm performance. Based on either the firm’s rate of innovation25 or the rates of sales 
growth, Stuart concluded that more important than the number of alliances a firm is 
involved in for the alliance-performance link are the partners’ attributes. “Technology 
alliances with large and innovative partners improved baseline innovators and growth rates, 
                                                 
24
 Divergent alliances - if they enable their members to specialise in different but complementary areas of 
technology. Convergent alliances - partners get increasingly similar capabilities. 
25
 The study used patent citation data to construct innovativeness scores for the sampled firms. 
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but collaborations with small and technologically unsophisticated partners had an 
immaterial effect on performance” (Stuart, 2000: 808). The findings also suggest that 
alliances can be highly advantageous even when they fail to achieve the strategic objectives 
that led to their formation. 
 
2.4.2.4 Alliance outcome analysis 
 
This group of studies takes a totally different approach in analysing the alliance-
performance link. They differ from the preceding because they attempt to identify and 
assess the benefits of alliances for the participating firms, normally based on opinions 
rendered by participants (by means of questionnaire or direct interview), rather than 
making associations between the two using statistical methods. 
 
Beta (1993) is the only study, as far as we know, that attempted to quantify all the benefits 
achieved by firms in currency units. The study, based on a sample of 50 consortia and 176 
firms, who participated in the EURAM, BRITE and BRITE-EURAM I R&D EC-
sponsored programmes, aimed to measure the quantitative economic effects generated by 
the participating firms for their own benefit. The data were gathered through direct 
interviews with all but three of the 176 firms. Two major groups of economic effects were 
evaluated. One group, called direct effects, relates to the attainment of the research project 
objectives. For instance, if the objective was to develop a new product, the sales of this 
product were considered direct effects. The rule was maintained even in the case of more 
fundamental research-oriented projects. Here the direct effects were related to the 
application of new scientific knowledge or the new technologies in the field foreseen at the 
beginning of the project. The other group, called indirect effects, concerns the achievement 
of economic benefits that were not part of the alliance objectives. The indirect effects have 
been broken down into technological, commercial, organisational and method, and work 
factor effects (see Table 2.9). Direct effects and most of the indirect effects have been 
expressed in terms of added value26 generated by sales and cost reductions.  
 
                                                 
26
 “The added value can be defined as the difference between total sales and the sum of the costs of goods and 
services. Added value is made up the sum of labour costs, operating results, and amortization and 
depreciation.” (Beta, 1993: 7) 
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Table 2.9 Assessment of the economic effects - variables and their quantification method 
Type of effects Quantification methods 
Direct effects  (The effects which are directly related to the 
objectives of the research projects, as they were defined at the 
beginning of each of the projects) 
 
Sales/Cost reduction 
Indirect effects (Those which go beyond the scope of the 
objectives of the projects): 
 
• Technological effects (Concern the transfer of technology 
from the project to other activities of the participant): 
 
    - Transfer of product ................................................................
    - Transfer of process ................................................................
    - Transfer of service ................................................................
    - Patents ................................................................................................
 
Sales/New research contracts 
Cost reduction/New research contracts 
Sales/New research contracts 
Cost of establishing and holding the patent (proxy 
value) 
• Commercial effects (Increased economic activities - sales 
of products and services or new research projects - that do not 
incorporate significant technological innovation coming from 
the project itself): 
 
    - Network effect ................................................................
    - Reputation effect ................................................................
Sales/Cost reduction/New research contracts 
Sales/Cost reduction/New research contracts 
• Organization and Method effects (Occur when 
experience gained through the project allows the participant to 
modify its internal organization and/or apply new methods): 
 
    - Project management ................................................................
    - Organisation effects................................................................
 
    - Methods effects ................................................................
Cost reduction 
Sales/Cost reduction/New research contracts 
budget (proxy value) 
Cost reduction 
• Work factor effects (Describe the impact of the project on 
the “human capital” of the participant): 
 
    - Competence ................................................................................................
    - Training ................................................................................................
Monetary equivalent of man-hours (proxy value) 
Monetary equivalent of man-hours (proxy value) 
Source: Beta (1993: 4-9). 
 
The Beta study expressed all the effects identified by firms, many of them of a qualitative 
nature, in monetary terms (ECUs). Although this procedure may have advantages in terms 
of interpretation and comparison27 of results, it has important drawbacks as well, since 
some of the measurement techniques used and assumptions made are highly questionable. 
Furthermore, because the purpose of the Beta (1993: 12) study was “to assess only the 
economic effects for the participant”, everything has been quantified in currency units and, 
as a result, other important information has been lost or hidden in the course of the 
quantification process. Even so, about one-third of all identified economic effects could not 
be measured, mainly due to lack of information. 
 
Considering all the direct and indirect benefits (i.e., “realised”, “anticipated” and “future” 
                                                 
27
 Especially the comparison between the amount of money given by the EC to the projects and the economic 
benefits they generated for the participating firms. 
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effects), the study concludes, “The 176 contractants of the sample received 39.4 MECU 
(1991). 611 economic effects have been measured while in addition about 300 have been 
identified without being quantified (mainly due to lack of information). 413.3 MECU will 
have been directly generated in the firms at the end of 1993 and 522.5 MECU at the end of 
1995. The corresponding ratios direct effects/EEC funding amount to 10.5 and 13.3 
respectively” (Beta, 1993: 20). Firms which were most efficient at generating direct effects 
were those which were able to attract the best research laboratories, and the long projects 
generated more direct and indirect benefits economic effects than the short projects.  
 
The BIE’s (1995) study assessed the impact on performance (employment levels, turnover, 
profits, productivity, exports) and on competitiveness (technology, quality, price, customer 
service) of respondent firms to a mail questionnaire. Firms were invited to indicate how the 
“key” arrangement (i.e. “the most important cooperative relationship a firm has 
established” (BIE, 1995: 145)) has affected (in percentage terms) those indicators over the 
three years prior to the study. It found that “cooperative arrangements can and do play an 
important role in improving the performance and competitiveness of Australian 
manufactures” (p. 169). In general, the key cooperative arrangement provided 
improvements for the bulk of firms, regardless of industry, size, age, product type and so 
on. Impacts on performance and competitiveness are likely to vary more frequently with 
the characteristics of the key arrangements than with the characteristics of cooperating 
firms. Interestingly, some firms reported negative impacts on the performance indicators. 
For instance, 5% of respondents indicated that their key arrangement has resulted in lower 
profits for the business over the three-year period prior to the study.  
 
In Rosenfeld’s (1996) assessment of two network initiatives, the participant firms were 
asked to report changes in their business performance and the extent to which those 
changes could be attributed to cooperation. Most firms reported having had performance 
improvements, namely improvements in the domestic sales, but they did not credit all the 
changes to inter-firm collaboration. Barlow et al. (1997) examined the managerial 
processes in five client-led partnering28 arrangements of the construction industry and 
                                                 
28
 “Partnering is [...] a range of practices designed to promote greater cooperation between organisations. It is 
best understood as an interaction between initiatives in business and procurement strategy, information 
systems, collaborative working and human resource practices” (Barlow et al. 1997: 58). 
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assessed the consequences of alliances for partner firms. They identified a number of 
partnering outcomes (mainly for clients), such as cost reduction, shortened delivery time 
and quality improvements, and a number of partnering problems (mainly for contractors), 
including increase in the amount of time communicating, uneven balance of power and 
ambiguous organisation roles. They were able to collect some quantitative data to 
demonstrate the benefits relating to the reduction of the construction costs and delivery 
time. These quantitative performance benefits were measured against the costs and delivery 
time of similar projects firms have been involved in before. The “share of experience” and 
the “contact with other ways of doing things” appear to be two general benefits (in terms of 
organisational learning) for all alliance partners. 
 
Human and Provan’s (1997) approach is different because their main aim was to categorise 
the network29 outcomes based on what the small firms have achieved from network 
participation. They have identified four main categories of outcomes, namely: inter-
organisational exchanges (i.e., direct transactions or exchanges among network firms, such 
as buying and selling, jointly producing and marketing a product, and exchanging 
friendship and information with each other); organisational credibility (i.e., respondents’ 
perceptions that firm external legitimacy was enhanced through association with the 
network); access to resources (i.e., how network participation played an instrumental role 
in respondents’ accessing new markets, new product ideas and other valued resources for 
their companies); and financial performance (i.e., economic benefits that occurred within a 
short time after joining the network and long-term perspectives on economic benefits). 
Based on the SMEs’ answers to a list of potential firm outcomes, they then assessed the 
percentage of SMEs that achieved each type of the listed benefits, concluding that the 
“involvement in an SME manufacturing network can be advantageous for firms” (p. 397). 
Networks are worthwhile despite their costs, and both transactional and transformational 
outcomes of network involvement occur. 
 
2.4.2.5 Alliance performance and firm performance 
 
The discussion above somewhat polarised the debate between alliance performance and the 
                                                 
29
 They adopted Jarillo’s (1988) definition of strategic networks, with some restrictions (see Table 2.1). 
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impact of alliances on firm performance, yet drawing a line between the two is not always 
easy. The two perspectives, although different in nature, are not necessarily independent of 
each other. Often the performance of alliances takes into consideration the achievement of 
technical as well as economic objectives, thus involving firm performance. As one 
executive put it, perhaps excessively, the success of alliances is “measured in the market” 
(Carvalho, 1996)30. R&D alliances often involve the production and transfer of knowledge 
to be, ultimately, used as input and transformed into results. It may happen, however, that 
the individual objectives of firms do not include the achievement of economic benefits, at 
least directly or immediately. On the other hand, when assessing the impact on firm 
performance, one is also addressing the alliance performance issue, even if unintentionally. 
Measuring the impact on firm performance does not elucidate, however, the extent to 
which the objectives were met or the level of satisfaction of partners. 
 
In general, the literature overlooked the relationship between alliance performance and the 
impact of alliances on firm performance. The Dussauge and Garrette’s (1995) study 
addresses both issues, although their main objective was to link the success of alliances to 
the way in which collaboration was organised and managed. They assessed alliances using 
three major indicators - technical quality of the project, commercial success and financial 
performance - which link firm performance with alliance performance. Previous research 
normally addressed just one aspect and did not attempt to establish a link between the 
impact on performance with the achievement of objectives, satisfaction of partners or the 
conditions in which the alliances were formed. As a result, the link between alliance 
performance and firm performance is still very much unknown. 
 
2.5 LEARNING THROUGH ALLIANCES 
 
The resource-based perspective of the firm31 views the firm as “a unique bundle of assets, 
skills and capabilities that influences the firm’s evolution, competitive strategies and 
growth paths” (Lei, 1997: 209). “Core competencies” (Hamel et al., 1989), “invisible 
assets” (Itami, 1987) and “dynamic capabilities” (Teece and Pisano, 1994; Teece et al., 
                                                 
30
 When questioned on the notion of alliance success, four out of seven executives emphasised the importance 
of good commercial results as a measure of alliance success. 
31
 For a revision of the resource-based perspective literature see, for instance, Teece et al. (1997). 
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1997) refer in somewhat differing ways to intangible, knowledge-based resources, a subset 
of the resource-based theory literature (Soo et al., 1999: 2), that constitute important 
sources of the firm’s competitive advantage.  
 
Self-sufficiency is becoming increasingly difficult in a rapidly changing environment and 
not many firms can go it alone (Hamel et al., 1989; Inkpen, 1996). To compete in a 
dynamic environment where time-to-market is critical and the rate of technological change 
is rapid, firms need a fast and effective way of acquiring knowledge and skills to renew 
their competencies. Even in less dynamic environments, normally firms do not possess all 
the information and knowledge needed to innovate. In their study on the dimensions of 
complexity, von Tunzelmann and Wang (1997) note that “Complexity now appears to be 
occurring with increasing frequency as an environmental contingency, and affecting 
supposedly ‘low-tech’ industries as much as ‘high-tech’”; therefore, the technologies may 
have to be partly acquired elsewhere. SMEs tend to have additional difficulties to cope 
with technological development because they often lack suitably qualified technical 
specialists and are often unable to support a formal R&D effort on an appreciable scale 
(Rothwell, 1991: 97). Whether in a fast-changing business environment or not, cooperation 
can be an effective mechanism for the acquisition of knowledge and skills, with advantages 
over alternative strategies.  
 
According to Ciborra (1991: 51), alliances “allow firms to implement strategies for 
organisational learning and innovation more effectively.” They provide firms with a unique 
opportunity to leverage their strengths with the help of partners (Inkpen, 1996: 123). 
Alliances are considered a mechanism to facilitate the transfer of knowledge, enhance the 
firm’s learning capabilities and to deal more effectively with technological and market 
uncertainty (Hagedoorn et al., 2000: 572-3). Alliances may be an avenue for learning and 
internalising new skills, in particular those which are tacit, collective and embedded (Doz 
and Hamel, 1998: 5). 
 
The difficulties associated with the transfer of knowledge, especially tacit knowledge, drive 
firms to seek alliances. Because tacit knowledge is embedded in the organisation’s 
practices and routines, it is difficult for firms to learn and absorb such skills from their 
partners without close contact, in a master-apprentice relationship (Badaracco, 1991; Doz 
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and Hamel, 1998). Close inter-partner collaboration can thus help firms absorb and 
internalise the tacit knowledge and skills possessed by their partners, but “close interaction 
with another firm on a day-to-day basis is not a requirement to learn explicit knowledge” 
(Lei, 1997: 215). This has implications in terms of the design and implementation of 
alliances; the alliance design and type of interaction between the partners are indications of 
the type of knowledge most likely to be transferred. For instance, Mowery et al. (1996: 87-
9) found that joint ventures are more effective conduits for the transfer of complex 
capabilities than contract-based alliances such as licensing agreements.32 
 
The fact that new knowledge is the product and the goal of alliances (Ciborra, 1991: 59), 
namely in the context of R&D alliances, and that collaborations exist to transfer knowledge 
(Dodgson, 1992b: 238) turns organisational learning33 into a critical factor of success. 
Learning is not an automatic process and involves a substantial effort. It requires a 
proactive attitude of firms to learn and the ability to understand and internalise the 
knowledge and skills acquired from partners. However, to suggest that incremental 
learning should always lead to incremental performance improvements is misleading, argue 
Inkpen and Crossan (1995: 603). Hamel (1991) examined the process of inter-partner 
learning within alliances and found three broad determinants of learning outcomes: intent, 
transparency and receptivity. “Intent refers to a firm’s initial propensity to view 
collaboration as an opportunity to learn; transparency to the ‘knowability’ or openness of 
each partner, and thus the potential for learning; and receptivity to a partner’s capacity for 
learning, or ‘absorptiveness’” (Hamel, 1991: 89-90). While intent establishes the desire to 
learn and transparency the opportunity, receptivity determines the capacity to learn. 
 
The firm’s absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) is an important determinant of 
learning, perhaps the most important. It refers to the ability of firms to identify, assimilate 
and exploit external knowledge, which in this context refers to knowledge from alliance 
partners. This ability is largely a function of the level of prior related knowledge (i.e. path-
                                                 
32
 This conclusion is in line with the conclusions of Davis (1977), Killing (1983), Henart (1988) and Kogut 
(1988a). 
33
 Organisational learning can be described as “the ways firms build, supplement and organize knowledge and 
routines around their activities and within their cultures, and adopt and develop organizational efficiency by 
improving the use of the broad skills of their workforces” (Dodgson, 1993a: 377). Dodgson also discusses the 
processes of learning and the ways in which the organisational learning may be facilitated and impeded. 
 
 54 
dependent) and is a critical component of innovative capabilities. The organisation’s 
absorptive capacity depends on the absorptive capacities of its individual members and the 
internal structure of communication to disseminate the knowledge across the firm. Two 
empirical studies confirmed the Cohen and Levinthal assertion that the firm’s ability to 
absorb new knowledge from alliance partners is path-dependent. Mowery et al. (1996: 89) 
found that experience in related technological areas is an important determinant of 
absorptive capacity. Soo et al.’s (1999: 26) results suggest that individual level of 
absorptive capacity has significant influence on both information and know-how 
acquisition, and organisation-level absorptive capacity has a significant impact on 
information (but not know-how) acquisition.  
 
The difficulties of small firms to learn from partners in the context of an R&D alliance can 
be quite substantial. Although SMEs have efficient and informal internal communication 
networks, essential for the dissemination of knowledge across the firm, they often lack the 
time and resources to identify and use external sources of scientific and technological 
expertise and often lack suitable R&D resources to conduct formal R&D in-house 
(Rothwell, 1991; Rothwell and Dodgson, 1991). In their study of the U.K motor industry, 
Beecham and Cordey-Hayes (1998: 193) note that small firms (fewer than 100 employees) 
continue to have difficulty in “assimilating and adopting new technologies through 
customer-supplier partnership arrangements.” In line with the arguments above, the ability 
of SMEs to absorb knowledge and skills from alliance partners tends to decrease when the 
R&D projects are less related to the firm’s core activities. Desire and opportunity to learn 
from partners can be impeded by the capacity to do so.  
 
To understand better the impact of alliances on firm performance, it is important to include 
the organisational learning dimension in the analysis. The acquisition of knowledge and 
skills through alliances may not be totally or immediately captured by the performance 
indicators, but they are an important component of innovative activities. Examining the 
extent to which firms learn from alliances can be regarded as a different way of interpreting 
performance, and surely complements the information obtained through the performance 
indicators.  
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2.6 PERFORMANCE OF ALLIANCES VERSUS OTHER STRATEGIES 
 
The question of comparing performance of alliances with the performance of its possible 
alternatives is of relevance given the unusual use of alliances for competitive purposes, 
suggesting that firms might get more net benefits through cooperation. Alliances are not 
just a high technology industries phenomenon any more (if they ever were) and their use is 
spreading across low technological and service sectors as well (Gugler, 1992; Doz and 
Hamel, 1998). Furthermore, governments have had an active role in promoting interfirm 
relationships, which is an important indication of a perceived competitive advantage of 
cooperation, at both the macro and the micro levels. In the context of this thesis, it is worth 
understanding whether the SMEs had an alternative available to carry out the research 
project and, if so, what were the advantages of alliances.  
 
In principle, the choice for an alliance instead of an alternative strategy, such as go-it-alone, 
merger, acquisition or licensing,34 should be based on a net-benefit comparative analysis of 
each alternative. In practice, the choice of a given strategy is more complex than that 
because the range of choices is not always available to firms and the assessment of 
alternative strategies is complex and costly. Each of these strategies encompasses a 
different set of advantages and disadvantages that make it difficult to consider them as 
perfect alternatives to cooperation. “Going it alone can be time consuming. Licensing is 
only a short-term fix. Merger and acquisition is often prohibited by antitrust laws or 
barriers to foreign ownership” (Bleeke and Ernst, 1993a: 11). Actually, although all the 
above strategies might be used to reach a specific benefit or objective, they may only be 
considered partial substitutes to cooperation because each of them has necessarily 
dissimilar implications in terms of human resources, investment, management skills, 
flexibility, control, time and so forth. Of course, small- and medium-sized firms face more 
difficulties and, generally, do not have all the above alternatives available.  
 
A few studies have touched on the question but no strong empirical evidence has been 
produced so far. Previous studies normally took a general approach and rarely was a 
                                                 
34
 Licensing agreements, especially one-way ones, might be considered an alternative strategy to an alliance, 
however, in some cases they are considered alliances, which is basically due to the problems of identifying 
those licensing agreements that are merely market transactions. 
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particular alliance structure and/or sector analysed in greater detail. It is beyond the scope 
of this thesis to carry out any detailed analysis of the matter, which is by the way an 
excellent suggestion for another DPhil thesis. Only the main arguments put forward by 
researchers concerning the option to cooperate instead of an independent strategy, likely 
the most meaningful issue for this research, are presented here35. Porter and Fuller (1986: 
329) argue that “coalitions are a more rapid means of repositioning than internal 
development.” Harrigan (1986) observed that joint ventures allow partners to make smaller 
investments in risky projects than they would otherwise do to tackle them on their own. 
Thus, partners share the risk and the return on investment but the net effect of the risk-
return trade-off make JV partners better off than if they have to go it alone.  
 
One of the questions that guided Human and Provan’s (1997) study was whether outcomes 
for firms in SME networks differ from outcomes for firms that are not network members 
(i.e., market-based firms). They were not able to accurately determine whether financial 
performance was stronger for network or non-network firms, but they were told that market 
firms achieved financial performance through independent and competitive activities. They 
concluded, “Overall [...] network membership provided an external structure beyond 
market mechanisms through which network firms generated new interorganizational 
exchanges, expanded organizational legitimacy, and accessed organizational resources” (p. 
387). 
 
Schmitz (1998) investigated a footwear industry cluster in the period 1992-97 and reported 
a positive relationship between changes in performance and changes in cooperation. He 
stresses that “firms which have stepped up co-operation have improved their performance 
more than those which have not” (p. 21). Singh and Mitchell (1996) and Singh (1997) 
examined the U.S. hospital software systems industry between 1961-91 and found that 
business survival is positively correlated with collaboration, and collaborative firms 
outperform those that take an independent approach. “As a general empirical outcome, 
businesses with collaborative agreements will tend to outperform businesses that take 
independent approaches in complex business situations, if managers are at least intendedly 
                                                 
35
 For information on alliances versus mergers and acquisitions see, for instance, Porter and Fuller (1986), 
Doz (1988), Abravanel and Ernst (1993), Bleeke and Ernst (1993b), Hagedoorn and Schakenraad (1994), 
Gomes-Casseres (1996), Doz and Hamel (1998). For alliances versus licensing see, for instance, Mowery 
(1989). 
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rational in their approach to interfirm relationships” (Singh and Mitchell, 1996: 101). 
 
In line with the advantages of alliances in acquiring knowledge and skills from partners 
explained above, when the cooperative project involves technological- or knowledge-
related objectives, the option to cooperate seems to be a good strategy. According to 
Brockhoff and Teichert (1995), “firms which take part in R&D cooperation seem to be 
more successful than firms that do not take part in such cooperations.” Link and Bauer 
(1989)36 demonstrated that the return on R&D investment of U.S. manufacturing firms was 
higher in cooperating firms than in those firms that did not cooperate; firms cooperating in 
research enjoy greater R&D efficiencies than those that do not. The findings in Hagedoorn 
and Schakenraad (1994: 300-1), who analysed the correlation between corporate 
performance and strategic technology partnering (i.e., external linkages of firms), indicate 
that “companies attracting technology through their alliances and companies concentrating 
on R&D cooperation have significant[ly] higher rates of profit.” Doz and Hamel (1998: 52) 
point out that an alliance is a better and faster alternative to win the race to learn, because 
internal development is often slow and uncertain. And Mowery (1989: 23) affirms that 
collaborations “allow established firms a more rapid and less costly means than internal 
development to gain access to new technologies that are not easily licensed.”  
 
Unlike these optimistic views of alliances, Kotabe and Swan (1995) studied product 
innovativeness within the context of cooperative strategies and, according to their findings, 
“there appears to be a disadvantage to cooperating with other firms in developing and 
introducing more innovative new products. [...] We cannot rule out the possibility that poor 
performance can cause firms to seek additional cooperation with competitors.” They could 
not find support to validate the hypothesis that products of cooperating firms tend to be 
more innovative than products of a single firm. They acknowledged some possible bias of 
their results due to limitations of the study, though. 
 
Comparative empirical research fully demonstrating (or not) the relative advantages of 
alliances over alternative strategies does not yet exist. Despite some studies recognising 
weaknesses on the evidence provided, the message appears to be that alliances have 
                                                 
36
 Quoted in Watkins (1991: 89) and Brockhoff and Teichert (1995: 112). 
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advantages in many situations, but cannot be considered a universally better option. 
Comparisons in absolute terms are virtually impossible. According to Chowdhury (1992), a 
given strategy is not better than another in an absolute sense, but it is only relatively 
superior (or inferior) to others in specific circumstances. In the context of government-
sponsored alliances, it is important to understand the extent to which an alliance is a better 
option because of government intervention. 
 
2.7 CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter is concerned with the theoretical background for the rest of the investigation. 
It analyses the major conceptual issues relevant for this thesis and contextualises the 
government-sponsored R&D alliances. A common feature to all the concepts is the lack of 
consensus among scholars regarding their definition and boundaries. The concept of 
interfirm alliance has been evolving to describe the increasing diversity and complexity of 
alliance forms, but the problems concerning its boundaries and wording still remain. There 
appears to be no doubt, though, that an R&D alliance is one of many alliance types, one 
which involves R&D activities or the transference of technology between alliance partners.  
 
It is difficult to find a single definition for alliance success because of the large spectrum of 
alliance types, the multiplicity of purposes and diversity of results. Ultimately, the notion 
of alliance success must reflect the individual perspective of alliance partners, irrespective 
of the common achievements. Concerning the notion of organisational performance, there 
is no unique set of indicators or “best way” to measure it. The notion of organisational 
performance is, thus, based on individual preferences of those involved in measuring it. In 
any case, traditional financial indicators seem no longer to suffice because they are 
essentially good at measuring past performance, but rather poor at assessing the firm’s 
future competitive stance. 
 
The chapter discusses several different ways of analysing performance in the context of 
alliances. One approach has to do with the assessment of alliance performance. This has 
been of concern of researchers for a long time, namely the performance of joint ventures. 
Earlier empirical studies used an array of measures, ranging from perceptual measures (i.e., 
partners’ own assessment) to financial indicators. Each measure captures partially the 
 59 
phenomenon, and not all measures are adequate to measure the performance of all alliance 
types. A multidimensional approach is likely to be a more effective way of assessing the 
performance of alliances. A second perspective to analyse performance consists in 
assessing the impact of alliances on firm performance and, again, a range of perspectives 
and performance indicators have been used to do so. Some studies analysed the stock-
market reaction to the alliance formation announcements, other studies examined the 
importance of alliances to firm survival. Another group of studies looked at the relationship 
between alliance intensity and firm performance, normally using statistical methods to find 
associations between the two, but with relative success given the difficulty in proving the 
cause-effect link. Yet another group of studies examined the alliance outcomes and impact 
on firm performance using direct interviews or questionnaires. This approach overcomes 
the causality issue but cannot avoid the problem of subjectivity because it is based 
essentially on perceptual measures. 
 
Performance can also be interpreted from the viewpoint of organisational learning and 
competence-building. An alliance is an appropriate mechanism for the acquisition of 
knowledge and skills from partners, especially tacit knowledge, but the learning process is 
far from automatic, requiring effort and ability of firms to recognise, assimilate and exploit 
the new knowledge. Because the performance indicators may not capture in full what firms 
have learned from alliances, analysing organisational learning is likely to complement the 
understanding of the impact of alliances on firm performance. Yet another way of 
analysing performance is to assess the performance of alliances against alternative 
strategies (i.e., go-it-alone, merger, acquisition and licensing). These alternative strategies 
are not perfect substitutes for each other and not all of them are always available to target 
particular objectives. Further, there is no absolute advantage of one strategy over the 
others; each strategy is only relatively advantageous over the others.  
 
The next chapter addresses specific theoretical issues related to the type of alliances under 
analysis and the context in which they took place. 
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3 R&D ALLIANCES - EMPIRICAL BACKGROUND 
 
 
 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Unlike the previous chapter, which focused extensively on the question of performance 
assessment, this chapter overviews some relevant matters aiming at locating the CRAFT 
alliances examined below and characterising the context in which they took place. This 
will help towards a better understanding of the formation of CRAFT alliances and the 
interpretation of later results. The upward trend in the formation of R&D alliances is an 
environmental pressure for SMEs to seek external relationships, for instance, in the context 
of government-sponsored schemes. Governments promote collaborative research for a 
number of reasons, such as correcting market failures, speeding-up technological 
innovations and transferring technology. The Portuguese industrial structure surely needs 
and welcomes initiatives aimed at increasing its innovative potential, but this also raises 
the question of the extent to which the ability of SMEs to participate in R&D alliances and 
absorb knowledge from partners is affected by the relatively low performance of 
Portuguese industry. 
    
The chapter structure is as follows. First, it looks at the trends in the formation of R&D 
alliances, the existing databases on alliances and the participation of SMEs in R&D 
alliances. Then, a general picture of the Portuguese industrial structure and its performance 
is provided. In sections 3.3 and 3.4, the chapter addresses the rationale behind the 
government’s policy towards cooperation and gives an overview of EU RTD (research and 
technological development) policy, emphasising the role of the Framework Programmes 
and the Structural Funds. Some concluding remarks close the chapter.   
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3.2 TRENDS IN R&D ALLIANCES 
 
There is a general perception and acceptance in the literature that the formation of alliances 
since the early 1980s has registered an upward trend. This holds for alliances in general and 
for R&D alliances in particular, both government-sponsored and market-driven alliances. 
So far, no study has convincingly refuted it as untrue. However, von Tunzelmann (1995: 
268-9) believes that the networks might be a structuring device to cope with the current 
period of “fast history” in technology that in due course will abate. The alliance 
phenomenon gained enormous visibility over the last two decades in part due to its extent 
and pervasiveness across different sectors; however there is no comprehensive database on 
alliances, capturing the phenomenon in its multiplicity of alliance types, range of sectors 
and the different types of partners involved. The lack of a general consensus regarding the 
conceptual issues, as we have seen in the previous chapter, the complexity involved in 
systematically collecting the data, and the reliability of the information sources are some 
very important obstacles in the way of researchers to build reliable databases. According to 
Doz and Hamel (1998: 285), “statistics on strategic alliances are notoriously unreliable, 
since definition and reporting vary across industries and data bases.” Leveque et al. (1996: 
199) stress emphatically that there is an “unsurmountable bias implicit in databases.” 
 
Despite all the problems, some databases on alliances do exist even if they are partial, 
unbalanced (large firm alliances tend to have higher visibility) and biased according to the 
definitions and processes of collecting the data used. That helped Hagedoorn (1995: 207) 
to recognise that “the study of strategic technology partnering is to a large extent 
concentrated in so-called high-tech industries or core technologies.” At least three different 
approaches have been taken in building databases, which albeit different in purpose, do 
share certain characteristics. 
i) One approach, that may be called “project-specific databases”, consists of building a 
database for a specific research project with no intention to develop it once the project 
is finished (e.g. Ghemawat et al., 1986; Harrigan, 1986, 1988).  
ii) Other databases, “generalist databases”, have information about different types of 
alliances (e.g. R&D, production, marketing) and sectors (e.g. the INSEAD database, 
see for instance European Commission (1995)). In European Commission (1995: 38) 
one can read, “alliances continue to grow rapidly in the world economy as a major tool 
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of strategic management for companies in almost all industries and most major trading 
blocs.”  
iii) A third approach consists of building “thematic databases”. The ITSA database, 
“which records publicly announced interfirm alliances in IT worldwide” (Vonortas and 
Safioleas, 1997: 658), is an example. The authors reported an increase in the number of 
alliance records throughout the examined period (1984-94), with the exception of 
1990-91. They observed a “rapidly increasing pace of alliances with developing 
country firm participation [that] is very much defined by alliances with explicit 
technological content” (Vonortas and Safioleas, 1997: 661). Another example is the 
MERIT-CATI database, which collects information on inter-firm agreements “that 
contain some arrangements for transferring technology or joint research” (Hagedoorn, 
1995: 228).  According to Vonortas and Safioleas (1997: 657), “the only large database 
of publicly announced interfirm alliances that has been extensively explored for 
economic policy research is CATI.” 
 
Hagedoorn et al. (2000) identify three major databases related to research partnerships: 
MERIT-CATI, CORE and NCRA-RJV databases. Concerning the MERIT-CATI database, 
they note that “the number of new partnerships set up annually gradually increased from 
about 30-40 in the early 1970s to 100-200 in the late 1970s. The 1980s marked a period of 
a further rapid increase. Starting from around 200 per year, the number of new partnerships 
announced every year reached around 600 or more later in the 1980s and 1990s” (p. 577). 
Concerning the CORE and NCRA-RJV databases, they say, “the significant increases in 
registrations during 1985-1995 have been followed by decreases in the last 3 years, which 
have been particularly steep in 1997 and 1998. The reasons for this change are not clearly 
understood” (pp. 577-8). According to OECD (1999: 76-7), the number of national and 
international technological alliances did not change significantly between 1988 and 1990, 
but rose rapidly during the period 1994-96 in the zones (United States, European Union, 
Japan). 
 
The CORDIS database37 contains a repository of information (e.g. alliance partners, 
objectives, duration) on the EU-sponsored cooperative projects, per project and covering 
                                                 
37
 http://www.cordis.lu 
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the range of cooperative programmes, but it is not structured in a way to provide data for 
statistical analysis.  
 
3.3 SMEs AND R&D ALLIANCES 
 
The presence of SMEs in R&D alliances has long been referred in the literature. However, 
it has traditionally given higher visibility to large firm alliances, in most cases disclosing 
information on the SMEs’ cooperation activity in the context of their involvement in 
asymmetrical alliances. This is especially true in the case of hi-tech SMEs. Even so, Gugler 
and Dunning (1993: 128) affirmed that “smaller companies are becoming more involved in 
strategic alliances, particularly with their larger customers. [...] Asymmetrical agreements 
between large and small enterprises are growing more rapidly than those between large 
firms.” Past and current government-sponsored collaborative research programmes have 
created better conditions for the participation of a higher number of SMEs in R&D 
alliances, virtually from every sector. Over 60% of SMEs participating in the European 
Union’s Fourth Framework Programme had never participated before in regional, national 
or multinational RTD co-operation programmes.38 
 
There are not many studies specifically reporting on the rate of SMEs participation in R&D 
alliances. Agreements between small firms tend not to be publicised and, therefore, they 
tend not to be included in databases on R&D alliances. It is also likely that many of them 
are informal and it may even happen that the R&D agreements are not considered as such 
by SMEs because most of them do not perform formal R&D. Of the studies on technology 
alliances, the majority of them tend to feature large firm collaboration rather than that 
undertaken by small and medium-sized enterprises (Rothwell and Dodgson, 1991: 125). 
One of the pioneering studies conducted on “innovative” firms from all sectors of 
manufacturing in the UK registered a “considerable innovation-related linkage activity 
amongst small and medium-sized firms. [...] A significant number of firms do engage in 
collaborative R&D ventures, in the same way as large firms” (Beesley and Rothwell, 1987: 
10)39. 26% of the sampled firms were engaged in some form of collaborative R&D venture 
                                                 
38
 http://europa.eu.int/comm/research/faq.html#tocref3_10 
39
 The study was then published as Beesley, M. and R. Rothwell (1987), Small firm linkages in the United 
Kingdom, in Rothwell, R. and J. Bessant (eds) (1987), Innovation, adaptation and growth. Amsterdam: 
Elsevier.  
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and about 56% of them took place with firms employing less than 200 employees. More 
than half of the firms who participated in the Eureka projects were SMEs with fewer than 
500 employees and about 30% of the participant firms had fewer than 100 employees 
(Mothe and Quelin, 1999: 35). One in six French SMEs with research capabilities was 
involved in EC research programmes (Larédo, 1998: 35). 
 
Figure 3.1 Cooperation between business and the public sector (1994-96) 
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Source: OECD Secretariat (1999a: 136, based on data from Table 4.5.1.). 
 
In their innovation surveys, some OECD countries include a question on firms with 
cooperation arrangements for innovation with universities or government. Figure 3.1 shows 
the percentage of firms who engaged in cooperative activities with the public sector. As 
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expected, in all the countries, smaller firms (fewer than 50 employees) have less propensity 
for engaging in cooperative activities with the public sector than larger ones. Such 
agreements for innovation are more common for large firms than for small ones (OECD 
Secretariat, 1999a: 42). 
 
It is difficult to confirm whether the general trend in the formation of R&D alliances 
reported in the previous section holds for small firms, in particular non-high-tech SMEs 
and firms with little research resources. The information sources are rather scarce and 
incomplete. The EU-sponsored R&D programmes appear to be creating incentives for an 
increasing number of SMEs to establish joint R&D projects, but the percentage of SMEs 
who enter new partnerships outside the EU-sponsored schemes is still unclear.  
 
3.4 PORTUGUESE INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE AND PERFORMANCE 
 
This section makes a diagnosis, necessarily incomplete, of some aspects of the Portuguese 
industrial structure,40 which are of relevance to understand the role of the Portuguese firms 
in the context of CRAFT alliances. In short, Portugal is a small open economy with a high 
proportion of small firms, a productive structure concentrated in traditional sectors, and 
heavily dependent on external sources of technology. The examiners’ report in the OECD’s 
1993 review of Portuguese science and technology policy (OECD, 1993: 101) identifies 
some of the “most significant structural and cultural problems”. These include: lack of 
R&D capacity in manufacturing industry in terms of both expenditure and skilled personnel 
- perhaps the single most important barrier to a technologically dynamic and competitive 
industry; lack of direct government support for basic pre-competitive industrial R&D; 
industrial structures characterised by a large number of SMEs and bias towards low-
technology production in traditional sectors. Caraça et al.’s (1993) conclusions on the 
weaknesses of the Portuguese S&T system point to similar structural problems.  
 
Portuguese industry is composed mainly of small and very small firms. According to 
OECD (2000: 169), “small firms (fewer than 50 employees) accounted for 95% of 
manufacturing firms in Portugal in 1995 and SMEs (fewer than 200 employees) accounted 
                                                 
40
 See, for instance, Assis (1996: Ch. 5) and Hidalgo (1997) for a more detailed analysis of the Portuguese 
scientific and technological (S&T) system. 
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for 99%. Small firms represented 43% of employment while SMEs represented 70%. In 
terms of value added, the contribution of SMEs to GDP was 47% (25% by small firms). 
And small firms generated 29% of turnover while SMEs generated 53%.” Only 0.12% of 
all firms have more than 250 employees, representing about 20% of employment. Besides 
the small size, “a low technological-intensity profile dominates the production sector” 
(Caraça et al., 1993: 8), because most firms are concentrated in traditional and generally 
low technology sectors (OECD, 1993: 125). Hidalgo (1997) provides a general description 
of the sectoral specialisation of the Portuguese industry. 
 
“Traditionally within the productive sector, it was the textile sector which showed more 
important rates of activity. [...] Portuguese companies are also strong in those sectors of 
production where they have been able to establish themselves: paper, plastic, chemical, 
shipbuilding etc. Proven political stability, accompanied by low labour costs compared to 
those of their EU partners, have led to the establishment of companies with high technological 
content in the country, especially in the motor sector. [...] Perhaps the most outstanding single 
fact is that an important productive sector does indeed exist, but lacks a sufficient technology 
level.” (Hidalgo, 1997: 137) 
 
“A further weakness is technological dependence” (OECD, 1991). The Portuguese 
production sector depends heavily on technology from abroad in comparison with the 
limited levels of domestic research (Hidalgo, 1997: 143). While it is entirely rational for 
Portugal, as a small and relatively less advanced country, to devote a limited amount of 
resources to R&D activities, it is the small share spent by its enterprises which is of 
concern (OECD, 1991). Traditionally, the Portuguese firms do not spend large amounts of 
resources on R&D activities, which is to a large extent the consequence of a productive 
structure mainly characterised by very small firms. Figure 3.2 compares the R&D 
expenditures as a percentage of GDP for the European Union countries. “In most countries, 
the BES [business enterprise sector] accounts for the largest share of R&D expenditure (as 
a % GDP), [...] in Greece and Portugal, the largest share of their respective total R&D 
expenditure is accounted by the HES [higher education sector]” (Eurostat, 1999: 26-7).  
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Figure 3.2 R&D expenditure as a % of GDP by institutional sectors – 1997  
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Source: Eurostat (1999: 86 (Table 14), 98 (Table 18), 110 (Table 22)). 
 
Laranja and Fontes (1998: 1025-6) note that the large corporations operating in Portugal in 
technologically intensive sectors are essentially of two kinds: (a) “Subsidiaries of large 
multinationals, [...] which link directly to their home base for technology and development 
activities; and (b) large indigenous companies, which rely on foreign technology suppliers 
for their technological needs.” In their study comparing Portuguese, French and English 
firms, Birchall et al. (1996: 296) affirm that the Portuguese firms “are less likely to report a 
strong input from their own R&D activity and in consequence appear more reliant on 
outside sources for product/service innovation. Competitors, formal linkages and informal 
networking, trade sources and equipment vendor are of more importance to the 
Portuguese.” Unsurprisingly, the authors found that the Portuguese executives reported that 
they spend a lower proportion of their turnover on R&D than their French and British 
counterparts. 
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One of the consequences of being technologically dependent is that “Portugal exports 
mainly low-technology goods and imports a large volume of high-technology goods” 
(OECD, 1993: 125). Table 3.1 gives information on the Portugal’s relative export 
specialisation by type of industry. The data illustrate what is said above and even show a 
reinforcement of the export specialisation in low-technology industries in the period 1980-
1992. Table 3.2 below shows a negative technology balance of payments, where the total 
receipts cover just 34% of the payments, further confirming the technological dependency 
of the Portuguese productive sector.    
 
Table 3.1 Relative export specialisation by type of industry (OECD average = 100) 
High-technology 
industries 
Medium-technology 
industries 
Low-technology 
industries 
 
1980 1992 1980 1992 1980 1992 
Portugal 58 48 37 40 196 227 
Note: See OECD (1995: 30) for information on the classification of the manufacturing industries. 
Source: OECD (1995: 34).   
 
Table 3.2 Technology balance of payments (as a percentage of GDP) 
 Receipts Payments Balance Receipts/Payments 
ratio (%) 
Portugal (1997) 
European Union (1996) 
Total OECD (1996) 
0.22 
0.35 
0.32 
0.60 
0.49 
0.25 
-0.39 
-0.13 
0.07 
34 
72 
128 
Source: OECD (1995: 34, extract from Table 11.5.1).  
 
The Portuguese “characteristic” firm is, thus, an SME which invests very little in R&D, 
depends largely on technology from outside, and most likely belongs to a traditional sector. 
This implies that Portuguese firms might benefit substantially from participation in joint 
research projects such as CRAFT by acquiring knowledge, skills and competencies from 
partners. But the structural weaknesses of the Portuguese industry also act as an important 
obstacle for the ability of SMEs to set up and participate in R&D projects and, perhaps 
more important, recognise and assimilate new knowledge.   
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3.5 GOVERNMENT POLICY 
 
3.5.1 The rationale for government-sponsored alliances 
 
Governments, especially of the OECD countries, have actively promoted and supported the 
formation of partnerships between firms and also involving other bodies such as 
universities and research institutes. The CRAFT (1994-98) programme is an illustrative 
example of that policy at the European Union level. Pre-competitive R&D has been one 
important area for the collaborative policy, but collaboration is being encouraged much 
more widely. There appears to be no doubt about the interest and effort of governments in 
stimulating collaboration, it is important, however, to understand the rationale behind that 
public policy. An overview of the underlying factors found in the literature is presented 
below without any pretension of an in-depth discussion of the arguments put forward or the 
assessment of the results, since these would go beyond the scope of this thesis41. Of the 
following six interrelated factors, the first two are of a general nature, the others are more 
focused on the case of research partnerships. 
 
Thus, governments encourage interfirm collaboration aiming at: 
 
Stimulating competitiveness at the firm and national levels. Collaboration among SMEs is 
an emerging approach to industrial competitiveness and an effort to stimulate industrial 
modernisation (Rosenfeld, 1996). The objectives of the partnership programmes in Europe 
“include reinforcing the competitiveness of EU industry (especially SMEs) with benefits 
for the economy, and promoting employment and export potential” (Fukasaku, 1999: 110). 
In Australia, the cooperative programmes “have at heart the idea that firms exchange 
information and capabilities as well as goods and services - so that cooperation can 
enhance firm competitiveness” (BIE, 1995: 2). To Guy et al. (1999: 132) “public funding 
support for ATPs [Advanced Technology Programmes] can be justified on the grounds of 
[...] enhancing international competitiveness, in the face of perceived weaknesses relative 
to trading partners.” Gugler and Dunning (1993: 156) note that, viewed from a national 
perspective, “R&D collaboration may [...] induce higher productivity, avoid a duplication 
                                                 
41
 See, for instance, Peterson and Sharp (1998) for a detailed and critical view on the EU technology policy. 
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of research investment, reduce structural overcapacity, and improve the competitiveness of 
their national champions.” 
 
Stimulating local and regional integration. This is clearly visible in the case of the 
European Union’s collaboration policy, which encourages “firms to think in European 
terms, to work with firms beyond their national borders as a matter of routine, and to seek 
new market opportunities beyond their traditional home markets” (Peterson and Sharp, 
1998: 215). And Fukasaku (1999:110) notes that “partnerships programmes in Europe have 
largely been aimed at enhancing European integration by involving enterprises and 
research bodies from different countries in joint projects.” Chesnais (1988: 106) stresses 
that the aim and result of programmes organised on the basis of a large number of projects, 
co-ordinated between participants of different sizes, technological strengths and legal 
status, “will necessarily be mainly that of stimulating the creation of interfirm and inter-
organizational linkages for R&D and technological linkages in a context where such 
linkages do not exist or [exist] only to a limited extent.” The European framework 
programmes “carry out an important task of inter-territorial cohesion” (Hidalgo, 1997: 
145). 
 
Correcting market failures in R&D. Public funding support for R&D partnerships aims to 
correct the market failures which results in under-investment in R&D by firms (e.g. 
Jacquemin, 1988; Macdonald, 1992; Guy et al., 1999; Link, 1999; Scott, 1999, Hagedoorn 
et al., 2000). According to Scott (1999: 71), there are two broad and interrelated sources of 
market failures that cause under-investment in technology and innovation. One is 
“appropriability difficulties” - private firms typically do not appropriate all the social 
returns from their innovative investments. R&D cooperation between firms partially 
overcomes the appropriability problem by lowering the cost of the innovation to 
participating firms and making the results available to the entire group (Watkins, 1991: 
89). The other is “risk and uncertainty” - reluctance of firms to invest in costly and risky 
projects that can drive them to bankruptcy if unsuccessful. R&D alliances are rarely 
initiated to restrict competition and, since it is usually hard to make profits from basic 
research, private and public collaboration in basic research may promote innovation that 
otherwise would not be developed (Gugler and Dunning, 1993: 156). Peterson and Sharp 
(1998: 46) are more emphatic on this point saying, “the market [...] will not provide basic 
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research. Unless the state steps in and supports it, it will not be undertaken.” 
 
Although market failures generally occur at the pre-competitive stage of technology, where 
the public funding can be justified, Scott (1999: 69) discusses a rather “aggressive view”. 
Scott argues that public funding can be more important and feasible “to correct market 
problems that extend beyond the basic and generic end of the research spectrum and into 
the development and commercialisation of innovations.” “There is therefore an argument 
for tailoring government support, such as information provision or financing, according to 
whether the failure lies in the pre-competitive stage or closer to market” (Cervantes, 1999: 
9). 
  
Speeding up technological innovations. Government-sponsored technological collaboration 
aims to speed up technological innovation and increase international competitiveness 
(Hagedoorn et al., 2000: 583). It is a way of improving the efficiency of the innovative base 
of the economy (OECD Secretariat, 1999b: 43). “The main motivation for the introduction 
of ESPRIT and the other schemes that became the Framework Programmes was 
competitiveness. European companies [...] were losing market share to their American and 
Japanese counterparts because they were falling behind in both the production and use of 
new technologies” (Peterson and Sharp, 1998: 211). 
 
Increasing technological information exchange.  “One of the assumptions concerning the 
promotion of collaboration is that it is primarily a mechanism for technology sharing” 
(Dodgson, 1992b: 466). R&D cooperation stimulates the exchange of information, 
scientific and technological knowledge between the public and private sector (e.g. Tijssen 
and Korevaar, 1997; Hagedoorn et al., 2000). Guy et al. (1999: 132) note that public 
funding for advanced technology programmes can be justified on the grounds of “systemic 
failure, where the structure of the overall R&D system may be such that bottlenecks exist 
in relationships between the various actors, leading to, for example, poor information flows 
and unnecessary constraints to the sharing of know-how and expertise.” According to the 
OECD secretariat (1999b: 43), “today, most policy makers subscribe to the view that such 
collaborations [between universities and the private sector] increase the distributive power 
of innovation systems by allowing the smoother and faster flow of knowledge from 
universities to the final users of this knowledge - private sector enterprises.”  
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Improving the efficiency of public support for R&D. According to Cervantes (1999: 9), the 
government’s support for partnerships in the context of innovation and technology helps 
“improve the ‘efficiency’ of public R&D support by eliminating overlapping investments, 
reducing the time horizons for R&D and stimulating additional spillovers from public 
research.” Public funding for R&D collaboration may avoid a duplication of research 
investment (Gugler and Dunning, 1993) and it is a way of co-ordinating and concentrating 
collaborative R&D efforts (Tijssen and Korevaar, 1997: 1278).  
 
3.5.2 Basis for public policy towards inter-firm cooperation 
 
As we have seen, there are a number of important reasons supporting government policy 
towards cooperation. The potential benefits are enormous for both the firms and the 
economy as a whole. But, to what extent are such policies based on actual benefits rather 
than perceived benefits? How effective have such policies been? Since the government 
support for collaboration normally takes the form of financial incentives, it raises a 
question about the motives for private firm participation. That is “whether firms participate 
to improve technological capacities or to benefit from public subsidies” (Dodgson, 1992a: 
466). These are examples of pertinent questions for which there are no appropriate answers 
yet. Therefore, “it becomes imperative for policy makers to offer an economic rationale for 
their support of public/private partnerships” (Link, 1999: 191). 
 
The Bureau of Industry Economics in Australia says that “policy makers have identified 
networking and similar activities as potentially useful, [however] their impacts on 
performance and competitiveness are largely undocumented” (BIE, 1995: 145). Cervantes 
(1999: 20) points out that “partnerships policies and schemes should not be designed solely 
on the notion that co-operation between industry and public research is intrinsically 
‘good’.” And Rosenfeld (1996: 247-8) notes that “although there are a growing number of 
local, regional, and state efforts to encourage and accelerate inter-firm collaboration, there 
have been few systematic studies of their impacts. In the absence of hard data, policy 
makers rely on claims of effects and outcomes based on anecdotal evidence”.  
 
The U.S. Office of Technology Policy made an assessment of public/private partnerships, 
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pointing out their benefits for firms and the U.S economy42. Link (1999) concedes that the 
report’s findings should be given “some credibility and perhaps even some 
generalizability”, but also says the findings are very general and the recommendations non-
operational. The efforts should first be directed at examining the question of “market 
failure”, the main argument in favour of the participation of governments in the innovation 
process. Market failure must be the “cornerstone” of any evaluation, says Link (1999: 215). 
Concerning the EU-sponsored cooperative research programmes, “the evaluations and 
studies have added fairly little to the general discussion on the contribution of the 
programmes to furthering the competitiveness of European industries, their prime 
objective” (Luukkonen, 1998: 599). On the one hand, most of the evaluations and studies 
have been commissioned by the authorities responsible for the R&D policies, either at the 
European or national level. That discourages evaluators from voicing strong criticisms. On 
the other hand, the evaluations are based on unsystematic background information and 
many studies have weaknesses in their data collection process. The fact that most studies 
and evaluations were carried out at a micro level (projects, research teams, firms) is 
inadequate to understand the role of the programmes in advancing competitiveness in 
European industry in general (Luukkonen, 1998). 
 
Although there are many and diverse reasons behind the government policies towards 
cooperation, there is insufficient empirical evidence on the impacts of such policies, in 
particular at the firm level. It is largely unknown what is the impact of the EU-sponsored 
collaborative programme on the performance of SMEs. 
 
3.6 EUROPEAN UNION RTD POLICY 
 
The Framework Programme (FP) is the basic, multi-annual, instrument of the European 
Union for the RTD (research and technological development) policy within the Union. The 
Single European Act, signed in 1986 and ratified in 1987, provided the formal legal basis 
for the EU RTD policy, legitimising it for the first time (Peterson and Sharp, 1998: 115). 
Subsequently, the Maastricht Treaty, signed in 1992, gave further support to the role of EU 
in regard to RTD policy and the competitiveness of European industry. It states in its 
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 Office of Technology Policy (1996), Effective partnering: a report to congress on federal technology 
partnerships. Washington, DC: US Department of Commerce. 
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Article 130f: “The Community shall have the objective of strengthening the scientific and 
technological bases of Community industry and encouraging it to become more 
competitive at international level...”  
 
However, since the notion of competitiveness should be used in relation to firms rather 
than to countries43, and the Treaty of Rome forbids the promotion of individual firms, the 
Framework Programmes have therefore an “in-built paradox”: while they are expected to 
promote competitiveness at a general level, they are not to promote particular firms 
(Luukkonen, 1998: 601). In order to avoid that inconsistency, the EU R&D support is 
described as pre-competitive R&D (i.e. concerned with generic research for which no 
immediate commercial application is expected). 
 
The Maastricht Treaty also demands coordination between the Union’s and Member 
States’ RTD policies. According to Article 130h, “The Community and the member States 
shall coordinate their research and technological development activities so as to ensure that 
national and Community policy are mutually consistent.” It adds that the Community may 
take any useful initiative to promote such coordination. Therefore, the Framework 
Programmes (currently the Fifth - 1998-2002) include the basic areas of high-priority 
research grouped together in specific programmes designed to satisfy the individual and 
collective needs of the Member States (Hidalgo, 1987). The Framework Programmes, 
which are approved unanimously by all Member States, define the main technological 
objectives and the corresponding budget for each of them. The FPs gave coherence to the 
European Union’s RTD efforts (Peterson and Sharp, 1998). 
 
There are two main sources of funds for R&D. On the one hand, there are the FPs, which 
are administered directly by the Commission and are materialised in RTD programmes. 
The CRAFT (1994-98) is an RTD programme of the Fourth Framework Programme 
especially designed for SMEs44. All institutions of the Member States can participate, but 
the Commission favours projects with participants from the cohesion countries (Portugal, 
Greece and Ireland). Although the EU spending on RTD has grown, the total amount is still 
relatively small. Figures for 1994 indicate that the EU RTD spending as a percentage of 
                                                 
43
 See, for instance, Metcalfe et al. (1992) and Sharp (1998) for a discussion on the issue of competitiveness.  
44
 See Chapter 4 for detailed information on the CRAFT programme. 
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Member States’ total RTD spending (public and private) amounted to 1.7% and 3.8% if 
considering only the Member States’ government spending on R&D (Peterson and Sharp, 
1998: 11). These authors note that such “modest EU share of all European spending on 
research [...] cannot hope to make a large or even tangible difference in terms of European 
competitiveness or employment” (p. 22). In the same way, Pavitt (1998) says that such 
small spending “will not have a significant rate and direction of technical change in 
Europe” (p. 564). Larger countries (Germany, UK, France, Italy) tend to get a larger 
percentage of FPs’ funds. Despite the relatively small figures, the rate of firm participation 
in the EU research programmes makes the debate on the EU research policy necessary 
(Larédo, 1998: 591). 
 
On the other hand, there are Structural Funds (SFs), which are “the principal means by 
which the European Union delivers regional and other assistance” (OECD, 2000: 203). 
These funds are mainly for the cohesion countries to build technological capabilities in 
order to reduce the existing technological gap between them and the other Member States. 
Unlike the Framework Programmes, the recipient Member State administers the Structural 
Funds, which amounted to about 25% of the Fourth Framework Programme. Sharp 
clarifies the difference between the two sources of funds: 
 
[...] “Structural Funds, which of course are used in conjunction with other national and 
regional funds, play a much more important role in funding RTD in the cohesion countries 
than the Framework Programme. [...] The aim of the Structural Funds [...] is implicitly to build 
up capabilities in terms of physical assets (in this case, laboratories and equipment) and 
personnel (education and training). By contrast, the Framework Programme, with its emphasis 
on collaboration, takes physical assets as given but seeks to add value by encouraging 
researchers and laboratories to work jointly on research projects. [...] While the Structural 
Funds upgrade the physical infrastructure, the Framework Programme collaborations provide 
opportunities for learning.” (Sharp, 1998: 581-2) 
 
Of the numerous initiatives taken by Portugal with Structural Funds, PEDIP45 is probably 
the most ambitious scientific programme carried out since Portugal’s incorporation into the 
                                                 
45
 PEDIP II (1994-1999) stands for “Strategic Programmes for the Promotion and Modernisation of 
Portuguese Industry”. 
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EU (Hidalgo, 1997: 129). This programme “aims to promote sustained growth in the 
competitiveness of Portuguese industrial firms, reinforcing their capacity to respond to 
rapid technological and market changes and promoting their modernisation, diversification 
and internationalisation” (OECD, 2000: 170). 
 
Both the Framework Programmes and Structural Funds are important for SMEs. Despite 
the importance of SMEs in the context of the European industry, until the Third 
Framework Programme their participation in RTD programmes was difficult given the 
programmes’ pre-competitive nature and the transaction costs associated with the 
negotiation and implementation of cooperative projects. Since then, there has been an 
increasing awareness of the important role of SMEs, not only in the development of new 
technologies but also, and even more crucially, as users of new technologies (Peterson and 
Sharp, 1998: 151). Besides the “Multi-annual Programmes for SMEs”, aiming at 
simplifying and harmonising procedures within the Union, the later Framework 
Programmes have included specific programmes for the participation of SMEs in RTD 
projects. The FP4 (1994-1998) included the programme “Technology Stimulation 
Measures” and the FP5 (1998-2002) includes the programme “Promotion of innovation 
and encouragement of SME participation”.46 
  
At the national level, Portugal’s main economic policies and programmes have 
implications for SMEs. Included in these policy measures and programmes are: “support 
for increases in competitive capabilities; [...] support for direct investment in distribution 
and production; increased support for intangibles, in particular workforce skills, 
management capability, R&D, innovation and the quality of sales and structures; 
encouragement of co-operative efforts between companies; support for the modernisation 
of SMEs in retail trade” (OECD, 2000: 169). 
 
3.7 CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter gives an overview of relevant issues which characterise the context in which 
the CRAFT alliances took place. The existing databases on alliances have some structural 
                                                 
46
 See, for instance, the Internet site http://www.cordis.lu/fp5/home.html for more information. 
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limitations and can only capture the phenomenon partially. The available data seem, 
nevertheless, to indicate that the number of R&D alliances formed each year is still 
increasing, however at a much slower pace than that witnessed in the 1980s and early 
1990s. The information about the number of SMEs involved in R&D alliances is scarce, 
especially alliances involving non-high-tech firms. It appears, however, that the 
participation of SMEs in EU-sponsored collaborative programmes is growing, which is a 
consequence of the government stimulation of alliances, but it may also be the result of an 
increasing awareness of the importance of technology for their competitiveness. 
 
The Portuguese industrial structure has a number of characteristics such as: a large number 
of very small firms, mainly concentrated in traditional sectors; a small amount of 
investment in research by the business sector; and technological dependency from abroad 
which likely affects the competitiveness of Portuguese firms. While collaborative 
programmes like CRAFT might be important opportunities to strengthen their 
competencies and improve their performance, the limitations identified above might as 
well be important drawbacks to do so. 
 
This chapter also identifies several factors which justify public policies towards 
cooperation and government intervention in the innovation process, including the 
stimulation of industrial competitiveness at national and international level, and correction 
of market failures in R&D. However, the perceived benefits of such policies are not yet 
supported by empirical research. Finally, we have seen that the Framework Programme is 
the basic EU RTD policy instrument to strengthen the competitiveness of the European 
industry. Additionally, the cohesion countries, such as Portugal, benefit from Structural 
Funds to increase their technological capability. The growing attention paid to SMEs is the 
consequence of an increasing awareness of their importance to the economy and the 
innovation process. 
 
Chapters 2 and 3 have thus developed the theoretical and empirical backgrounds in a 
complementary way. Chapter 4 outlines the research approach which is used in this study. 
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4 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The previous chapters reviewed the relevant literature aiming at deriving the theoretical 
framework for the research undertaken in this thesis and characterising the practical 
context in which the R&D alliances took place. This chapter outlines the research approach 
which is used in this thesis.  
 
The literature reviewed in Chapter 2 made a substantial contribution to the understanding 
of the alliance-performance link. Authors have used a range of different approaches and 
indicators to assess alliance performance and the impact on firm performance in a number 
of contexts. This thesis examines the impact of R&D alliances on firm performance and 
attends to some of the limitations found in the literature. Based on a homogeneous sample 
of SMEs who participated in the EU-sponsored CRAFT programme, the thesis addresses 
the causality between R&D alliances and firm performance, examines the influence of 
initial conditions on the alliance performance and firm performance, looks at the ability of 
SMEs to exploit the alliance outcomes, and attempts to understand organisational learning 
from alliances. 
 
The study is based on qualitative data, collected by means of face-to-face interviews with 
SME executives and using a structured questionnaire as a guide. The method of data 
collection is a compromise between the interview and questionnaire methods, aiming at 
getting deeply into the projects and simultaneously collecting data for comparative 
purposes and aggregate analyses. The study relies upon perceptual measures; the 
questionnaire was designed chiefly to capture the firm’s own assessment of the alliance 
performance and the impact on firm performance. 
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The chapter is structured as follows. First, it describes the elements of the research design, 
namely the specific research questions and related assumptions to be tackled, the unit of 
analysis and the sampling. Then it proceeds with the description of the instruments for data 
collection used during the fieldwork and the procedures to analyse the data. The next 
section discusses the adequacy of the research method employed, acknowledges the 
methodological limitations and limitations of the collected data and addresses the question 
of generalisation of the findings. The chapter ends with a summary of the methodological 
approach used in this thesis. 
 
4.2 ELEMENTS OF THE RESEARCH DESIGN  
 
4.2.1 Research question and its implications 
 
For a better understanding of the impact of R&D alliances on firm performance, the 
analysis should take into consideration the alliance performance, the initial conditions and 
the implementation process, and the capacity of firms to materialise the alliance outcomes 
into performance. Previous research has not considered such a combined approach and 
instead tended to focus on just one of the issues. Several studies attempted to correlate the 
use of alliances with firm performance, but failed to demonstrate the pattern of causality. 
The fourth group of studies that examined the impact on firm performance (see Table 2.7, 
Chapter 2) implicitly considered the issue of causality but did not address it purposefully. 
This thesis intends to address these issues and answer the following main research question 
and related implications. 
 
Do (successful) technology alliances cause better firm performance?  
 
The question addresses the issue of causality between technology alliances and firm 
performance, aiming at understanding the relevant factors linking the two matters. It goes 
beyond the identification of the number of firms who achieve performance improvements 
and attempts to discover whether technical success is a sufficient condition to cause any 
impact on performance. The attainment of technical success, here measured by the degree 
to which the objectives set out at the beginning (including changes in the course of the 
relationship) are achieved, is an important objective that the alliance partners should meet 
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in order to expect economic benefits. The attainment of poor technical results represents a 
fundamental obstacle for partner firms to derive any impact on their performance, unless 
unplanned benefits not related to the alliance objectives occur. On the other hand, a 
positive impact on the performance of the participating firms may be expected if the 
alliance objectives are fully met or at least substantial parts of them are attained. In other 
words, when the alliance’s technical outcomes are sufficient for any practical use, it is 
expected that the partner firms will exploit such outcomes. Therefore, the following 
working hypothesis is to be tested: 
 
Firms whose R&D alliance has achieved technical success are expected to exploit the 
alliance outcomes and have a positive impact on performance. 
 
The above question has a number of implications attached to it which help to understand 
the complexity of that seemingly straightforward relationship. Those implications lead to a 
set of new questions for which this study will attempt to provide some answers.  
 
• To what extent do the initial conditions and the alliance implementation process affect 
the alliance outcomes? This question looks at the circumstances that may affect the alliance 
outcomes and, consequently, the expected impact on the performance of firms. It includes 
factors such as the nature of the alliances and the context they were formed (i.e. R&D 
alliances in an EU-sponsored research setting), the circumstances in which the projects 
were shaped and the contribution of partners, the implementation process and the 
relationship between partners, especially between technology producers and technology 
users. The literature suggests that these factors matter although there has been an 
insufficiency of empirical studies attempting to link them with alliance performance and 
firm performance, and even fewer addressing the case of SMEs taking part in joint R&D 
projects. 
 
• Does satisfaction with the alliance imply better firm performance? Despite its 
importance, this question has been largely neglected in the literature and, thus, remains 
basically unanswered. One may assume that individual satisfaction with the alliance 
implies better firm performance because from a firm’s point of view, the notion of success 
generally goes beyond the achievement of technical success and includes commercial 
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success as well (Carvalho, 1996). However, it is important to understand the extent to 
which the individual satisfaction with the performance of alliances is related to the 
attainment of the alliance objectives and if it implies necessarily better firm performance. 
 
• To what extent can firms turn technology alliances into performance? What are the 
factors behind the unsuccessful exploitation of alliance outcomes? Once an alliance 
reaches technical success, a great deal of the literature implicitly assumes that the process 
of exploiting the alliance outcomes and getting performance improvements is rather 
“automatic” or “unproblematic”. The achievement of technical success represents a 
landmark for the successful exploitation of the alliance outcomes but it does not eliminate 
the risk of failure in doing so. The ability of firms to turn alliance outcomes into 
performance is crucial but it is equally important to understand the extent to which they 
depend on third parties or other factors to accomplish that. 
 
Complementary to these questions, the thesis further examines the link between R&D 
alliances and firm performance by addressing the issue of organisational learning. Under 
methodological constraints, it attempts to understand how much firms have learned from 
alliances and then identify some important barriers to learning.  
 
4.2.2 Unit of analysis  
 
There are many aspects related to the topic under analysis that could have been chosen as 
the unit of analysis and all of them deserve the attention of researchers. Among them the 
most relevant are the cooperative programme and the European Union RTD policy, the role 
of RTD performers, the research alliances and the firms (see Figure 4.1 below). Any 
alliance involves the pooling of individual resources and/or assets for a common purpose 
that ultimately aims to generate additional benefits for the participating firms. From the 
firms’ point of view, it can be regarded as an investment that they expect to be rewarding. 
There are alliance outcomes that can be exploited together (e.g. patenting rights) but most 
of them, as in this study, are to be exploited by each partner firm individually. The thesis 
aims to examine the individual attainment of benefits. Therefore, the unit of analysis in this 
study is primarily the firm and secondly the research alliance. Specifically, the study aims 
to shed light on the research alliances versus firm performance relationship.  
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The main purpose of this thesis is assessing neither the role of RTD performers nor the 
cooperative programme (and the EU policy) under which the alliances took place. Instead, 
the emphasis is on the firm and its ability to get performance improvements from alliance 
participation. Both the RTD performers and the cooperative programme are here 
considered a means to be used by firms in achieving their objectives. However, they cannot 
be simply ignored, given the central role of the former in performing the research activities 
on behalf of the firms and the importance of the latter in framing the general settings of the 
research projects. Though these two factors are not explicitly included in the main aims of 
the study, their important roles will be assessed because they are expected to be linked to 
the performance of alliances; hence it is expected that the research will provide some 
important recommendations for policy-makers. 
 
Figure 4.1 Major participants in the CRAFT II47 programme 
The European Commission 
Cooperative research (CRAFT II) programme 
                      
     Regulations 
                      
     Funding 
                      
     Project supervision 
 
 
 
 
  (and/or)                                                       (and) 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
 
4.2.3 Sampling  
 
This research project aims at studying the impact of the research alliances under the EU 
                                                 
47
 This is the second version of the former CRAFT (Specific programme of research and technological 
development in the field of industrial and materials technologies) programme (1990-94). 
 
Portuguese RTD performers 
(national RTD performers) 
Other EU Member States and 
Associated States firms 
(international firms) 
Portuguese firms 
(national firms) 
Other EU Member States and 
Associated States RTD performers 
(international RTD performers) 
RTD 
Alliance 
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cooperative programme CRAFT II (1994-98) on the participating firms performance. 
“Cooperative Research (CRAFT) is a project type designed to enable groups of SMEs with 
no or inadequate R&D means of their own to engage third parties to carry out research on 
their behalf, to solve common or similar technical problems” (European Commission, 
1994). Thus, this programme was designed to provide financial support to cooperative 
R&D projects involving firms, primarily small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), with 
limited research resources and facing a common industrial or technological research need. 
CRAFT II enables these SMEs to join together and to engage a third party – the RTD 
performer - to carry out the research on their behalf. RTD performers “are organisations 
who must have adequate R&D means to carry out the required research on behalf of the 
SME proposers, and can be universities, research organisations, industrial companies, etc. 
They must normally be from Member States or associated States and must not be affiliated 
to any of the proposers” (European Commission, 1994).   
 
The objectives of the CRAFT II programme are (European Commission, 1994): 
• to promote the development of technologies adapted to the needs of SMEs; 
• to promote transnational networking and cooperation amongst SMEs, and between 
SMEs, research organisations and large companies; 
• to support SMEs in their efforts to strengthen their capability to absorb and to contribute 
to the development of the technologies they require. 
 
The research projects under this programme are limited in time (between 1 and 2 years) 
and those analysed here typically lasted two years; two of the projects under analysis lasted 
18 months only. 
 
The CRAFT II programme was chosen for a number of reasons. First, the programme itself 
is closed since 1998 and many of the projects were then terminated (at the time of the 
interviews). Therefore it seemed to be the appropriate moment to study their outcomes and 
evaluate the consequences for those firms involved. Second, the sample to be analysed 
belongs to a well-defined population and the projects have been selected by the EU 
supposedly according to the same criteria, assuring greater homogeneity in the sample. 
Third, all alliances were formed for R&D purposes. Fourth, SMEs are the unit of analysis 
and, despite representing a much bigger group of firms as compared to large ones, they are 
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under-represented in the literature on inter-firm cooperation. 
 
After selecting the CRAFT programme, an interview was conducted with its Portuguese 
co-ordinator, Dra. Margarida Garrido, at the Institute for International Scientific and 
Technological Co-operation (ICCTI) in Lisbon. She kindly provided important information 
about the programme itself, about the projects with Portuguese participants and the 
elements of contact of the Portuguese firms, which were then confirmed by using two other 
sources of information (CORDIS database and an on-line phone book).  
 
In defining the population of firms suitable for this study, three additional conditions were 
taken into consideration. First, cooperative research (CRAFT II) is one of the technology 
stimulation measures for SMEs that is implemented by several research programmes under 
the Fourth Framework Programme, but only the projects under the sub-programme 
“Industrial and materials technologies” (BRITE-EURAM III) are important for this 
thesis.48 Second, this study is intended to comprise only the research alliances with 
Portuguese participants and, third, only the Portuguese partner firms are to be analysed. 
These criteria assured greater homogeneity of the sample since it comprises only one kind 
of alliance formed under the same EU programme, these alliances are contemporary with 
one another, and the firms all have the same nationality. 
 
This means that the total population consists of 105 research projects and a total of 755 
partner firms, 153 of them being Portuguese. Of those, 67 firms49 were contacted for a 
face-to-face interview and 41 accepted, corresponding to 43 different project-firm 
groupings and 30 research alliances (see Figure 4.2). Four other interviews were carried out 
(two of them by phone) but the collected information is insufficient to include them in the 
sample and it will be used only in support of specific points.  
 
                                                 
48
 The other sub-programmes are: Standards, measurements and testing (SMT); Biomedicine and health 
(Biomed II); Biotechnology; Agriculture and fisheries (FAIR); Environment and climate; Marine science and 
technology (MAST); Non-nuclear energy (JOULE and Thermie); Transport; Information technologies 
(Esprit) (European Commission, 1998: preface). 
49
 These were the firms in condition to be contacted (i.e. their projects were terminated or about to terminate) 
at the time the fieldwork was carried out (between February and May 2000). Many projects had been 
approved in April 1998 and started some months later, others were delayed and got extra time to close the 
research activities. This diminished the number of projects suitable to be studied and the number of 
Portuguese firms suitable to be contacted. 
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Figure 4.2 Firms contacted and number of interviews carried out 
       
INTERVIEWS 
41 firms (61.2 %) 
  OTHER INTERVIEWS 
4 firms (6.0 %) 
  OTHER SITUATIONS 
22 firms (32.8 %) 
       
       
Remarks: 
• This corresponds to 43 
project-firm groupings. 
Two firms took part in two 
projects simultaneously; 
• And 30 research alliances. 
In some alliances more than 
one  partner firm has been 
interviewed; 
• In one situation the project 
was cancelled but the firm 
had had an active 
involvement in the alliance; 
• Two firms took part in two 
projects simultaneously but 
one refused to talk about 
the second project it was in 
and the other did not 
remember it at first but then 
said it was abandoned at an 
early stage. 
  Remarks: 
• Two firms have been contacted by 
phone only. These firms quit their 
alliance and were available for an 
interview but assured me having 
nothing more to say; 
• In one case the interviewee (the 
current general manager) did not 
know anything about the project 
the firm has been involved with 
because the “right” person to 
contact had left the firm. Thus, the 
interview was useless; 
• In the other case the interviewee 
could not tell much about the 
project for two reasons: first, the 
project has been cancelled and 
could not be concluded; second, the 
firm had no real involvement since 
its participation was planned to a 
later stage of the project. 
  Remarks: 
• In three cases the “right” 
person to contact had left 
the firm and there was 
nobody else available for 
an interview (i.e. 
someone who knew 
enough about the 
project); 
• One firm went out of 
business meanwhile; 
• Eighteen firms were 
unavailable for an 
interview due to several 
reasons. 
       
Note: 67 firms were contacted for an interview, corresponding to 73 project-firm groupings and 44 research 
alliances. 
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
 
4.2.3.1 Some characteristics of the sampled firms  
 
Figure 4.3 categorises the 41 Portuguese firms according to (a) the number of employees in 
the year 2000 and (b) the turnover in 1999. Five firms have less than 20 employees, about 
60% (25) have less than 100 and two of them have a number of employees higher than 500. 
About 49% (25) of the firms had less than 5 million Euro turnover in 1999, 15% (6) had 
more than 20 million turnover and 2 firms surpassed 38 million. In total, three firms did 
not meet all the criteria to be classified as an SME50. The sampled firms are from thirteen 
industrial sectors as depicted in Figure 4.4.51 The sectors “Machinery & Equipment” and 
                                                 
50
 “An SME is an enterprise which generally satisfies the following criteria: - has no more than 500 
employees; - is no more than 1/3 owned by an organisation larger than an SME (based on turnover and 
number of employees), unless it is a financial investor such as a bank or venture capitalist;. - has an annual 
turnover of no more than 38 million ECU (MECU)” (European Commission, 1994). The definition has since 
changed, and the European Commission now defines SMEs as non-subsidiary firms with fewer than 250 
employees, annual turnover not exceeding EUR 40 million and/or a balance-sheet valuation not exceeding 
EUR 27 million. 
51
 Two firms are counted twice because each of them participated in two research alliances. 
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“Textiles” are those with the highest number of participants, 7 and 5 respectively. Because 
each sector is represented by a small number of firms, establishing sectoral differences is 
hardly possible. The analysis in the subsequent chapters is based on the whole sample and 
no reference to a particular sector will be made.  
 
Figure 4.3 Size of firms according to the number of employees and turnover 
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Source: Interviews 
 
Figure 4.4 Breakdown of the sampled firms by industrial sector 
Ceramics [3]
7.0%
Tanning [4]
9.3%
Shoe-making [1]
2.3%
Textiles [5]
11.6%
Cork [3]
7.0%
Mould-making [4]
9.3%Rubber & 
Plastics [2]
4.7%
Construction [4]
9.3%
Foundry [4]
9.3%
Wood [2]
4.7%
Machinery & 
Equipment [7]
16.3%
Stone [2]
4.7%
Chemical [2]
4.7%
 
Notes: The numbers in brackets refer to the number of firms of each industrial sector. The 
“Machinery & Equipment” sector includes a commercial firm.  
Source: Interviews. 
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4.3 DATA COLLECTION METHOD  
 
The empirical data have been collected through face-to-face interviews, using a structured 
questionnaire as a guide during the interviewing process.  
 
4.3.1 The questionnaire52  
 
The questionnaire consists of a set of structured questions, both open-ended and scored 
(Likert-type) questions, whose main purpose was to be used for guiding the interviews. It 
also guaranteed that all the interviewees were asked this fundamental set of questions, 
which were regarded as being important for this research project. However, the respondents 
were not bounded by this pre-defined set of questions because other related issues were 
raised by them in the course of the interviews and additional questions were then asked. In 
fact, they were stimulated to take an active participation and enrich their contribution. 
 
The questionnaire is structured in order to capture information on alliances in a 
longitudinal fashion, from inception to impact on firm performance. It comprises four main 
sections, namely the “initial importance of the projects”, “structural factors”, “determinants 
of performance” and “indicators of performance”, and has been designed to meet the 
following objectives. First, to understand the importance of research alliances as a means to 
improve the performance of partner firms, analyse how the initial circumstances and the 
implementation process have influenced the alliance outcomes, and look at the ability of 
firms to exploit them. Second, to take advantage of the interview for an in-depth analysis of 
the research projects and simultaneously collect structured information for comparative 
purposes and aggregate analysis. Third, to help establish a stronger interaction with the 
interviewee by giving him/her an active role in filling in the Likert-type questions and at 
the same time being asked to explain the underlying reasons for their answers. A few of 
them tacitly refused to perform such a role by verbally answering the questions. 
 
 
 
                                                 
52
 A copy of the questionnaire (English version) can be found in Appendix 1. Naturally, a Portuguese version 
of the questionnaire has been prepared for the interviews. 
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4.3.2 The interviews  
 
Table 4.1 below describes the steps taken to carry out the face-to-face interviews. All the 
interviews took place at the firms’ premises with top management staff or technical 
directors (in most cases the interviewee was the entrepreneur). There were two 
interviewees in seven interviews and just one interviewee in all the others. The longest 
interview took more than three hours while the shortest one took just 45 minutes, with the 
average duration of the interviews being around one hour and fifty minutes. It was decided 
from the outset not to tape-record the interviews in order to create an informal atmosphere 
and avoid possible verbal inhibition of the respondents; instead, notes were taken and the 
answers written up immediately after the interview had taken place, using as far as possible 
the interviewee’s own expressions. Subsequently, the answers were sent back to the contact 
person for validation and further comments.   
 
At the beginning of each interview, the interviewee was given a full copy of the 
questionnaire. This proved to be a very important strategy because (s)he had the 
opportunity to follow each question being asked and re-read it when necessary. It was 
especially important if the terms used were not familiar to the interviewee or the question 
was too long and could not be fully assimilated at once. Having a copy of the questionnaire 
was essential to the planned interaction and active participation of the interviewee in filling 
in the scored questions. Furthermore, it greatly facilitated the researcher’s control of the 
interview, namely in keeping it focused on its intended course after any respondent’s 
diversion into particular issues, and especially after asking additional questions to clarify a 
particular point or justify a given answer. 
 
The data collection process successfully combined the interview and questionnaire 
methods and greatly benefited from the advantages of both. The use of a mixture of open-
ended and closed questions has been an appropriate approach for the purpose of getting 
deeply into the projects without losing the possibility of gathering data for comparative 
purposes. The interaction with the respondents, who after each scoring were requested to 
justify their answer, has been extremely successful to understand the reasons behind the 
answers given by them, namely those concerning the Likert-type questions. This procedure 
has broadened the understanding about the alliances and the firms’ perspective on them, 
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and now permits a more accurate and extended interpretation of the results which 
otherwise would not be possible. The qualitative information collected by this process is 
extremely important to substantiate the interpretation of the scored questions and statistical 
findings. Indeed, this systematic data gathering process proved to be very useful to 
understand many results and some possible paradoxes that otherwise could hardly be 
explained. This compromise between both the interview and questionnaire methods ended 
up as an important methodological contribution of this thesis. 
 
Table 4.1 The fieldwork process  
Step Action Purpose 
1 Checking the 
CORDIS 
database53 and 
other Internet sites 
• validating (or not) the information obtained from other 
sources;  
• getting additional information on the projects and firms; 
• identifying the firms who were suitable to be contacted 
(namely if the alliance had ended or was about to end);  
2 Phone call(s) • getting the contact person's name; 
• confirming the firm's address and other details;  
3 Letter • personal letter to the contact person explaining the purpose 
of the project, asking for an interview at the firm’s 
premises and assuring confidentiality on the source of 
information; 
4 Phone call(s) • getting an answer to my letter and if affirmative setting up 
the interview;  
5 Interview • direct interview at the firm’s premises, typically with one 
person but sometimes with two; 
• a full copy of the questionnaire was given to the 
interviewee(s) at the beginning of the interview; 
• the interviewee was invited to collaborate in filling in the 
Likert-type questions; 
• notes were taken in the course of the interview; 
6 Writing-up • the answers were written up immediately after each 
interview while the information was still fresh in memory; 
7 Letter • sending the questionnaire with answers to the contact 
person for validation. The interviewee was also invited to 
add other relevant information that (s)he had not recalled 
before; 
8 Conclusion • correcting the answers according to the feed-back received 
(only a small number of firms answered back and most 
without any suggestions for correction); 
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
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4.3.3 Procedures for data analysis 
 
The interviews were carried out on the basis that both the firms’ and the respondents’ name 
would not be disclosed. Therefore, each project has been attributed a number between 1 
and 43, in a random manner, that will be used for its clear identification whenever 
necessary throughout the thesis. The empirical data collected will be analysed by using 
matrices, categorisation and statistical tools when appropriate54. The interpretation of data 
will be supported by constant references to the qualitative information gathered from the 
individual cases.  
 
4.4 STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH APPROACH  
 
4.4.1 Adequacy of the research method  
 
The selection of the research method(s) to collect the empirical data is extremely important 
for the reliability of the study. Every method of data gathering has strengths and 
weaknesses and the investigator’s decision for one method or a mixture of methods 
normally takes into consideration four basic criteria: accessibility of data, economy of 
resources, accuracy, and relevance (Richardson, Dohrenwend and Klein, 1965: 21). While 
it is desirable to choose the method most likely to provide the best information, there is a 
trade-off in applying each criterion that weighs considerably in the investigator’s decision. 
As Richardson et al. (idem.) point out, “in applying the criterion of accuracy, the 
investigator will try to choose the method that yields the greater accuracy within limits of 
economy and accessibility. [...] The degree of precision of a piece of information, although 
not inevitably related to accuracy, does affect economy and accessibility. In general, the 
greater the precision required, the more costly is the acquisition of the information.” The 
present study is not an exception and it is bounded by a number of restrictions.  
 
A longitudinal analysis would probably be a more effective approach than the cross-
sectional analysis used here for the sake of accuracy, since the information would be 
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 As Guy et al. (1999: 23) say, “Although, strictly speaking, it is technically incorrect to think in terms of 
averages when using ordinal scales, their use does offer a simple way of visualising differences across the 
‘Nature’ dimensions. For similar reasons histograms are used to depict these differences.” 
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collected through several means (e.g. interviews, alliance progress reports, internal 
company data, press coverage) through the several stages of the cooperation process, from 
the negotiation phase until the impact on firm performance. This method would likely 
provide richer information, both qualitative and quantitative, and would avoid many of the 
data limitations described below. However, on the drawback side, at least three aspects are 
very important. First, it takes a few years’ time from the inception phase of alliances to the 
impact on firm performance; in the present case, the research period alone generally lasted 
two years and only a small number of firms were able to get economic benefits 
immediately after that period or in the course of the relationship. Besides that, it is difficult 
to identify the exact moment that the stream of benefits really stops, being different from 
firm to firm. Therefore, a longitudinal study would be a time-consuming process, 
incompatible with the available time for the completion of a PhD thesis. Second, 
monitoring a sample of more than 40 firms for a long period of time would demand a 
relatively high amount of financial resources and the cost-effectiveness of that investment 
is not yet demonstrated. Third, there is the accessibility question. Some of the benefits 
achieved by firms (e.g. better image) are not easily quantifiable in terms of firm 
performance given the eminent difficulties in establishing a cause-effect relationship. On 
the other hand, most firms probably would not be available for an intense scrutiny of 
private and sensitive information, since “SMEs are often reluctant to share confidential 
information” (Rosenfeld, 1996: 262). Consequently, the accessibility to the information in 
great detail would likely be a critical constraint. 
 
The methodology employed to address the matter under analysis has some limitations that 
need to be recognised from the outset. The cross-sectional analysis can be criticised in 
terms of its limitations for addressing an issue with implications over a period of time; 
although the design of the questionnaire, the interaction with the respondents and the 
systematic approach in collecting the data minimised considerably those limitations and 
greatly helped to capture what had changed. The study was not designed to address 
satisfactorily the question of organisational learning from alliances, which would improve 
the understanding about the effect of R&D alliances on firm performance. It is possible that 
firms have acquired knowledge and skills that are not immediately reflected in the 
performance indicators. 
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Another limitation has to do with the measurement process. This study uses only 
perceptual measures (i.e. the firm’s own assessment) and a Likert-type scale to assess the 
impact on firm performance, meaning that the measures are qualitative and rather 
subjective. Unlike the Beta (1993) study, which attempted to quantify (in currency units) 
all the identified effects of alliances with impact on the performance of participating firms, 
the quantification in currency units has never been perceived as essential here and the 
chosen methodology would not be appropriate for that purpose. The perceptual assessment 
is sufficient for the purpose of understanding the impact on performance and it also permits 
the assessment of non-financial indicators of performance. 
 
Concerning the instrument chosen for data collection, there was the possibility of 
conducting a postal questionnaire instead of interviews. The former generally reaches a 
larger audience, even the whole population under analysis, and is perhaps more appropriate 
for statistical significance, but it suffers from a relatively low response rate and normally is 
unable to capture adequately any substantive information to support the answers given by 
respondents. If poorly constructed or tested, ex post it can be very difficult or even 
impossible to validate the answers. In the present case, there was an additional and 
significant problem concerning its workability: the population to be analysed includes 
firms from all the EU member states, which involves many different languages. This means 
the logistic problems of administrating the questionnaire would be very significant.   
 
4.4.2 Limitations of the data 
 
The present study is aware that the data collected through the face-to-face interviews have 
some limitations which are intrinsic to the data collection process and are not easily 
avoidable, even following scientifically rigorous procedures when collecting the 
information. Five possible limitations have been identified and are explained below. They 
tend to be relevant only in specific parts of the questionnaire.  
 
First, limited perception. Some firms performed a minor role in the whole process of 
cooperation, and the involvement among partner firms and RTD performers was minimal 
as well. In such cases, the answers to specific questions, namely those concerning the 
involvement and attitude of partners, might have been based on insufficient or inadequate 
 93 
information. This was noticeable, for instance, when the executives were asked to rate the 
negative factors of cooperation (question B7), i.e. those negative factors related to the 
partners’ competence or commitment to the project. Two or three executives admitted not 
having sufficient information to answer those questions properly. This problem has a slight 
influence on the results concerning the implementation of projects. 
 
Second, inconsistency of the answers. This happens when the answers to later questions do 
not express exactly the same perspective of the previous ones, if related. It is not always 
possible to detect the presence of inconsistency between the answers during the interview 
and it may cause problems at the time of interpreting the results. For example, there 
appears to exist some inconsistency between the answers of twelve executives who 
affirmed that the overall impact on the firm performance is irrelevant (cf. variable D1.18) 
and fifteen others who disagreed with the statement concerning the possibility of a positive 
impact on firm performance (cf. variable C1.4). The answers of those executives who 
affirmed having had direct and indirect benefits but do not expect any effect on firm 
performance appear to be also inconsistent. This inconsistency is minimised because the 
study is able to provide an explanation. 
 
Third, poor recall problems. This may have happened in questions such as D1 which aims 
at comparing information on the same subject from two different periods. The answers may 
have been distorted because the respondent was unconsciously influenced by the actual 
circumstances, (s)he did not quite recall what the initial expectations were, did not want to 
look foolish, etc. “The respondent in an interview may have a faulty memory; he may 
distort unconsciously for a number of reasons; or he may deliberately mislead the 
interviewer” (Richardson et al., 1965: 26). To a few respondents, recalling initial facts or 
situations accurately proved to be a difficult exercise, and sometimes the answers from 
different partners of the same alliance do not entirely match (e.g. whether or not a formal 
contract was signed), which can be due to asymmetric information.  
 
Fourth, truncation problems. This may have happened in questions where a full answer 
could not have been given at the moment of the interview because further outcomes would 
continue to arise in the future. This problem affected primarily the understanding of the 
future consequences for firms which could not have been fully predicted at the time of the 
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interviews. The type and amount of benefits (question C1) and the real impact on the 
performance indicators (question D1) are examples of questions that require a certain 
period of time to be fully assessed or at least assessed more accurately. In these situations 
the collected information is the best assessment possible given the circumstances. 
 
Fifth, field notes limitations. The process chosen to store the information generated during 
the interviews has (human) limitations. According to Miles and Huberman (1994: 51), 
“field notes taken during an interview usually contain half or less of the actual content. [...] 
But a write-up55 usually will add back some of the missing content because the raw field 
notes, when reviewed, stimulate the field-workers to remember things said at that time that 
are not in the notes.” In addition to the write-up and in order to minimise this problem, the 
answers were sent back to the interviewees for validation and further comments. The field 
notes limitations were minimised also by the fact that the questionnaire was structured and 
had relatively few open-ended questions. 
 
4.4.3 Generalisation limits 
 
Much like any other research study, it is important to understand whether the validity of the 
thesis’s findings are context-bounded or can be generalised. The specific characteristics of 
the alliances under analysis suggest some caution in interpreting the findings and the 
following factors should be taken into consideration when doing so. First, these alliances 
are “government-sponsored” R&D alliances, meaning that their formation was 
“encouraged” by the European Union. To what extent is this important for the alliance 
outcomes? Would “market-driven” alliances (those with no government intervention) get 
different results? For instance, Sciberras (1987: 21) suggests that firms will be prepared to 
engage in research projects on which they themselves place only a marginal value and on 
strict commercial criteria they may not consider worthwhile, as long as the projects are 
funded by public money. If this is true, one might expect different results from “market-
driven” R&D alliances because the latter tend to be more central to the firms’ core 
activities.  
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 “A write-up is an intelligible product for anyone, not just for the fieldworker” (Miles and Huberman, 1994: 
51). 
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Second, the previous chapter notes some idiosyncratic characteristics of the Portuguese 
industrial structure, namely its dependence on external sources of technology. Since all the 
sampled firms are Portuguese, it poses the question of whether this factor will affect the 
alliance outcomes and, therefore, the conclusions. Third, all firms are industrial firms, 
mostly SMEs, and belong to a restricted number of traditional industrial sectors. These are 
firms with scarce internal R&D resources and whose investment in research activities is 
very limited. The results might change if the characteristics of firms change. Fourth, an 
R&D alliance is one of the many types of interfirm alliances, thus the conclusions might 
not be relevant for other types of alliances.   
 
These factors are beyond our control, and in the work described in the chapters to follow 
we try to avoid any conclusions that would be seriously invalidated by such serious biases. 
In other words, the generalisations are for the most part limited to the type of sample and 
the type of industrial structure under observation. At the same time, we do feel that our 
particular study, for all its particularities, can contribute to overall understanding of R&D 
alliances. The pros and cons of generalisation are spelled out in the chapters to follow. 
 
4.5 CONCLUSION 
 
Drawing on the theoretical framework developed in Chapter 2, this chapter states the 
research questions to be tackled here. The chapter describes the research methods which 
are used in this thesis, identifies their advantages, limitations and constraints, and discusses 
the generalisability of results. It discusses the relative merits of using a cross-sectional 
analysis versus a longitudinal analysis and interviews for understanding the impact of 
research alliances on the performance of participating firms. Our conviction is that the 
research methods used here maximise the accuracy of the study given the major constraints 
related to the accessibility of data, time and financial resources that any obvious alternative 
method would imply. The major methodological limitations have to do with the 
measurement process and the inadequacy of the research design to address satisfactorily the 
question of learning from alliances.  
 
The successful combination of the interview and questionnaire methods to collect the data, 
complemented with the interaction with the respondent, proved to be a robust strategy for 
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getting deeply into the research projects and simultaneously collecting information for 
comparative purposes and aggregate analysis. Despite the acknowledged limitations of this 
study, the data collection method used here permits a more accurate and extended 
interpretation of the results, thus leading to an important methodological contribution of 
this thesis. 
 
The research method employed overcomes the problems of the inferential studies that have 
analysed separately the performance of firms and the number of alliances they were 
involved with and assume an association between both variables. This study goes beyond 
the mere association of technology alliances with firm performance and addresses 
unambiguously the question of causality between the two. Further, it looks back at the 
implications of the circumstances in which the research alliances were formed and their 
implementation process for the alliance outcomes and the ability of firms to exploit them. 
Complementary to this, the thesis addresses the question of organisational learning from 
alliances. 
 
Despite the above methodological limitations and constraints, we are confident about the 
adequacy of the method employed here to provide some answers for the matters under 
analysis.  
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5 INITIAL CONDITIONS 
 
 
 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter is concerned with the circumstances in which the CRAFT research alliances 
were formed. By characterising the initial conditions, the chapter aims to capture some 
essential structural features of the alliances, the importance of the projects to the 
Portuguese firms, and their motivation to participate in the alliances. It attempts to identify 
potential strengths and weaknesses, which may help towards a better understanding of the 
implementation process and alliance outcomes. The underlying supposition is that the 
alliance outcomes and the impact on firm performance can be partly explained by the initial 
conditions of alliances and alliance partners. The case studies presented throughout the 
chapter illustrate different alliance contexts and show that alliance outcomes may be 
completely different even when starting conditions are similar.  
 
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 1 draws attention to the nature and structure of 
the research alliances, the contractual relations and the number of alliance partners. Section 
2 analyses the prior experience in interfirm cooperation of the Portuguese firms, the way 
they became partners and their initial contribution to the project’s structure. Section 3 looks 
at the importance of the research projects for the Portuguese firms, examines some 
important factors which helped the decision in favour of an alliance, and looks at the 
feasibility of alliances in the context of absence of public financial intervention. Some 
conclusions close the chapter. 
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5.2 THE R&D ALLIANCES 
 
5.2.1 Nature and structure 
 
The R&D interfirm alliances under analysis were sponsored by the European Union (EU). 
Most of the partner firms are small and medium-sized enterprises with little research 
capabilities, which thus are permitted to engage a third party – the RTD performer – to 
perform research on their behalf. All the research costs of the research activities carried out 
by RTD performers are covered by the EU funding. Partner firms are able to set up 
research projects to meet their specific needs by covering only part of the project costs. 
 
The structure of these EU-sponsored R&D alliances involves two different kinds of 
partners. On the one hand, there are firms seeking solutions for their specific needs, but 
generally lacking at least some of the skills or competencies to carry out the whole research 
project autonomously. Partner firms are normally the end users of the alliance outcomes 
and their ability to participate actively in the research activities depends on how much the 
projects fall within their competencies. On the other hand, there are RTD performers 
(universities, R&D institutions or firms) with adequate skills and research capability to 
execute the research projects. RTD performers are not meant to be end users of the alliance 
outcomes, but only to carry out research. 
 
A main advantage of having both types of partners together appears to be their 
complementary role in the whole process of cooperation. RTD performers provide the 
knowledge and research capability firms do not have. In most cases, firms could hardly 
achieve the project objectives without the contribution of the RTD performers. However, 
this may represent an important drawback as well, depending on how far is the “distance” 
between the two types of partners; that is, how much interdependence is needed to execute 
the project and how much can firms participate in the research activities. A large “distance” 
between technology producers and technology users tends to polarise their contribution to 
the project, minimise their interdependence and reduce the interaction between them. 
Consequently, firms are less capable of actively participating, controlling and influencing 
the research being done. Too large a distance between them is also likely to generate 
communication problems within the partnership and create barriers to the acquisition of 
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knowledge and skills from the alliance.  
 
In general, local RTD performers may help in partly bridging the gap, however about one-
third of the R&D alliances did not include any Portuguese RTD performer. “Even though 
the quality of the periodic meetings was good, the technical discussions about the 
technology under development could not be followed by our staff given their lack of 
competence in the area, but then we could count on [the local RTD performer] to support 
us”, said a production manager of a textile firm. Two executives of a tanning SME 
emphasised that without the assistance of the local RTD performer the firm was not able to 
implement the new technology successfully.  
 
Box 5.1 Case study A  
 
A foundry SME (with 45 employees) was invited to enter an R&D alliance to develop a new, 
better heat-resistant coating to substitute for the traditional alcohol-based formulations. The 
project was seen as a natural technological evolution with advantages over the traditional 
process, and not participating would imply waiting for the market, the usual way of innovating 
in this industry. The firm did not know any of the alliance partners and there was no Portuguese 
RTD performer in the alliance. The project was structured when it reached the firm, there were 
no pre-project meetings and no initial contribution to the project on the part of the firm, 
because it had no technological competence or human resources available to do so. The firm 
entered its first joint research project under major constraints to assess the competencies of 
partners, their objectives and the technology to be developed. The CEO said, “[The firm] 
recognises that a Portuguese RTD performer with adequate technological capability was 
essential to assist the firm over the execution of the project and particularly at the 
implementation stage.” The technology producer has shown no interest in sharing the new 
knowledge. “The alliance partners were merely informed that the new process works, but they 
[the technology producers] did not make themselves available to demonstrate it,” he added. The 
firm was given a technical dossier of the project but it still does not know whether the alliance 
has attained its technical objectives because it has no technical competence to read the dossier 
and implement the project. 
 
Source: Interview. 
 
These two examples and the Case study A in Box 5.1 illustrate how important a local RTD 
performer can be to small firms lacking adequate competencies to participate in joint 
research projects, over both the execution and implementation stages. None of the firms in 
the sample regarded local RTD performers as unimportant partners; on the contrary, firms 
felt more comfortable with their presence. The presence of a local RTD performer in the 
alliance structure is not, however, absolutely necessary even when the firm lacks specific 
competencies on the technology under development, as the Case study C in Box 5.3 below 
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demonstrates. In this example, trust, commitment of partners and the financial capability of 
the firm were the main critical factors of success.   
 
5.2.2 Legal binding 
 
The CRAFT alliances are contract-based. Contracts are an important aspect of partnerships 
and they “must be precise enough to allow commitment, but not so precise as to leave no 
room for learning and interpretation” (Doz, 1988: 326). The contracts the firms signed with 
the EU were quite general and the alliance partners were advised by it to establish more 
detailed formal contracts among themselves. In approximately 45% of the research 
alliances, partners signed a contract concerning the research activities in addition to the 
contract signed with the EU, and in about 45% of the alliances partners signed an 
agreement on the intellectual property rights and/or commercial rights. In about 30% of the 
alliances only one of the agreements has been signed.56 Some contracts, particularly those 
on the intellectual property rights and commercial rights, were drafted and signed in the 
course of the relationship when firms realised the potential value they had created together. 
In some other cases, however, the contracts never became effective because some key 
partners refused to sign them. Some contracts were informally established and remained 
informal until the end of the relationships.  
 
Many firms recognised the importance of formal contracts as an adequate way of 
establishing the rights and obligations of partners, protecting the technological 
achievements against potential users, and defending the partners’ interests in the 
commercial exploitation of the alliance outcomes (see Case study B in Box 5.2). However, 
many of the signed research contracts were not exhaustive about things such as the 
partners’ rights, obligations and responsibilities, timetable and tasks, of both firms and 
RTD performers. Typically, agreements on the intellectual property and commercial rights 
consisted of a few clauses of the research agreement or the agreement signed with the EU. 
Luukkonen (1998: 604) argues that “In EU consortia, the problem of intellectual property 
rights is especially pertinent, because the statutes require that all participants share the 
results obtained.” Thus, this leads firms to adopt a defensive strategy to prevent leakage of 
                                                 
56
 Vertica’s (1998) study found that only about 25% of firms participating in the CRAFT programme or 
Exploratory Awards have signed a consortium agreement before signing a contract with the EU. 
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sensitive information. 
 
Box 5.2 Case study B  
 
A CRAFT R&D alliance was set up to develop a new automatic system for the detection of 
defects in the textile printing process. This new system would have benefits for textile firms at 
the productivity and production costs levels, by replacing the traditional method – human 
vision, which detects only between 10% and 30% of the printing defects at a machine speed of 
30m/min. (and much less at higher speeds) – for a complex automatic process which would be 
100% effective. A textile firm with about one thousand workers, rather big by Portuguese 
standards, entered the alliance with no prior knowledge about the alliance partners, except the 
local RTD performer. There were no pre-project meetings with all the partners, the local RTD 
performer being responsible for the “bureaucratic” aspects of setting up the project and finding 
the local partner firms. Only a standard agreement was signed between the alliance partners and 
the EU. In the words of its technical director: “There was no pre-alliance agreement on the 
intellectual property rights and this probably was the major negative factor of this partnership. 
There was only an informal agreement which was truly insufficient.” The consciousness about 
the importance of a formal agreement arose only after realising the potential economic benefits 
of the project. The inexistence of a formal contract, detailing the individual responsibilities and 
participation in the benefits, as was required by the firm but without the other partner firms 
creating the conditions to be signed, led to an atmosphere of distrust among them and 
uncertainty about the future behaviour of the partners. As a result of this disagreement, the EU 
cancelled the project, though prematurely according to the interviewee. Retrospectively, the 
firm accepts that not paying enough attention to the selection of partners and setting up the 
project phases was extremely important for the alliance outcome. The firm believes that the 
lack of experience in cooperation explains most of the negative aspects of cooperation; had it 
prior experience it would have never entered a joint project under the same conditions as it did. 
 
Source: Interview. 
 
Besides the refusal to sign the contracts by one or some of the partners, many other reasons 
were given for not signing a formal contract, including: friendship between partners; too 
much bureaucracy (“it involves lawyers”); the contract signed with the EU was adequate 
and sufficient; it was not perceived as useful or necessary; maybe it would complicate the 
relationship between partners; it was just an exploratory project and only in a subsequent 
stage will a contract be signed. Concerning the contract on the intellectual property rights, 
the reasons for not signing are rather different: there was a clear distinction between 
technology producers and technology users, therefore there was no doubt about who was 
the technology “owner”; the expected technological progress was rather small and hardly 
could it be the subject of a contract; was not important given the small expected impact on 
the production process; deemed not necessary given its ineffectiveness to control the 
diffusion of knowledge; there has been no concern, no discussion or lack of interest in it; 
the diffusion of the new knowledge was one of the objectives of the project.  
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Despite the plausibility of the justifications given for not signing a formal contract, two 
other aspects are of relevance here. On the one hand, there are substantial transaction costs 
involved in making contracts, especially for inexperienced SMEs and alliances involving 
several international partners. It requires time and energy to negotiate with potential 
partners; for small firms, collaboration often means crucial time taken away from key 
players (Peterson and Sharp, 1998: 151). On the other hand, the way that most firms 
entered the alliances - by invitation - and the non-essential role of some of them weakened 
their position to make demands and establish contracts. 
 
Executives were also asked about the importance of contracts in the whole process of 
cooperation. They have established a relationship between the importance of contracts on 
one side and the amount and type of problems faced during the implementation of projects 
and their outcomes on the other. If no major problems occurred during implementation or 
alliances were not successful, contracts have not been considered especially relevant. But 
the executives were concerned about what would have happened if the technology under 
development had proved to be successful and no contract had been signed. 
 
5.2.3 Number of alliance partners 
 
There is no definite guideline about the optimum number of partners an alliance should 
have, given the unique circumstances of each joint project, but each partner should have a 
distinct contribution so as to make itself essential and avoid becoming redundant. 
According to Killing (1988: 61), “the more partners there are in an alliance, the greater is 
the potential for organizational complexity. [...] An alliance with more than three partners 
may be quite unmanageable unless each partner has a well-defined role and sphere of 
influence from the outset, which may include one or more partners agreeing to play a 
relatively passive role.” The complexity and costs of managing alliances increase with the 
number of players involved (Dussauge and Garrette, 1995: 512). Therefore, the number of 
alliance partners is likely to affect the alliance outcomes and cannot be disregarded.  
  
The average number of partners of the 30 R&D alliances under analysis is 8, considering 
the partner firms only, or 11, if partner firms plus RTD performers are accounted for. 
Figure 5.1 breakdown the alliances according to the number and type of partners. Almost 
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50% of all alliances had more than ten partners, four of them exceeded the number of 
sixteen and one alliance had twenty partners. Adding to this picture the fact that, on 
average, each alliance had partners from four different European countries, these were 
projects that were potentially difficult to manage. Two questions are important to ask at 
this point: What are the reasons behind this apparently high number of partners? Did it in 
any way influence negatively (or positively) the expected outcomes? 
 
It is a legal requirement of the European Union that partnerships under the CRAFT II 
programme should have at least four non-affiliated eligible SMEs, from at least two 
different Member States (or from at least one Member State and an associated State) 
(European Commission, 1994). The rationale behind such requirement aims at promoting 
international linkages within the European Union and neighbouring countries, however it is 
questionable if it really helps the formation of better alliances. Additionally, the EU’s 
dominant thinking seems to consider that larger partnerships means better use of the EU 
funding, since a higher number of firms will benefit directly from the alliance outcomes. 
Consequently, there are no reasons for the EU to impose limits to the number of partner 
firms that freely want to associate in a joint undertaking. 
 
Figure 5.1 Breakdown of the research alliances by number of partners 
and according to partner status 
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Sources: Interviews and CORDIS database. 
 
The question of whether the number of partners have influenced or not the outcomes of the 
alliances is rather difficult to answer because of the contradictory information collected, 
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which is noticeable in the following quotation. “Perhaps there were too many partners in 
the alliance because the contribution of some of them was not essential to the project; 
although that did not affect negatively the project, it is easier to have a relationship between 
a smaller number of partners”, said an executive of a stone sector firm. On the one hand, 
the average score of the answers given to question B7.7 - the importance of the number of 
alliance partners as a negative factor - is just 1.3657, which basically means that the alliance 
outcomes have not been negatively influenced by the number of partners. On the other 
hand, looking carefully into the answers, one finds pieces of information that help to 
understand the former answer and, more significantly, lead to a somewhat different 
conclusion. An important aspect referred to by 12 interviewees (representing 11 alliances) 
is that some partners were not absolutely essential to the project, because of their marginal 
contribution to the project (in performing activities) or no contribution at all. However, 
such non-positive contributions were not perceived by most respondents as being a 
negative factor, despite the fact that a larger group of partners tends to increase the 
transaction costs and the management difficulties of alliances. A second point worth 
mentioning is that 13 firms (of which 5 are part of the previous group of 12) reported 
having had a strong interaction with the local RTD performer during the preparation and 
implementation phases of the project, but a weak or no interaction with the other alliance 
partners. Therefore, these firms were not particularly well positioned in the partnership to 
clearly assess the contribution of the other partners or evaluate whether the number of 
partners affected in any way the alliance outcomes. A third point, referred to by some 
executives, relates to the logistic problems of organising meetings with a large number of 
partners and from several different countries. Finally, three out of four interviewees who 
mentioned that some partners quit the alliance did not consider it a negative factor capable 
of influencing the alliance outcomes. These issues suggest that the number of partners was 
relevant indeed, although not perceived as so by many firms. 
 
5.3 THE PORTUGUESE PARTNER FIRMS 
 
5.3.1 Prior experience in interfirm cooperation 
 
                                                 
57
 For n = 36 since six firms have considered the number of partners to be too few and one observation is 
missing. 
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The level and kind of prior experience of the Portuguese partner firms in interfirm 
cooperation are rather diversified. In Figure 5.2 below, which classifies the firms according 
to their experience in cooperation, it is observable that less than half of the firms affirmed 
they had prior experience in interfirm cooperation, but about 23% had already participated 
in three or more partnerships. Also very significant is the fact that for more than 55% of all 
firms this has been their very first experience, although four of them had had joint research 
projects with universities or research institutions beforehand (see Table 5.1). Of those firms 
who had prior experience, four had participated in just one project and seven had 
experience in commercial/business cooperative projects only. No more than 12 out of 43 
firms reported they had prior experience in research cooperative projects, sometimes 
involving universities or research institutions along with firms, however not all the cases 
included international partners. Only two firms had participated in the preceding 
cooperative research programme (CRAFT I). 
 
The results demonstrate that in general the Portuguese firms had little experience in 
interfirm cooperation, particularly in R&D cooperative projects and projects involving 
partners, firms and RTD performers, from other countries. The level of prior experience 
reported by the respondents is not related to the size of the firms, therefore it cannot be 
assumed that smaller firms had less prior experience in interfirm cooperation than the 
larger ones or vice-versa. 
 
Figure 5.2 Prior experience in interfirm cooperation 
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Note: Two firms are being counted twice because they participated in 
two projects each. 
Source: Interviews (question B1). 
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Table 5.1 Prior experience in interfirm cooperation - breakdown by type of projects 
Group  Fre- Type of projects  Remarks 
(prior 
alliances) 
quency Commercial 
/Business 
Research Both  
B1.1 (= 0) 24    Four firms had had research projects with 
universities or research institutions. Two firms 
were involved in two projects simultaneously. 
B1.2 (< 3) 9 2 7  Four firms had participated in one joint 
project only. 
B1.3 (≥ 3) 10 5 4 1 One firm had participated in informal client-
supplier projects only. 
Source: Interviews (question B1). 
 
Harrigan’s (1988: 223) results suggest that the dissimilar venturing experience levels 
between partners tend to have a negative impact on the venture success. And Ciborra 
(1991: 59) argues that “a firm can learn how to set up and fine-tune alliances per se. The 
result of such learning is the institutionalization of the organization’s rules and routines 
aimed at managing alliances.” Hence, to what extent did “prior experience” affect the 
alliance outcomes? And, how far did it affect firms’ ability to derive benefits from 
alliances? It is very difficult to answer these important questions objectively, given the 
complexity in isolating one factor among many others that have influenced alliance 
outcomes. Table 5.2 below contains the average scores for the variables “Overall 
assessment of the performance of the alliance” (C1.1), “Lack of experience as a negative 
factor” (B7.14) and “Importance of the experience gained for firms” (C2.8), according to 
the level of experience reported by firms.  
 
Although the average level of satisfaction with the alliance of group B1.1 (first-timers) is 
rather similar to that of the full sample (3.61 and 3.69, respectively), the average 
importance attributed to the “lack of experience as a negative factor” is considerably higher 
for group B1.1 than for the full sample (2.39 and 2.02, respectively). The difference is even 
greater between groups B1.1 and B1.3 concerning the variable B7.14 (lack of experience as 
a negative factor), despite the level of satisfaction with the alliance being higher for group 
B1.1. The average scores for the variable B7.14 of groups B1.2 and B1.3, 1.44 and 1.70 
respectively, are considerably lower than that of group B1.1. These figures suggest that 
prior experience positively influences the ability of firms to capture benefits (or avoid 
problems) from interfirm relationships. Unexpectedly, the group of firms with less 
experience (B1.1), on average, ascribe less importance to the experience gained with the 
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alliance (C2.8) than the other groups do, despite the interest of the former in entering new 
partnerships being higher than all other groups, including the sample average. 
 
Table 5.2 Lack of experience as a negative factor versus level of satisfaction with the 
alliance, according to firms’ level of interfirm cooperation experience 
 C1.1 B7.14 C2.8 
Group Average 
scores 
SE Average 
scores 
SE Average 
scores 
SE n [%] 
B1.1 (n = 24) * 3.61 0.20 2.39 0.25 2.94 0.23  18 [78 %] 
B1.2 (n = 9) 3.89 0.33 1.44 0.40 3.67 0.32    9 [100 %] 
B1.3 (n = 10) 3.50 0.31 1.70 0.38 3.57 0.36    7 [70%] 
ALL (n = 43) * 3.69 s = 0.98 2.02 s = 1.20 3.26 s = 0.96  34 [81 %] 
Notes: (*) One observation is missing. (s) Sample standard deviation. (SE) Standard error (= ns ). 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the answers to questions B1, C1, B7 and C2. 
 
Many executives considered prior experience in cooperation important but the multiplicity 
of situations found in this particular sample does not allow one to identify a clear pattern of 
causality. Firms with no experience in interfirm cooperation tended to play a more passive 
role within the relationship, but not in all cases. Some of these firms were able to establish 
a link between the alliance outcomes and lack of experience, and two of them came to the 
conclusion that they would have never entered the alliance had they prior experience in 
cooperation, given the number of problems faced during its execution which could have 
been prevented from happening at the beginning (see Case study B in Box 5.2 above). The 
general director of a foundry firm said that they would be “more confident and less 
passive” had they experience in cooperation. Experienced firms appear to have a different 
perception about the implications of alliances, but the following cases of two firms with 
experience in R&D alliances show that experience alone may not be enough for a 
successful outcome. In a very successful alliance, which is reported in Box 5.3, the 
interviewee clearly emphasised the importance of prior experience in successfully dealing 
with an unexpected increase in total research costs that would have prematurely ended the 
alliance otherwise. Another firm was successful in an attempt to reduce an oversized 
project to a smaller one fitting the firm’s needs but the project eventually failed. The firm’s 
intervention occurred only when the research activities were already under way, though it 
could have done it much sooner, but the firm rejects that the alliance outcomes were in any 
way the consequence of lack of experience in cooperation (see Case study E in Box 5.5 
below). Prior experience may not have been an important factor for the alliance outcomes 
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in all cases, however the lack of experience has surely been significant in many 
unsuccessful alliances. 
 
Box 5.3 Case study C  
 
As a natural product, cork contains microorganisms and chemical properties that are 
responsible for the so-called “stopper flavour” in bottled wine. A CRAFT project was set up to 
develop a technological process to eliminate or at least reduce substantially this problem, which 
is damaging the market, but keep the characteristics of the cork. Besides being disagreeable for 
wine lovers and the wine industry, this problem is also explored by synthetic stopper producers 
for competitive purposes. A Portuguese cork stopper producer (with 170 workers) was invited 
to join the project but the firm made little contribution to structuring the project and setting up 
the alliance. It did not have the technological expertise required to do so. There were no 
Portuguese RTD performers in the alliance but there was trust between the firm and the 
project’s prime proposer, as a result of good prior commercial and personnel relationships. One 
major negative factor could have ended the alliance prematurely: a substantial rise in the 
research costs when the project was well under way. Based on the potential benefits of the 
project and the trust in the prime proposer, the firm decided to proceed with the project and 
assume the extra costs. The financial director affirmed that “if it was not our prior experience 
in cooperation probably the project would have stopped at that stage”. Eventually, the alliance 
was a great technical and economic success. The European Patent Office granted a patent on 
the new technological process (rather unusual for Portuguese firms) and the firm has now an 
important competitive advantage. Three aspects are important to emphasise: the strong 
commitment of partners to the project, the trust between them (for instance, they signed an 
agreement on the intellectual property rights only after realising the potential benefits of the 
project), and the financial capability of the firm to support the extra research costs and 
particularly to acquire the novel equipment and make the necessary changes in the production 
layout. This was a major investment for the firm. 
 
Source: Interview. 
 
5.3.2 Selection and prior knowledge about the partners 
 
Having information about the partners before embarking on any inter-firm relationship is 
widely regarded as an important factor for its future success. Prior information about 
partners’ culture, technological strengths and objectives, among other things, is extremely 
important to assess the compatibility and potential advantages and disadvantages of 
working together. Dodgson (1992b: 237) is emphatic on this point when he states that 
“partner selection is the most critical decision affecting the success of collaboration.” It 
requires time and energy to negotiate with potential partners and small firms often lack the 
time and/or resources to identify external sources of knowledge (Rothwell and Dodgson, 
1991; Peterson and Sharp, 1998). 
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RTD performers played a central role in most partnerships on this matter. Besides the R&D 
activities, they frequently carried out other activities, such as project co-ordination, 
searching for partners and “persuading” them to participate. Figure 5.3 elucidates their 
pivotal importance in the partner selection process. It reports that 29 out of 43 partner firms 
were first contacted by RTD performers, and only 1158 were contacted by the prime 
proposer. Apparently, there is nothing wrong with this practice. However, partners should 
be “chosen” according to their potential to strengthen the partnership, and not just for 
convenience, to share part of the research costs or merely to take part in, as seems to have 
happened in many cases. An important sign that substantiates this suspicion is the fact that 
many firms have been contacted when the project was already structured, thus restricting 
the room for negotiation and further contributions.  
 
Figure 5.3 Who did first contact the Portuguese partner firms?  
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Source: Interviews. 
 
In many cases, it appeared that the question was more about being “invited” to participate 
than to have the chance to choose the partners. One selection method consisted in sending 
an emissary directly to pre-selected firms with the mission of making a presentation of the 
research project and inviting them to enter the alliance. In other cases, that role was carried 
out by the local RTD performers. In general, the Portuguese partner firms “easily” accepted 
the conditions being offered by others, without imposing their own conditions on 
                                                 
58
 Two out of the five Portuguese prime proposer firms are included here. The other three were first contacted 
by a local RTD performer.  
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participation, namely concerning the type and number of partners involved, but also by 
making no substantial contribution to the project. Such passivity about the partner selection 
process is likely to produce negative consequences on the alliance outcomes since this is 
widely accepted as being a particularly important task.  
 
Most firms seemed to disregard the importance of the partner selection process or, 
possibly, they just failed to notice its importance given their scarce experience in interfirm 
cooperation. Another explanation, valid for some cases, relates to the fact that the potential 
benefits on offer easily surpassed the costs of participating, thus relegating to secondary 
importance the issue of partner selection. For some firms, however, the partner selection 
was important. In one case, the executive stressed that the compatibility among partners 
was guaranteed since the local RTD performer knows the firm well and it would not invite 
the firm to enter an alliance if the partners did not match the firm’s philosophy and culture. 
Two other firms imposed as a condition to enter the partnership that no other Portuguese 
and no other Portuguese and Spanish competitor firms, respectively, should participate. 
 
Figure 5.4 Prior knowledge about the partners: breakdown by type of partner 
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Note: The category “Does not apply” refers to the number of alliances which included one 
national firm only (7 cases) and the number of alliances which did not include national RTD 
performers (13 cases). The “Knew all” category is applied even when the alliance includes just 
a single partner of a given type. 
Source: Interviews (question B2). 
 
Figure 5.4 clearly shows a sharp contrast between what firms reported knowing about the 
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national and international alliance partners. As was indeed quite expected, the international 
partner firms and international RTD performers were completely unknown to 65% (28) and 
79% (34) of the firms interviewed, respectively. Conversely, the national partner firms and 
national RTD performers were all known to 72% (26) and 80% (24) of them, respectively. 
In 15 alliances the executives knew at least one international partner firm, but only in 9 
alliances was an international RTD performer known. 
 
However, of all firms that reported having had some prior knowledge about the partners, 
what kind of knowledge were they referring to? Figure 5.5 breaks down the prior 
knowledge about partners according to the type of knowledge. Only a very small 
proportion of those firms had worked together in a similar cooperative project (e.g. 
business or technology alliances), some had had commercial relationships (e.g. client-
supplier relationships or the development of technical studies by research institutions), but 
the majority of them had had relations at an institutional level only (e.g. as a member of an 
association) or they merely recognised the partner’s name. Proportionally, firms that 
worked together in similar projects with international partners outnumber those that 
worked together with national ones. 
 
Figure 5.5 Prior knowledge about the partners: breakdown by kind of 
knowledge  
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Source: Interviews (question B2). 
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As we have seen, prior knowledge about alliance partners was, in general, rather limited 
and most Portuguese firms accepted entering the partnerships without having any further 
knowledge about them, since pre-project meetings with the purpose of getting to know 
each other were very rare indeed. Very few interviewees said there were preparatory 
meetings with all partners to discuss things like the project’s structure, individual 
objectives and specific needs, the RTD performers’ technological competence to carry out 
the research activities and their responsibilities, and, very importantly, to assess the 
partners’ compatibility in the future joint undertaking.  
 
To what extent did prior knowledge about the partners influence alliance outcomes? The 
answer is rather complex since there is no unique pattern in the sample. Indeed, at least 
three different situations emerge from the answers. Some firms did not establish any 
particular link between the two, which is understandable if the relationship ran smoothly 
and has reached the pre-defined objectives, but surprising if not. Other firms stressed that 
prior mutual knowledge greatly helped the partners in generating trust and understanding 
among them, which facilitated the implementation of the projects. A third group of firms, 
which have in common the failure of their projects, emphasised the initial lack of 
knowledge of alliance partners and their objectives as a major negative factor for the 
alliance outcomes (see Case study B in Box 5.2). Incompatible objectives came out in the 
course of the relationship and, in some cases, firms also found that the project had been 
prepared to meet the needs of a specific partner; that is, they did not perceive at the 
beginning the partners’ hidden agenda. Furthermore, some RTD performers have been 
accused of not having adequate competencies to carry out the research activities or, even if 
they did have such competencies, the research activities have been intentionally biased 
towards the benefit of some partners, or they did not seriously commit themselves to the 
project. 
 
5.3.3 Initial contribution to the project and bargaining power 
 
The initial contribution of the Portuguese partner firms in structuring the projects was 
rather modest, which is symptomatic of the absence of earlier discussions among alliance 
partners. About 74% of these firms entered the alliance without giving any significant 
contribution to the project’s structure (see Figure 5.6 below). In most situations, projects 
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have been set up by somebody else, frequently an RTD performer, and were completely 
structured when the Portuguese firms learnt about them. Despite the fact that some firms 
reported that the projects were well structured or they lacked the (technological) 
competence to make any changes, in many partnerships their opportunity or possibility to 
make changes to the project was blocked as well. It was a question of accepting or rejecting 
it, as an executive put it. In other cases, firms “delegated” to the local RTD performer the 
responsibility to set up the project and act on their behalf. Eight firms made small 
contributions, such as providing (requested) technical data or searching for partners, and 
only three out of 43 firms took major responsibilities in setting up the alliance (see Case 
study D in Box 5.4). This is too little taking into consideration that the number of 
Portuguese prime proposers alone is five and it was naturally expected that their 
contribution would be more significant. 
 
Box 5.4 Case study D  
 
A project was set up to recover the slate waste, which represents about two-thirds of the total 
material extracted. The objective was to assess the technical and economic feasibility of 
creating ceramic products of high quality by using slate powder as the raw material. To the 
prime proposer, a Portuguese slate SME (about 30 employees), the project was not 
economically or strategically very important but the firm put great effort into setting up and 
accomplishing the project, even though it was the first it entered a partnership. The firm’s 
director said, “At first the project was only moderately important. There was great expectation 
about its technical and economic success but there was also great technical and market 
uncertainty. Furthermore, the new products should have innovative characteristics to be 
competitive with traditional ceramic products.”  
With no competencies in material engineering and knowledge about the ceramics industry, an 
alliance seemed to be the best strategy because it could include partners with complementary 
competencies, such as slate firms, ceramics firms and research institutions. Eventually, the 
project was technically successful and the new product is competitive. The commitment of 
partners to the project and friendly relationship between the firm and an important ceramics 
firm, which is also very important for the subsequent stages of production and 
commercialisation, are important factors of success to refer to. An application for a patent has 
been submitted. 
  
Source: Interview. 
 
In a specific case, the firm accepted participating without making any substantial 
contribution to the project, despite knowing that it was over-sized and could not be fully 
concluded within a two-year period. In the first meeting, the firm suggested and its partners 
accepted a reduction of the project’s objectives in order to take advantage of the firm’s 
prior research and adjust it to the firm’s existing products. However, the firm did not have 
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much control over the research activities to be performed and the project eventually failed. 
It agrees that not acknowledging the importance of the pre-project stage, namely the 
compatibility between the project’s objectives and the firm’s needs, was a crucial mistake 
for the alliance outcome (see Case study E in Box 5.5 below). Two firms not included in 
the sample quit their alliance precisely because there was no compatibility between their 
specific needs and the objectives of the projects. 
 
Figure 5.6 Firms’ initial contribution to the projects  
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Source: Interviews. 
 
Many projects reached firms via the local RTD performer (in general a specialised 
technological centre), instead of originating within firms and being tailored to solve their 
specific problems. Despite the advantages of the latter approach, firms stressed that they 
lacked adequate R&D structures or financial resources for research, and they are not always 
aware about existing technological solutions that fit their needs.59 On the other hand, the 
local RTD performers have easier access to new knowledge and new technologies and 
know quite well the firms’ problems, therefore they are in a good position to identify and 
recommend research projects that suit the firms’ needs and meet their financial capability. 
A financial director of a foundry firm summarises the perspective of SMEs: “Given the 
lack of resources for research, it makes every sense that R&D projects not close to the 
firm’s core business should be set by research institutions.” 
 
When firms do not commit enough time and resources to structuring a cooperative project 
                                                 
59
 This is consistent with Delapierre et al.’s (1988: 23) work on cooperation between firms and research 
institutes, where they refer to the “inability [of small firms] to formulate [their] requests for assistance.” 
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and make themselves essential for its implementation, it is likely they will not have enough 
control over it and there will be no strong interdependence among partners. In many cases, 
the bargaining power of partners was unbalanced from the very beginning, penalising those 
who, for any reason, accepted playing a relatively passive role in the whole cooperative 
process. Additionally, the lack of knowledge about the partner firms and RTD performers 
and their objectives created adequate conditions for hidden agendas and opportunistic 
behaviour.  
 
Box 5.5 Case study E  
 
A CRAFT alliance was set up to develop an automated lay planning system for leather shoe 
upper parts to be interfaced to a manual cutting system. A machinery and equipment sector 
Portuguese SME (about 20 employees) participated in the alliance. This firm had a large 
experience in joint R&D projects with firms and R&D institutions, had good knowledge about 
another Portuguese firm of a different sector, and did not make any substantial contribution to 
the project’s structure. Initially, the prime RTD performer’s idea was to develop the entire 
machine from scratch, something hardly possible to accomplish in two years given the 
technological complexity of integrating several different technologies that the project required, 
some of which took the firm some years to perfect. In the first meeting, the alliance partners 
accepted a proposal from the Portuguese firm to reduce the project to the development of the 
lay planning algorithm which would be adapted to the firm’s existing leather cutting machine. 
In the words of the firm’s computing director: “Retrospectively, an active participation in the 
pre-alliance stage would have been useful to tailor the project to be adapted to the machine the 
firm already makes.” However, the firm’s capacity to influence the course and intensity of the 
research being carried out was very small. “The RTD performer refused the firm’s offer of 
expertise and specialised staff (in some cases better than the RTD performer’s) and that 
impoverished the relationship, repeated research already done and thus limited the alliance 
outcomes”, he added. Eventually, the alliance was a failure. The main negative factors were the 
weak interaction amongst the partners, their refusal to share knowledge, and different 
expectations about the alliance. “Some partners wanted to create something innovative and 
useful, others were only (possibly) interested in the acquisition of the new technology, and yet 
others regarded the project as a source of funding for their research activities but without the 
required commitment to attain the project’s objectives.” Ironically, the firm had adequate 
competencies and could have developed the algorithm autonomously but it would have to 
allocate 2 or 3 people on a full-time basis to the project for a minimum period of two years, a 
substantial effort for a very small firm. Now, the firm will do that! 
 
Source: Interview. 
 
5.4 IMPORTANCE OF THE ALLIANCES 
 
5.4.1 Strategic importance and main goals of projects 
 
The perception of how important projects were to the firms is likely to be a helpful 
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indicator for a better understanding of the role and commitment of partners in the 
relationship. It is also relevant for a better assessment of the relationship between alliance 
outcomes and firm performance, since a low impact on firm performance may be simply 
the consequence of little initial interest in the project.  
 
Figure 5.7 identifies the main strategic importance ascribed to projects by the Portuguese 
firms at the beginning of the relationship. More than half of the projects were primarily 
aimed at strengthening the firm’s existing core products by improving or adding new 
features and, fundamentally, by introducing innovations to the production process in order 
to increase productivity, diminish the production costs or improve the quality of products. 
About 25% (A1.2 and A1.3) of all projects aimed at launching a new line of business, 
consisting of one or a range of new products. Some firms (A1.1 and A1.6), however, 
regarded the alliance chiefly as a means to attain individual objectives, including getting 
experience in interfirm cooperation, establishing international contacts, establishing 
linkages with universities, and keeping an eye on the research being done which might be 
of interest to the firm. Five executives have chosen one of the options listed despite 
admitting not having real interest in the alliance objectives and, if they had not been 
invited, their firms would not have entered the partnerships.   
 
Figure 5.7 Strategic importance of projects 
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Key: The project: 
A1.1 Was mainly seen as a way of getting experience in interfirm cooperation; 
A1.2 Aimed at launching a (major) new line of business; 
A1.3 Aimed at launching a subsidiary line of business (e.g. reusing a by-product); 
A1.4 Was to strengthen the firm’s existing core products/services; 
A1.5 Aimed at preventing/diminishing environmental damage; 
A1.6 Other. 
Source: Interviews (question A1). 
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Figure 5.8 categorises the 30 research projects according to their main goals. Half the 
projects aimed at improving an existing production technology and about 25% aimed at 
developing a new product. Normally, the latter projects also required the development of a 
new production technology or at least the improvement of the existing one. Three projects 
aimed at developing a new process for dealing with the waste resulting from the production 
process. 
 
Figure 5.8 The main goal of projects 
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Key: 
A4.1 To develop a new marketable product/service; 
A4.2 To improve the features of an existing product/service; 
A4.3 To develop a new production technology; 
A4.4 To improve an existing production technology; 
A4.5 To adapt an existing production technology from other sector(s); 
A4.6 Other. 
Source: Interviews (question A4) and project’s synopsis. 
 
5.4.2 Importance versus urgency of projects 
 
This section attempts to understand if the urgency of a project is related to its importance 
for the firm or if the two variables are independent from each other. Table 5.3 compares the 
importance of the projects for the firms with its urgency. It demonstrates that only 4 
projects were of marginal importance but 19 (45.2%) were not urgent at all; 19 projects 
were very important but only 12 (28.6%) of them were in fact urgent; 19 projects were 
moderately important but 12 of them were not urgent at all; and just 17 out of 42 projects 
were urgent indeed. Only twelve executives classified the project as being simultaneously 
urgent and very important. No project has been considered fundamental for the firm’s 
survival with, perhaps, the exception of one case (see Case study F in Box 5.6). The results 
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indicate that the firms were able to distinguish the importance of projects from their 
urgency.60 Projects were not regarded as being more urgent just because their potential 
advantages were greater, and vice versa.  
 
Table 5.3 Comparison between the importance of the projects and their urgency 
 Importance of the project  
Urgency of the 
project 
Very  
important 
Moderately 
important 
Marginal 
importance 
Total 
Urgent 12   (28.6%) 4   (9.5%) 1   (2.4%) 17   (40.5%) 
Not very urgent 3   (7.1%) 3   (7.1%) 0   (0.0%)   6   (14.3%) 
Not urgent at all 4   (9.5%) 12   (28.6%) 3   (7.1%) 19   (45.2%) 
Total 19   (45.2%) 19   (45.2%) 4   (9.5%) 42 
Notes: One observation is missing. Percentage figures refer to the total number of observations (42). 
Source: Interviews (questions A2 and A3). 
 
Box 5.6 Case study F  
 
A cork sector SME entered a CRAFT alliance to develop new building materials by using a 
mixture of organic materials, particularly cork, and concrete. The firm was invited to enter the 
alliance by the prime proposer, who structured the project and with whom the firm had prior 
commercial relationships. The firm considered the project strategically very important, perhaps 
fundamental for the firm’s survival, because at the time the cork sector was in crisis and the 
firm was considering a diversification strategy. Two factors were menacing its economic 
stability. On the one hand, synthetic stoppers were becoming important substitutes for its main 
product – cork stoppers. On the other hand, the cork was too unvalued because the cork waste 
in the cork stopper production process is about 50% of the total cork used and only a part of the 
total cork produced is suitable for stoppers, representing a strong disincentive for the cork tree 
producers to keep looking after the trees and thus a serious problem for the cork industry in the 
medium term. The new range of products was of great economic potential and, by using all the 
cork produced, would certainly raise the cork’s economic value.  
The project was implemented according to plan and it was technically very successful. 
However, the firm decided not to exploit economically the alliance outcomes due to a major 
change in raw material prices over the project execution, which made the new product 
economically unfeasible even before it had reached the market. On the one hand the firm was 
not completely satisfied with the alliance because the project has not been implemented. On the 
other hand, it was very satisfied since the diversification strategy had been “imposed” by the 
market conditions and was not something genuinely wanted by the firm. The new economic 
circumstances allowed the firm to keep itself in its area of business with no need to acquire 
competencies in a completely different area, and to develop and market products of a very 
                                                 
60
  A χ2 test has been run to test whether or not there is an association between the level of importance and the 
urgency of projects (i.e. test if the answers were or were not in proportion). The χ2 statistic obtained (9.643) is 
just greater than the 20.05;4χ critical value (9.49) but well below 
2
0.01;4χ critical value (13.3), meaning that 
the null hypothesis of no correlation would be accepted for the 1% level of significance and rejected for the 
5% level of significance. Thus, there is some evidence to reject the null hypothesis at the 5% level of 
significance, however the difference between the χ2 statistic and χ2 critical value is so tiny that the weak 
association between the variables it represents is likely to be related to the fact that some expected values are 
smaller than five, one of them being smaller than one. 
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different kind. Also important to note is the fact that they have signed a contract on the 
intellectual property rights at the end of the relationship, after realising the economic potential 
of the alliance outcomes, and they are applying for a patent.  
 
Source: Interview. 
 
Table 5.4 Reasons supporting the importance versus urgency of the projects 
 
Very important Moderately important and 
Marginal importance 
 1 
– 12 firms – 2 – 5 firms – 
U
rg
en
t 
• Firm was seeking a technological solution 
of the kind to add value to its products; 
• For environmental reasons; 
• The project fitted the firm’s policy on 
innovation and product quality; great market 
potential; 
• The traditional process being used was not 
satisfactory and the firm was receptive to 
novel solutions; 
• Expected a great impact on the firm’s 
production process or product quality; 
• The project had great economic and/or 
competitive potential; 
• Firm was seeking a new product to 
overcome the crisis in the sector; 
• The firm was seeking a new solution but was not 
convinced it would work; 
• The project fitted the firm’s strategy on innovation 
and search for new products/technologies but this 
was just an exploratory stage; 
• The firm feels the need for a new production 
technology but the expectation about its workability 
was low; 
• The economic and competitive benefits would be 
great if successful but the best expectation was that 
the project would confirm the firm’s prior research 
results; 
• The new system was technically feasible but its 
economic success demands novel equipment and 
depends on the users’ technological upgrading; 
 3 
– 7 firms – 4 – 18 firms – 
N
o
t v
er
y 
u
rg
en
t a
n
d 
N
o
t u
rg
en
t a
t a
ll 
• The new automated and flexible process 
only applies to a small percentage of the 
total production and the firm already had a 
solution; 
• It is a longer-term solution and more 
environmentally friendly but with little 
economic impact and the firm already had a 
solution; 
• The firm was not seeking the project but 
working with an R&D institution and its 
economic potential made the project 
important; 
• Was a needed innovation but the firm did 
not know about the technology; 
• The firm needs to comply with 
environmental demands but the new process 
has no economic advantage over the 
existing one; 
• Was an important technological 
improvement if successful but the existing 
technology was near to its potential; 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Important for environmental reasons but there was 
no interest in the project; 
• Important to add value to by-products but the firm 
does not depend on it; 
• Important for the firm’s image but the potential 
market for the new product was too small; 
• Important to learn about a new technology but the 
expectation about its success was very low; 
• The firm’s small size made the project less important 
and the firm already had a solution; 
• The firm was not interested in exploiting the results 
but it was a duty to collaborate; 
• The innovation is only important to a small part of 
the total production and the firm had already a 
solution; 
• Some advantages but the expectation was very low - 
not interested in the project if not invited; 
• Not interested in the results of the project; 
• No immediate interest in the project; 
• The project was less important than the opportunity 
to work with RTD performers; 
• Low expected impact but it is important to take part 
in projects of this kind; 
• Was a political decision not supported by economic 
or technological benefits; 
• Fits the firm’s innovation policy but the expected 
economic impact was very low; 
Source: Interviews (questions A2 and A3). 
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Table 5.4 contains the main reasons given by the interviewed executives in support for 
their answers concerning the relationship between the importance and the urgency of 
projects at the beginning of the relationship. Some of them admitted they have changed 
their opinion in the course of the implementation of the project, after becoming aware of its 
potential benefits. It comprises four sections, representing the different combinations of 
importance versus urgency of projects. Some of the variables have been aggregated for the 
benefit of the analysis. Table 5.5 below provides four examples to illustrate each of these 
four combinations that represent the strategic importance of projects. 
 
In section 1 in Table 5.4, projects were considered urgent and very important because the 
firms were already seeking or were receptive to novel solutions, the firm’s strategy was 
based on innovation and product quality, or the projects were expected to render substantial 
economic and competitive advantages. In section 2, both the firms and projects basically 
share similar attributes to those in section 1, however the expectation of firms about the 
success of the projects was quite low, at least in the immediate future. Projects were 
considered urgent due to their potential advantages but not so important because of the 
pessimistic expectation about their success. Firms were not optimistic that the projects 
could meet the technical goals set out at the beginning. In section 3, the projects were 
important for a number of different reasons but the expected advantages were quite small. 
Consequently, these projects were not considered urgent and several firms stressed the fact 
that they had already a technical solution. Section 4 combines low expectation about the 
success of the projects with low expectation about its advantages, plus lack of interest in 
the alliance outcomes. Therefore, to this group of firms the projects were neither urgent nor 
important. 
 
These findings above demonstrate that many projects were hardly worthwhile and probably 
would not be accomplished outside the framework of an R&D alliance publicly funded. 
This is likely to affect the commitment of firms to the projects and, consequently, have an 
influence on the alliance outcomes. 
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Table 5.5 Importance versus urgency of the projects – illustrative examples 
 
Very important Moderately important and 
Marginal importance 
 1  2  
U
rg
en
t 
Case study G 
An SME of the construction sector (precast 
concrete) entered a research project to 
develop a prototype of a new GRC 
(combination of glass-fibre and cement) 
product, with great market and economic 
potential. The interviewee concluded: “In a 
sector where the R&D investment is very 
small and innovation essentially a reverse-
engineering process, this firm has a market 
culture of innovation in order to best serve 
our clients and beat competition.” 
Case study H 
One of the most important mould-making SMEs 
in Portugal entered an alliance to acquire 
expertise in a novel, potentially disruptive, 
production process. The firm and the mould-
making industry have been using a similar 
technological process to produce moulds for fifty 
years. The perception that a new production 
process based on novel technologies may be 
about to come up led the firm to enter the alliance 
to acquire knowledge which might be strategically 
important. However, the project was regarded as a 
first approach to assess the potential of the new 
technology and the expectation about its success 
was relatively low. 
 3  4  
N
o
t v
er
y 
u
rg
en
t a
n
d 
N
o
t 
u
rg
en
t a
t a
ll 
Case study I 
In a project aimed at developing a water-
based dye coating for the foundry industry, 
an SME participated in it for reasons which 
have to do with legal requirements to 
comply with environmental legislation. 
Foundry firms will have to adopt the water-
based dye coating in their production 
process and they were interested in learning 
about it, however the new technological 
process has no economic advantages over 
the traditional one.  
Case study J 
A project was set up to develop a prototype of a 
wood product which would be water- and fire-
resistant, and simultaneously environment 
friendly, aiming at reaching a rather small 
market niche. The quality director of a wood 
sector SME considered the project neither 
urgent nor important. In the words of the 
interviewee, “The decision to enter the alliance 
was political, because it was not supported by 
any future economic or technological benefit.”  
Source: Interviews. 
 
5.4.3 Cooperation instead of alternative strategies 
 
A cooperative project is complex, involves negotiation, sharing of the decision-making and 
demands a minimal degree of trust and commitment of all alliance partners throughout the 
relationship. As it is a rather different process from a firm’s internal procedures and 
routines, the question of “why cooperate?” remains important as long as an alternative 
strategy is available. Firms were asked whether the project they were involved with could 
have been accomplished by other means than through cooperation. Of those who answered 
affirmatively, Figure 5.9 shows which alternative strategies could have been used instead 
of an alliance.  
 
More than half of the firms considered that there was an alternative way of carrying out the 
project. Four firms had the capability to carry out the project alone, solely using internal 
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resources, fifteen firms could have done it in cooperation with the research institutions, and 
three others said the intended objectives could have been achieved through a market 
transaction. The fact that many projects were relatively small in scope and aimed at 
changing or having an impact on a (small) part of the firm’s overall activities is the major 
reason why the variables “Merger” and “Acquisition” have not been considered alternative 
strategies by any firm. Figure 5.10 below shows that the merger or acquisition strategy 
received the highest average score and lowest standard deviation (question A7.9: the scale 
of the project would not justify a merger or acquisition policy). Only three firms admitted 
that merger or acquisition was a possibility, although it had never been considered before 
the alliance. 
 
Figure 5.9 Alternative strategies to cooperation 
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Notes: (*) Using internal resources. (**) In cooperation with RTD performers. Two 
observations are missing. 
Source: Interviews (question A6). 
 
To most firms, however, neither the idea of carrying out the project alone (or in 
cooperation with RTD performers), nor the analysis of possible alternative strategies has 
ever been under consideration. In fact, as explained elsewhere, the majority of firms were 
invited to enter the alliance, most of the projects were already structured, and few firms had 
the possibility or capability to suggest changes. Therefore, an alternative strategy to an 
alliance has rarely been pondered. 
 
 
 
 123 
Figure 5.10 Factors that supported the decision to cooperate 
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Key: 
A7.1 The costs of the project were too high for the firm to carry it out alone; 
A7.2 Lack of in-house expertise to carry out the project alone; 
A7.3 We were expecting to get benefits that go beyond the scope of the project; 
A7.4 The expected benefits would not justify the costs if carrying out the project alone; 
A7.5 The kind of technological solution we were looking for was not available in the marketplace; 
A7.6 The risk of failure was too high if carrying out the project alone; 
A7.7 We were seeking to learn from our partner firms and RTD performer(s); 
A7.8 An independent strategy would have taken too much time; 
A7.9 The scale of the project would not justify a merger or acquisition strategy. 
Notes: (n) Number of observations. (s) Sample standard deviation. 
Source: Interviews (question A7). 
 
Executives were asked to provide their opinion on a number of statements related to the 
option to cooperate and the average scores for such statements are shown in Figure 5.10. 
The reasons given by firms in favour of a cooperative research project include the sharing 
of costs and risks that the research activities always involve, and the possibility of joining 
firms with different technological competencies around the same project. The CEO of a 
construction firm added, “The contribution with and confrontation of different perspectives 
to solve a common problem is deemed very important by this firm.” The complementarity 
of partners’ activities and competencies was referred to by many firms as an extremely 
important aspect of cooperation, because it increases the likelihood of technical success 
and enhances the research outcomes. The opportunity to work with R&D institutions on an 
international research project was also extremely appealing to SMEs. 
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The high average scores of all variables is indicative of the difficulties that the firms would 
have faced, especially had they attempted to carry out the project alone or in cooperation 
with the research institutions. The lack of financial and of research resources seem to be 
the two major obstacles for these firms to carry out research projects; the CRAFT 
programme has been created precisely with the objective of helping small and medium-
sized firms to develop research projects by partially funding the research activities. Of the 
four firms that had the capability to carry out the project alone, two said the costs would be 
too high since it would be necessary to deploy more than one full-time researcher to the 
project and for a long period of time. 
 
Generally, the research capability of firms was very weak and rarely could a research 
structure (e.g. R&D department, laboratory, equipment) or people performing research 
activities on a full-time basis be found. Most firms lacked the resources, namely qualified 
people, to participate actively in the research projects, particularly when they involved 
technologies where the firms had no competencies. Variable A7.2 - lack of in-house 
expertise - has one of the highest average scores because 33 firms (A7.2 = 4 or 5)61 stated 
not having in-house expertise to perform at least part of the research activities. But in many 
cases, firms were able to carry out only a very small part of the research activities which 
the projects involved. Furthermore, many firms were not interested in acquiring 
competencies in areas not related to their core activities. Examples of this happened when 
the project involved the making of a new machine or a new control system; firms were 
interested in what the machine or the system could do for the business and not about the 
technologies necessary to built them. That placed many firms in a situation of dependence 
on the research performers without having the means to monitor or give any contribution to 
the project’s technical progress. This also explains why 30 firms considered the risk of 
failure to be too high (A7.6 = 4 or 5) and 33 firms said the project would have taken much 
more time (A7.8 = 4 or 5) in the hypothetical case of being accomplished independently.  
 
Figure 5.10 also shows that variable A7.3 got the lowest average score (3.08), meaning that 
many firms were not expecting to get benefits that went beyond the scope of the project. 
Calculating the average score for this variable according to the level of experience in 
                                                 
61
 See Table A2.3 in Appendix 2 for a breakdown of the answers by category. 
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cooperative projects reported by firms, it results that the group of firms with less 
experience (B1.1) got the lowest average score (A7.3B1.1 = 2.91; A7.3B1.2 = 3.33; A7.3B1.3 
= 3.22), suggesting that past experience matters when firms define their objectives. The 
average score of variable A7.7 - want to learn from partner firms and RTD performers - is 
much higher than that of variable A7.3, 4.07 and 3.08 respectively, because firms were 
especially interested in accessing the know-how related to the project and less concerned 
about the know-how that went beyond the project goals. Firms were interested in accessing 
knowledge necessary to the future use of the alliance outcomes.  
 
Generally, the size of projects demanded resources and competencies that the firms alone 
were not capable to provide. Even those firms that indicated a possible alternative strategy 
to the alliance did not have all the necessary conditions to pursue such strategy, or the 
alternative strategy could not meet all the benefits of the alliance, namely the benefits 
deriving from the complementary role of partners. In most cases, the alternative strategies 
to an alliance have not been considered a priori and de facto alternatives.  
 
5.4.4 Would these research alliances go ahead without public funding? 
 
When asked about the firm’s financial capacity to carry out the project independently, 
about two-thirds of the interviewees agreed that such undertaking was beyond any 
possibility (see Figure 5.11). Many of them have admitted a certain difficulty in assessing 
accurately the total investment that the research project involved, partly because the 
prospect of carrying out the task alone has never been considered, but they were certain it 
was out of reach. Furthermore, to more than 55% of the interviewees the expected benefits 
from the project would not justify its cost in the hypothetical case of being accomplished 
autonomously. Some projects were simply too large, in others the expected advantages 
were quite small and in some other cases firms were not interested in the specific 
objectives of the alliance. More than half of the projects were considered by firms neither 
financially feasible nor rewarding. Sharing the research costs appeared to be not just a 
desirable strategy to pool resources and share the risk but an essential condition to make 
feasible many projects which would be dropped otherwise.      
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Figure 5.11 Importance of cost of projects and their expected benefits 
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Source: Interviews (question A7). 
 
Only eight firms affirmed they would have enough financial means to carry out the 
research project alone (A7.1 = 1 or 2), but either the firm is part of a group or the cost of 
the project was not particularly high. One of these firms, a chemical firm, even said that 
forming an alliance increased unnecessarily the total cost of the project. The director of 
operations of this firm said: “If the project was to be developed autonomously, its total cost 
would be certainly smaller because the firm’s personnel salary is only one-third of that of 
people from the research institutions and because the red tape associated with this kind of 
projects would surely be minimised. Besides that, the research institutions take advantage 
of this kind of project to get equipment, thus raising the cost of projects.” Generally, 
however, firms had scarce financial resources, especially for research activities, and many 
have admitted they would refuse participating in the alliance had it not been financially 
supported by the European Union. The attractiveness of many projects was dependent on 
the amount of financial (and other) resources the firms would have to devote to join in. The 
EU funding permitted a substantial reduction of the partners’ contribution and in some 
cases “alleviated” quite substantially the firms’ financial burden such that the decision to 
participate in the alliance became rather simple and almost risk-free. In such situations the 
potential benefits easily surpassed the cost of participation, even taking into account the 
fact that the project had been set up elsewhere and the “fitness” problems that entailed. 
Establishing international contacts, participating in a research project with international 
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firms and research institutions, and acquiring new knowledge are examples of advantages 
which could compensate for participating. 
 
Taking the firms’ point of view, an interesting finding comes out: eventually, the EU 
funding turned infeasible projects, had they been carried out autonomously, into cost-
effective ones, and sometimes irrespective of the outcomes. The EU funding “allowed” 
some firms to participate in cooperative projects which they would otherwise not have 
considered. The CRAFT programme had the effect of creating new collaborative links 
between firms.62 To many firms, not entering the alliance would mean waiting for a 
solution provided by the market, which is still regarded by them as the most important 
source of innovation. 
 
5.5 CONCLUSION 
 
The chapter provides a detailed analysis of the initial circumstances in which the R&D 
alliances were shaped. Despite some clear advantages such joint research projects have to 
offer to the alliance partners, there are several weaknesses as well which might negatively 
influence the alliance implementation process and its outcomes and, ultimately, the ability 
of firms to achieve benefits and experience performance improvements. Figure 5.12 
summarises the potential strengths and weaknesses of the R&D alliances which derive 
from the analysis of the initial conditions. While the “potential strengths” side emphasises 
the diversity of partners and their complementary aspects plus the relevance of the EU 
financial support, the “potential weaknesses” side mainly reflects structural problems of the 
alliances, lack of resources of the Portuguese firms and their cultural aspects. The 
categorisation of the initial pros and cons is an attempt to single out relevant factors in a 
complex picture which characterises partnerships where similar circumstances may not 
lead to similar outcomes and vice-versa, as the several case studies presented throughout 
the chapter demonstrate. 
 
The EU funding allowed many SMEs to participate in international research projects that 
most of them would not have done otherwise. The participation of RTD performers and 
                                                 
62
 Peterson (1993: 254) reached a similar conclusion for the Eureka programme. 
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firms with complementary competencies created adequate conditions to carry out research 
on a scale generally not possible for individual SMEs. This allowed firms to structure 
larger projects and define more ambitious goals, thus enhancing the possibility of 
generating additional benefits for them. The presence of partners from different countries 
and partners with complementary competencies generated an excellent opportunity to learn 
and acquire knowledge and skills from partners. 
 
Figure 5.12 Potential strengths and weaknesses of initial conditions for the alliance 
implementation process and outcomes 
    
Potential strengths   Potential weaknesses 
• Projects join partner firms with different but 
complementary competencies; 
• Projects involve RTD performers for carrying 
out research;  
• Projects join firms and RTD performers from 
different countries; 
• EU financial support makes possible the 
execution of research projects that would 
likely be dropped otherwise; 
  • Distance between technology producers and 
technology users; 
• On average, the number of partners seems to 
be too high for the alliance to be efficiently 
managed; 
• Disregard for formal contracts in many cases; 
• Little prior knowledge about partners; 
• Little interaction of all partners in the pre-
project stage;  
• Little contribution of partners in structuring 
the projects; 
• Limited importance and urgency of projects; 
• Imbalance of power among firms and between 
firms and RTD performers; 
• No participation of local RTD performers in 
some projects; 
• Firms’ inadequate research capabilities; 
• Lack of interest in the alliance objectives and 
outcomes by some firms; 
    
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
 
Figure 5.12 also identifies many important weaknesses. Too large a “distance” between 
technology users and technology producers cause difficulties for the former to participate 
in the research activities. This combined with the low research capabilities of SMEs 
constitute important barriers to the transference and assimilation of technology, particularly 
when involving tacit knowledge. The fact that many alliances did not include a local RTD 
performer further complicates the position of the Portuguese firms. That “distance” 
between alliance partners also creates an imbalance of power within the partnership 
favourable for opportunistic behaviour. 
 
The contractual relationship of partners has been overlooked by many firms and is likely to 
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represent an important weakness of alliances. Partners who already trust each other find it 
easier to handle things in an informal way (Doz and Hamel, 1998). However, trust mainly 
comes from previous relationships and most of the Portuguese SMEs did not know their 
partners beforehand. The degree of trust between partners influences the link between 
alliances and firm performance (Stuart, 2000: 809). Establishing formal contracts involves 
substantial transaction costs for SMEs, but not doing so in the context of unknown partners 
is more risky. 
 
The lack of interaction in the pre-project phase and the limited contribution of many firms 
in structuring the research projects led to the formation of a group of “associated” firms 
who accepted playing a more peripheral role. These firms did not make themselves 
essential to the projects and entered the alliances in a weaker position. The fact that several 
firms regarded the project as neither important nor urgent, arguably the consequence of not 
setting up their own research projects adjusted to their specific needs and resources, while 
others were not interested in the alliance objectives, represented an important obstacle to 
the full commitment of firms to the alliances. 
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6 
ALLIANCE IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS AND 
OUTCOMES 
 
 
 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The previous chapter focused on the initial circumstances in which the CRAFT alliances 
were formed, and identified several potential strengths and weaknesses which are relevant 
for the subsequent alliance stages. This chapter is concerned with matters related to the 
alliance implementation process and outcomes, aiming at understanding the type and 
importance of the benefits achieved by the Portuguese firms from alliances, assessing the 
alliance performance and examining a range of factors which had a negative impact on the 
alliance outcomes. Most of the weaknesses identified in the previous chapter emerge 
through the analysis of the negative aspects of cooperation, though with varying degrees of 
importance. The matters discussed in this chapter help to a better understanding of the 
impact of alliance on firm performance, which is the subject of the next chapter. 
 
The chapter is structured as follows. First, it looks at the importance of the investment 
made by firms, both the research investment and the investment necessary to exploit the 
alliance outcomes. Second, the chapter examines a variety of factors which influenced the 
attainment of better results, and attempts to understand their relative importance. It 
proceeds with an assessment of the performance of alliances, including the degree to which 
the initial objectives were attained, the firm’s level of satisfaction with the alliance 
performance and the firms’ motivation to enter new partnerships. Before the conclusion, 
the chapter analyses the direct and indirect benefits obtained by the Portuguese firms, here 
interpreted as determinants of performance. 
 
6.2 INVESTMENT ANALYSIS 
 
One line of inquiry attempted to capture the importance of the amount of resources the 
 131 
firms assigned to the research projects, i.e. assess how significant was the research 
investment to the Portuguese firms. This was done by taking into consideration two 
different types of costs. On the one hand, the direct costs of participation in the alliance and 
exploitation of the alliance outcomes, such as the costs of personnel, training, travel and 
subsistence, acquisition of equipment, etc. On the other hand, the extent to which these 
projects affected the accomplishment of other projects or the normal activities of the firms. 
Before examining the above, however, it is important to understand the position of firms 
on the assessment of alliances’ costs and benefits. 
 
6.2.1 Importance of assessing the costs and benefits of projects 
 
Is it worthwhile to assess the individual costs and (prospective) benefits of research 
alliances? Although not expected, the large majority of the executives answered no to this 
question. According to Figure 6.1, which addresses the concern of the Portuguese firms in 
measuring the project’s costs and benefits, only 10 out of 43 firms have opened any form 
of cost accounting to measure the (financial) costs of participating in the alliance, and none 
of them did a similar thing for the (potential) benefits. Most firms did an elementary cost-
benefit analysis at the beginning of the relationship, however none of them had it in mind 
to do a rigorous assessment.  
 
Figure 6.1 Assessment of the costs and benefits of projects 
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Source: Interviews (question C7). 
 
Two main reasons were given to justify this general lack of interest about the alliance 
assessment. On the one hand, such an assessment would be worthless because the figures 
involved were very small indeed and would not justify a specific assessment procedure. On 
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the other hand, most firms achieved a number of intangible benefits (e.g. image 
improvement, international contacts) which, naturally, are extremely difficult to assess in 
quantitative terms. The cultural attitude of firms and the effort required to assess alliances 
in greater detail appear to be the factors behind these justifications. A general perception 
about the costs and benefits of projects seemed to be sufficient for the accounting needs of 
many firms. A stricter analysis was not deemed necessary and sometimes was even 
inappropriate, since it is a time-consuming activity that would provide little additional 
information. 
 
The fact that the EU covered the RTD performers’ research costs made the assessment of 
costs in the research phase much simpler. But the costs of exploiting the alliance outcomes 
and the expected tangible benefits of many projects are sufficiently significant to deserve a 
rather more rigorous assessment. In any case, the above suggests that a methodological 
approach aiming at obtaining quantitative data would be difficult to operationalise because 
most firms would have difficulties in collaborating.  
 
6.2.2 Research investment vs. investment to exploit alliance outcomes 
 
Figure 6.2 compares the importance of the investment (such as personnel, time, production 
capacity and money) allocated by firms for the research phase with the importance of the 
investment necessary to exploit fully the alliance outcomes. The latter includes the 
unsuccessful projects and projects which will not be exploited by firms, for reasons 
explained in the next chapter.63 The aim is to emphasise the difference between the relative 
investment requirements in each stage. The research investment has been considered 
important only by one firm, not because of the amount itself, but due to financial problems 
the firm was experiencing at that time. “The total cost/investment has been irrelevant”, was 
the most common answer for the question concerning the cost of participation in the 
alliance. To 35 firms (81%) the total amount of resources allocated for the research 
activities was regarded as insignificant. Eventually, as a result of public financial 
intervention, the firms’ position about the research costs “shifted” from a condition of 
financial impossibility to a situation of a completely bearable financial contribution. 
                                                 
63
 In these cases, the analysis took into consideration an estimation of the amount of investment that would be 
necessary to exploit the outcomes had the projects been successful. 
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Furthermore, some of them came to the conclusion that their contribution had been so 
small that they would be satisfied with the alliance regardless of its outcomes. The 
relatively small amount of resources required from firms greatly facilitated their decision to 
enter the research alliances, and relaxed their initial demands and commitment. It also 
explains to a great extent the low percentage of firms unsatisfied with the alliance (as we 
will see below).  
 
Among the different categories of costs concerning the research activities, those referred to 
as most relevant were (in no particular order) “Personnel” (management time in most 
cases), “Travel and subsistence” (for attending meetings in other countries), “Raw 
material” (to carry out in-house experiments) and “Financial contribution” (in some cases). 
The cost categories “Training” and “Acquisition of equipment” were relatively less 
important at the research stage. The relative importance of each cost category differs from 
firm to firm but in general they are indicative of the role played by firms in the alliance 
(e.g. attending meetings, carrying out in-house experiments). They benefited from the RTD 
performers’ equipped laboratories and thus avoided the acquisition of expensive equipment 
necessary to carry out the research.   
 
Figure 6.2 Importance of the research investment and importance of the 
investment needed to exploit the alliance outcomes 
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Source: Interviews. 
 
Conversely, Figure 6.2 also shows that half of the firms regarded the investment needed for 
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fully exploiting the alliance outcomes (or the investment that would be necessary had the 
project been successful) as being at least important. Acquiring expensive machinery, 
setting up new plants, making substantial changes in the production process or protecting 
the knowledge (patents) are the types of investments firms have referred to as being 
important or very important. For instance, in one case just the acquisition of the novel 
equipment cost around 10% of the firm’s previous year’s turnover, while in another case 
that figure has been estimated to be about 50%. In absolute numbers, the former investment 
is fifteen times greater than the latter, meaning that the financial capability of firms in the 
post-research period is very important in joint projects of this kind. Some firms had to 
postpone the acquisition of the novel equipment due to lack of financial resources to 
acquire it immediately. One of the five missing observations could have been classified 
either as very important or insignificant, depending on whether the firm will carry out 
further research or not.  
 
In some unsuccessful alliances, the Portuguese firms were nevertheless satisfied, even 
taking into account the expected long payback period of the research investment. But other 
firms were unsatisfied because there will not be any payback at all. On the other hand, in 
successful alliances the amount of post-research investment was not a big concern if the 
expected payback period was short, but an important deterrent in case of being long.  
  
The evidence above shows that unlike the research investment (that was subsidised), the 
post-research investment necessary to exploit the alliance outcomes is important and 
sometimes represents a significant constraint against cumulative competence development.  
 
6.2.3 Opportunity costs 
 
Besides the amount of resources directly allocated to the projects, a second line of inquiry 
looked at the implications of project participation for the normal activities of firms and the 
implementation of other projects, here called opportunity costs. Figure 6.3 clearly shows 
that the resources assigned to the vast majority of the projects under analysis have not 
impeded, postponed or in any way affected the implementation of other research projects 
(or projects of other kinds). Actually, most firms did not have any other (research) projects 
in progress or planned, and those who did stressed that those projects were not (negatively) 
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influenced.  
 
Figure 6.3 Influence of alliances on firms’ other projects and/or normal 
activities 
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Source: Interviews (question C8). 
 
Figure 6.3 also tells us that firms’ normal activities have been somewhat affected in 13 
cases, although in general only slightly and for a short period of time. Typically, the normal 
activities of firms were affected at the time of performing in-house experiments, installing 
new equipment or making layout changes. The use of management time to carry out 
alliance activities, such as attending meetings in other countries, had a negative impact on 
the firms’ normal activities as well, especially in the case of smaller firms which rely 
heavily on one or two key persons. The fact that the RTD performers carried out most of 
the research activities and some of them rejected a greater participation of firms in the 
research process partially explains why firms were not much affected. In many cases, the 
firms’ peripheral role in the alliance or the non-strategic importance of projects are part of 
the explanation as well. The opportunity costs were not substantial because many firms 
carried out a relatively small number of tasks. 
 
6.3 NEGATIVE ASPECTS OF COOPERATION 
 
This section is intended to look at the negative side of cooperation, particularly over the 
project implementation phase. It analyses a number of factors that had a somewhat negative 
influence on or limited the alliance outcomes, looking at their relative (negative) 
importance. In addition, the negative factors are aggregated by means of factor analysis and 
an interpretation of the results is provided, taking into consideration the information 
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collected in the interviews. To achieve this, the interviewees were asked to rate a list of 
possible negative factors on a five-point importance scale and invited to add other negative 
factors not included in the list when appropriate. Then, they were asked to clarify the 
meaning of their answers. 
 
There are two important aspects with direct implications for the results that can hardly be 
exposed through the interpretation of the data, but were visible during the interview 
process. First, many firms, voluntarily or not, performed a minor role in the whole process 
of cooperation and only a small number of firms had enough technical competence to 
participate actively in the research activities or be able to monitor the research being 
carried out. Frequently, the firms’ main task was to perform in-house tests of the 
equipment, process or product under development. Second, the interaction between 
partners (firms and RTD performers), with some exceptions, has been rather small and in 
several cases restricted to the periodic formal meetings at a firm’s or RTD performer’s 
premises. These two factors have negatively affected the firms’ capability to assess 
satisfactorily the negative aspects of the joint undertaking. Therefore, the real picture of the 
negative aspects of cooperation would likely be different, presumably more negative than 
the one that can be drawn from the existing data. 
 
6.3.1 Relative importance of the negative factors 
 
Figure 6.4 depicts the average scores of the negative factors on a five-point importance 
scale. The average scores are mostly rather small64 and well below the scale’s mid-point, 
i.e. below the “Moderately important” point. The relatively low average scores of all but 
one variable are indicative of the interviewees’ general perception that the alliance 
outcomes have not been much negatively affected by such factors. It seems, nevertheless, 
there is a group of negative factors that stands out - those with an average score around two 
or above - and the difference between averages suggest that they are not equally important. 
 
 
                                                 
64
 The variable “Other” has an average score well above all the others because, as a residual variable, it 
comprises a mixture of negative factors not included in the list provided, and to which individual firms 
generally attributed greater importance. 
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Figure 6.4 Importance of the negative factors 
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Notes: (n) Number of observations. (s) Sample standard deviation.  
Source: Table A2.4 in Appendix 2. 
 
Figure 6.4 includes information about successful and unsuccessful research alliances. The 
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former tends to mitigate the visibility of the negative side of cooperation, because the 
negative aspects tend to be perceived as less important. In an attempt to minimise this 
problem, Figure 6.5 contains only those observations which the interviewees declared the 
objectives of the project were not fulfilled, i.e. those cases where C1.2 ≤ 3.65 Such a 
procedure reduces the number of valid observations to nineteen, representing 14 out of the 
30 research alliances under analysis, but enhances the visibility of the most important 
negative factors. All the average scores increased except three, and the relative importance 
of the negative factors is clearer now.  Figure A2.2 in Appendix 2 represents the average 
scores of the remaining observations, which correspond to the cases where the alliance 
objectives were achieved (i.e. those where C1.2 ≥ 4). As expected, the average scores are 
substantially smaller and the difference between them is much less visible. The factor 
“Language/communication problems” (B7.1), surprisingly, is the only factor with a higher 
score. It is interesting to note that the factor “Lack of commitment or delay in 
accomplishing tasks” (B7.16) stands out with the highest average score. 
 
The most important negative aspects of cooperation, as represented in Figure 6.5, are 
related to the commitment, different expectations/conflicts of interest and transparency of 
partners, the complexity and risk of projects, and the initial conditions of firms, namely the 
lack of experience and too much initial optimism. Also important are the number and 
quality of interactions among partners. The least important negative factors are related to 
the language and communication problems, the number and different size of partners, and 
the inflexibility of the project objectives. The standard deviation values increased (except 
in three cases) and some become relatively high. It indicates that the importance of the 
negative factors tends to vary considerably across alliances, i.e. the negative factors were 
not equally important in all unsuccessful alliances. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
65
 A similar analysis has been carried out for the “Level of satisfaction with the performance of the alliance” 
(question C1.1) and the findings are not much different (see Figure A2.1 in Appendix 2). That is not so 
surprising since there is a significant correlation between the level of satisfaction with the alliance and the 
attainment of the pre-defined objectives (r = 0.783, n = 41). 
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Figure 6.5 Importance of the negative factors - alliances that did not achieve the 
objectives (C1.2 ≤ 3) 
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Key: See Figure 6.4 above. 
Notes: (n) Number of observations. (s) Sample standard deviation.  
Source: Table A2.4 and Table A2.5, both in Appendix 2. 
 
A different way of looking at the relative importance of the negative factors takes into 
consideration each answer on a yes/no-type scale instead of the five-point importance scale 
used hitherto. This transformation can be done by summing up all the answers of each 
negative factor which have some associated degree of importance (i.e. categories 2 to 5).66 
Following such procedure, the negative factors have been re-classified as “Irrelevant” or 
“Important” and the results, sorted according to the latter, are presented in Table 6.1. 
Comparing the results of the two approaches, one realises that the nine most important 
                                                 
66
 Variable “Other” has been excluded due to its different nature. 
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negative factors identified in Figure 6.5 (i.e. those with the highest average scores) are 
exactly the first nine factors ranked in Table 6.1 (i.e. those which were important to a larger 
number of firms). 
 
Table 6.1 Negative factors of cooperation 
  Irrelevant Important Overall (*) 
   (a)  (b) Avg. score Avg. score 
 B7.16 Lack of commitment or delay in accomplishing tasks 
by partner firms (and/or RTD performers) 13 29 3.00 2.38 
 B7.10  Technological complexity of the project  16 26 2.96 2.21 
 B7.15 Different expectations/conflicts of interest among the 
partner firms (and/or RTD performers) 17 25 2.92 2.14 
 B7.2 Number of interactions between the partner firms 
and RTD performers  19 23 2.83 2.02 
 B7.14  Lack of experience in similar projects  19 23 2.87 2.02 
 B7.20  Too much optimism at the beginning  19 23 3.00 2.10 
 B7.13  Lack of or scarce management time  20 22 2.68 1.93 
 B7.6  Lack of willingness of partner firms to share know-
how  21 21 2.86 1.93 
 B7.3  Quality of interactions between the partner firms and 
RTD performers  22 20 3.00 1.95 
 B7.1 Language/communication problems 25 17 2.65 1.67 
 B7.9  Prior agreement on intellectual property rights  26 16 2.63 1.62 
 B7.11  Lack of in-house technological expertise to exploit 
the project outcomes  26 16 2.56 1.60 
 B7.19 Lack of expertise of the RTD performer(s) to carry 
out the research project 26 16 2.63 1.62 
 B7.21  Dependence on the European Union  26 16 2.44 1.55 
 B7.4 Cultural differences among the partner firms  27 15 2.27 1.45 
 B7.5 Difference in size between the partner firms  27 15 2.07 1.38 
 B7.7 Number of alliance partners  27 15 2.60 1.57 
 B7.12 Lack of or scarce financial resources to exploit the 
project outcomes  26 15 2.87 1.71 
 B7.17 Miscalculation of the risk involved in the project  27 15 2.47 1.57 
 B7.8  Written contract among the partner firms  29 13 2.69 1.52 
 B7.18 Inflexibility of the objectives of the research project  31 11 2.27 1.33 
Notes: Number of answers based on the number of observations of question B7: (a) of category “1-
Irrelevant”; (b) of categories “2-Slightly important”, “3-Moderately important”, “4-Very important” and “5-
Extremely important”. (*) Scores from Table 6.4. 
Source: Table A2.4 in Appendix 2. 
 
An important finding that comes out is the strong and positive correlation (r = 0.975, r2 = 
0.950) between the total number of “Important” observations of a given negative factor 
(Table 6.1, column 3) and the overall average score of that factor (column 5). It basically 
means the average scores of the negative factors are directly related to their number of 
“Important” observations. The higher the number of “Important” observations, the higher 
the average scores tend to be. This suggests that the negative factors which are important to 
a higher number of firms tend also to be the ones which firms consider, on average, the 
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most negative. Or, taking a rather different point of view, it simply means that the apparent 
difference of the average scores comes from the different number of “Irrelevant” 
observations of each negative factor. In this case, lower average scores are the result of a 
higher number of “Irrelevant” observations and vice-versa. 
 
Another important aspect worth analysing is the pervasiveness of the negative factors, i.e. 
how common are they. The negative factor “Lack of commitment or delay in 
accomplishing tasks” was regarded as important by two-thirds of the executives, while the 
factor “Inflexibility of the objectives of the research project” was considered important by 
only about a quarter of them. No negative factor was important to all executives or even in 
all research alliances, and no negative factor was unimportant as well. The substantial 
difference in the number of “Important” observations across the range of negative factors 
suggests some kind of hierarchy among them but the pervasiveness of a given negative 
factor cannot be dissociated from its nature, the attributes of firms and the context of each 
alliance. Besides that, the interviews carried out with different partner firms of the same 
research alliance were important for understanding that the executives frequently have 
different perceptions about what might be considered a negative factor of cooperation and 
its relative importance. The assessment is subjective and thus is subject to different 
interpretations, but it is unlikely to explain significantly different perceptions about the 
same phenomenon. Asymmetric information and different commitment to the project are 
factors which also help to explain the different perception about the importance of negative 
factors. 
 
Finally, it is relevant to understand whether the most common factors correspond to factors 
with the highest scores. An intuitive answer would be no, but many of the highest scores 
correspond indeed to the negative factors with the higher number of “Important” 
observations, and the correlation between the two is quite significant (r = 0.745; Table 6.1, 
columns 3 and 4). Therefore, the relative importance of a given negative factor is not just 
explained by the position at which it is ranked. 
 
6.3.2 An interpretation of the negative factors of cooperation 
 
The number of negative factors of cooperation affecting the alliance outcomes is 
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considerable and they touch upon a large variety of matters, whose relevance tends to vary 
from firm to firm and alliance to alliance. By means of factor analysis and for the benefit of 
interpretation, this complex picture is simplified to a smaller number of relevant variables 
(Factors), each representing a set of negative factors with some affinity among them. 
 
Table 6.2 shows the results of the factor analysis (only absolute values higher than 0.5 are 
shown), which has generated six factors.67 The Bartlett Test of Sphericity is significant at 
the 0.001 level and the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy equals 0.575, 
although a few individual MSA values are lower than 0.568. The six factors extracted 
recovered about 74.4% of the total variance.  
 
Below is an interpretation of the results of the factor analysis which takes into 
consideration the additional information provided by the executives. It focuses on each 
Factor individually for the sake of the explanation but there is some interdependence of 
many of the negative factors. Indeed, cross-references are hardly avoidable in the 
interpretation of the Factors. The six Factors can be labelled as follows: 
• Factor 1:  Commitment of partners; 
• Factor 2:  Cultural aspects; 
• Factor 3:  Lack of internal resources; 
• Factor 4:  Unperceived risk; 
• Factor 5:  Communication problems 
• Factor 6:  Structural problems. 
 
Factor 1: Commitment of partners. Factor 1 involves most of the negative factors 
concerning the relation among partners, both firms and RTD performers, and their attitude 
toward the research project and the other alliance partners. It unfolds chiefly at the project 
implementation stage when the commitment, competence, individual interests and 
expectation of partners become clear. Those firms that experienced problems at this stage 
frequently stressed their lack of experience in similar projects and high initial optimism to 
                                                 
67
 The SPSS 9.0 outputs can be found in Appendix 3. 
68
 When in presence of MSA values lower than 0.5 some authors (e.g. Hair et al., 1998) suggest that one or 
more variables should be excluded from the analysis until all MSA values reach a minimum of 0.5. In the 
current situation it would be necessary to exclude a total of three variables, however it is our conviction that 
such a procedure would not provide better results.  
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partially justify situations that otherwise could have been prevented or at least attenuated 
from the very beginning.  
 
Table 6.2 Results of a factor analysis upon the set of negative factors 
 Variable Mean Factor loadings Comm 
   1 2 3 4 5 6 unality 
 B7.15 Different expectations/conflicts of interest amongst 
the partner firms (and/or RTD performers)................................2.14 .839      .871 
 B7.20 Too much optimism at the beginning................................2.10 .760      .737 
 B7.6 Lack of willingness of partner firms to share know-
how ................................................................................................1.93 .721      .621 
 B7.16 Lack of commitment or delay in accomplishing 
tasks by partner firms (and/or RTD performers) ................................2.38 .719      .565 
 B7.14 Lack of experience in similar projects ................................2.02 .586      .795 
 B7.3 Quality of interactions between the partner firms 
and RTD performers ................................................................1.95 .558      .511 
 B7.19 Lack of expertise of the RTD performer(s) to carry 
out the research project ................................................................1.62 .532    .521  .691 
 B7.8 Written contract among the partner firms ................................1.52  .838     .783 
 B7.9 Prior agreement on intellectual property rights ................................1.62  .830     .828 
 B7.4 Cultural differences among the partner firms................................1.45  .799     .741 
 B7.21 Dependence on the European Union................................1.55  .608     .675 
 B7.11 Lack of in-house technological expertise to exploit 
the project outcomes ................................................................1.60   .807    .779 
 B7.5 Difference in size between the partner firms................................1.38   .708    .737 
 B7.12 Lack of or scarce financial resources to exploit the 
project outcomes ................................................................1.71   .692    .761 
 B7.13 Lack of or scarce management time................................1.93   .683    .774 
 B7.10 Technological complexity of the project................................2.21    .741   .793 
 B7.17 Miscalculation of the risk involved in the project ................................1.57    .722   .750 
 B7.2 Number of interactions between the partner firms 
and RTD performers ................................................................2.02    .657   .800 
 B7.1 Language/communication problems................................1.67     .902  .870 
 B7.7 Number of alliance partners ................................................................1.57      .810 .817 
 B7.18 Inflexibility of the objectives of the research 
project ................................................................................................1.33      .630 .721 
 Percentage of the variance explained ....................................................30.8 13.7 10.3 7.2 6.7 5.7 74.4 
Notes: Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Quartimax with Kaiser 
Normalization. The results of the Varimax rotation method are quite similar to the Quartimax, the major 
difference being the change of position of variable B7.19 from Factor 6 to Factor 1. The Quartimax rotation 
method results seem to be more adequate. 
The variable “Other” has been excluded because it comprises only 11 observations. 
Source: Based on the answers to question B7. 
 
An important negative factor has been the lack of commitment or delay in accomplishing 
tasks by the partners. Delays in performing research tasks happened quite frequently but the 
importance of this was often disregarded if projects did get through within the allotted 
time. The lack of commitment is clearly visible in many of partners’ attitudes described 
below, but the RTD performers were particularly targeted on this matter, which is not so 
surprising given their central role in all projects. Important is the fact that five firms 
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understand their passive role in the alliance as a lack of commitment.  Of those 
interviewees who were unsatisfied with the behaviour of the RTD performers, some 
strongly criticised them for their lack of commitment to the projects and sometimes lack of 
competence in carrying out the research. In some cases, they stressed, these institutions 
were much more concerned in getting funding for their normal activities and for the 
acquisition of equipment than to be professionally committed to the research project. And 
that happens because the quality of the research carried out by the RTD performers is never 
assessed by the EC (or a third party) and, consequently, they are unlikely to be punished 
even in the case of poor results due to badly conducted research activities. “The EC has an 
indirect negative contribution when it ‘allows’ that research institutions take control of 
projects, rejecting sometimes the participation and contribution of some partners”, said an 
executive. This has been the main negative remark on the European Commission’s role. 
 
Some RTD performers have been criticised for not having the competence or means to 
carry out the projects they were supposed to, and especially when they took the initiative to 
set up the project and “sell” it to the firms, suggesting having the capability to do it. 
“Research institutions have a good theoretical background but are not well prepared to 
solve practical problems”, added an interviewee. Three factors helped to minimise the 
magnitude of this negative factor. Some firms recognised their lack of competence and 
qualified personnel to assess both the technological complexity of the project, particularly 
when it involved unknown technologies, and the RTD performers’ technical competence. 
In four cases (3 projects), the firms affirmed that the project was by no means complex and, 
by looking at the question on the novelty of projects (see question A7.5 in Figure 5.10 and 
Table A2.3 in Appendix 2), one realises that four firms affirmed that the technological 
solution under development could have been found in the marketplace, while nine others 
were not sure about such a possibility. 
 
The lack of willingness of partners to share their know-how negatively affected many 
alliances. Perhaps the example that best illustrates this is the case of a certain technology 
producer who, at the end of the research project, refused to make a demonstration of how 
the new production process really worked; the alliance partners were just informed that the 
process works and were given a technical dossier on the project. This is an important 
problem because the Portuguese partner firm has no competence to decipher the technical 
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language, meaning that the alliance outcomes are of little use (see Case study A in Chapter 
5). Many firms stressed their reluctance in accepting a deeper relationship with competitor 
partners that would expose their knowledge or technologies. For instance, the single 
condition to participate in the alliance of a given firm was that it should not include any 
other Portuguese competitor. Other firm has emphasised it would not be willing to share its 
technological knowledge and be fully committed to the project in the circumstance of 
having other Portuguese or Spanish competitors as partners, because the firm regards them 
as on a lower technological rung. In other case, the alliance partners did not supply their 
best products for testing because important information could have been passed on to the 
competitor firm. Conversely, firms were completely available to share information and 
proprietary knowledge with competitor partners only when their geographic markets did 
not overlap (and it could not be expected this would happen). This is an advantageous 
strategy indeed because firms can maximise their joint contribution and the risk of 
transparency is insignificant.  
 
In many alliances there were conflicts amongst partners which typically appeared in the 
course of the relationship but often were the consequence of an underestimated  importance 
given to the pre-project phase (perhaps due to lack of experience!). There were two main 
sources of conflict concerning the contractual arrangement. First, when the (formal) 
contract did not exist or it was not sufficiently comprehensive about the responsibility of 
partners and the intellectual property rights and/or commercial rights. Second, when some 
partners wanted to sign a formal contract in the course of the project but faced the 
opposition of other partners. The latter generated such a conflict in one case that the 
European Commission cancelled the alliance (see Case study B in Chapter 5).   
 
Some projects were set up to fulfil the interests of specific partners and the research 
resources were used primarily for that purpose, however the partners’ perception of this 
happened later in their implementation. In other cases, there were communication problems 
between firms and RTD performers concerning the required balance between the interest in 
improving the theoretical knowledge (RTD performers) and the advantage of having a 
practical application of it (firms). The executive of a chemical firm said, “Firms and 
laboratories had different expectations. The latter tend to keep doing tests forever, by 
making marginal changes in the variables, but without a practical aim expected by firms.” 
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Two other firms quit their alliance due to conflicts of interest.69 In one case the technology 
to be developed would not suit the firm’s needs; in the other case the firm has been given a 
minor role in the partnership not compatible with the firm’s technological capabilities (the 
firm was invited to invent something else to do!) and there was no prospect of sharing 
know-how or be able to use their technological capability - the kind of things it was 
expecting to get from the alliance. 
 
In a number of research alliances, the weak interdependence and poor communication 
between technology producers and technology users caused some damage to the quality of 
the interactions between them. Often, the technology producers “assumed” that the 
technology users were dispensable to the research process, particularly when the latter 
lacked specific technical know-how or competencies in a given technological area. This 
attitude of technology producers dissatisfied many technology users and proved to be a 
wrong approach because a closer relationship between the two would avoid the “sense of 
exclusion” felt by many partner firms and would benefit the research by preventing errors 
from occurring. In a specific case, the know-how of a given firm has been rejected by the 
RTD performer despite being pertinent and superior in many respects to that of the RTD 
performer’s. This illustrates the unbalanced bargaining power and asymmetric information 
among partners.  
 
Technical discussions at the periodic meetings70 often created barriers to the participation 
of technology users and was perceived by executives as a cause for the low quality of 
meetings. The quality of meetings suffered also from the absence of some partners and 
non-participation of others. These factors discouraged many firms from attending the 
periodic meetings and some “delegated” their representation to the local RTD performers. 
Some firms never attended a periodic meeting! The interaction among partners was 
hindered from the very beginning because there were alliance partners that never met and 
few firms sought extra-alliance relations. Rarely did the Portuguese partner firms seek a 
stronger interaction between them and the development of extra-alliance activities. 
                                                 
69
  These firms were contacted by phone only though were available for an interview. Since both quit the 
alliance at an early stage and assured us of having nothing else to say besides what they have said, a face-to-
face interview appeared to be of no use. For this reason these firms are not included in the sample. 
70
 Typically, the periodic meetings took place every six months and gathered together all the alliance partners. 
 
 147 
Factor 2: Cultural aspects. It sounds contradictory that firms’ cultural aspects represent an 
important Factor while the “Cultural differences among the partner firms” is ranked one of 
the least negative factors. Its overall average score of 1.45 basically means that the 
partners’ cultural differences were little more than an insignificant negative factor.71 At 
least two things can shed light on this point. On the one hand, the kind of interaction 
among partners, their well-defined role in the alliance, and the divide between technology 
producers and technology users minimised the potential for conflicts and blurred the 
visibility of cultural differences among partners. On the other hand, the problems that firms 
faced in the course of the relationship seldom were perceived as cultural problems or 
rooted in the firm’s culture. However, many of the issues discussed in this section reflect 
the behaviour and attitude of firms, i.e. they reflect the organisational culture. 
 
The position of firms towards the formal aspects of the relationship reflect among other 
things a cultural attitude. Many firms neglected the importance of formal contracts for 
reasons explained elsewhere, just realising the advantage of having them when conflicts 
occurred (see Case study B in Chapter 5). The failure of some alliances minimised the 
dimension of the problem because their expected results, if attained, would generate 
conflicts among partners since no formal contract was signed. For many executives, the 
lack of experience in similar projects explains the attitude of firms because it limited the 
perception of possible consequences and led them to accept conditions that otherwise 
would have been rejected. On the other hand, when conflicts with the RTD performers 
came up because they were not being professionally committed to the project or were not 
treating equally all the partners, firms felt powerless to deal with the situation and criticised 
the European Commission for not doing anything to protect their interests in the alliance. 
 
Factor 3: Lack of internal resources. The CRAFT programme was extremely important in 
permitting firms to access the research resources they needed for the research projects, 
particularly expertise. It reduced substantially the amount of resources demanded from 
firms to participate in the alliances but only for the research activities. Several firms faced 
two important difficulties concerning the assignment of human resources for research 
activities. First, the number of available people was small and it was complicated to 
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 Saxton’s (1997: 456) results also contradict the “popular idea that ‘culture clash’ negatively influences 
alliance potential.” 
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“release” them on a full-time basis. As a rule, projects were assigned on a part-time basis to 
someone who frequently had some kind of managing responsibility. Second, they did not 
have the appropriate background. The lack of qualified people was particularly important 
when the firm had no competence in the technology under development, and partially 
explains the existence of stronger ties with the local RTD performers. At least two firms 
were unsatisfied for not having a Portuguese research institution in the alliance to provide 
the technical support they needed (see, for instance, Case study K in Chapter 7). 
 
We have seen above that the lack of resources matter in the post-project stage. At that 
stage, some firms could not implement the alliance outcomes without the help of other 
partners, and in other cases firms were not capable (and sometimes had no interest) of 
furthering the research activities alone because it involved knowledge new to the firm or 
they lacked adequate research resources (e.g. laboratory, equipment or personnel) to 
proceed with the research. In other cases, firms did not have enough financial resources to 
exploit the outcomes immediately (e.g. to buy the novel equipment) or the interest of firms 
in exploiting the alliance outcomes was dependent on the investment involved. Of course, 
size matters when the problem is the access to resources; smaller firms tend to face greater 
difficulties in accessing them. Only a small number of executives established a link 
between the firm’s size and the availability of resources, perhaps because the negative 
factor “Difference in size between partner firms” appeared before the others in the list 
(which may be the reason for its relatively small average score). 
 
Factor 4: Unperceived risk. Risk was not expected to be an important negative factor, at 
least in the research period. Firms’ financial contributions were relatively small, the 
projects were far from fundamental research (perhaps with the exception of one of them), 
and firms were permitted to choose RTD performers with appropriate technological 
competencies and research facilities to carry out the research. Firms had the opportunity to 
reach a critical mass of human and financial resources to implement (larger) projects 
suiting their needs. Many executives showed surprise when asked about the risk involved 
in the project, however not all risk was taken into account at the beginning of the 
relationships or perceived as such at the end of it. Most firms were invited to enter the 
alliance and were attracted by the enhanced benefits of the project and low cost of 
participating, but overlooked the risks associated with it. 
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It is possible to identify at least two major categories of risk. On the one hand, there is the 
risk concerning the technological complexity of projects. It was an important negative 
factor to many unsuccessful alliances and impeded others from achieving the totality of the 
expected results. Some projects did not take into consideration the whole complexity of 
combining several technologies or were oversized for the available time, resources or the 
RTD performers’ technological capability, and therefore could not reach the objectives 
they set out to achieve (see Case study E in Chapter 5). On the other hand, there were risks 
related to: (in)compatibility of partners and their objectives due to poor prior knowledge of 
both; high initial optimism because the project was “sold” as being better than it really was; 
rising project costs in the course of its execution, and post-project risk concerning the 
conditions to market the new product; the in-house (im)possibility of taking full advantage 
of the alliance outcomes or the dependence on a third-party to do so.72 An important reason 
why the number of interactions among the alliance partners has been considered too small 
is because some firms wanted to have a stronger participation in the research activities and 
be better informed. In many cases both things were denied (or not required) by the 
technology producers. Such a risk has been identified but not explicitly reckoned as such. 
 
Factor 5: Communication problems. An interesting but unexpected finding concerns the 
language and communication problems, that apparently have been a minor concern for 
most firms. Given that the average number of alliance partners is about eleven, on average 
partners are from four different European countries, and the talks were generally conducted 
in English, it was expected that these factors would be a serious obstacle to the normal 
relationship among alliance partners and a handicap to non-native English speakers. 
Apparently, that did not happen because 25 firms (60%) have considered this negative 
factor to be irrelevant and 10 others only slightly important. 
 
The low interaction among partners partially explains the phenomenon but it is also likely 
that the communication problems have been underestimated. As explained above, some 
firms were refused a more substantial participation in the research process by the 
technology producers, and others criticised the R&D institutions for not being sensitive 
enough in dealing with the relative interest of furthering the theoretical development and 
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 This point is thoroughly explained in the next chapter. 
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the need for practical applications. Some firms were unsatisfied with the RTD performers’ 
attitude that ignored their request to stop putting the interests of some partners ahead of the 
others. There were communication problems particularly with the RTD performers, which 
explains why the negative factor “Lack of expertise of the RTD performers” is significant 
in Factor 5 (factor loading is 0.521). It appears that the language and communication 
problems were not perceived as so significant because the well-defined roles of partners in 
most alliances did not demand an intense and dynamic interaction among them. 
 
Factor 6: Structural problems. Problems related to the structure of alliances are dispersed 
across all the Factors, diminishing their visibility and importance, probably much more 
than would really be appropriate. The number of alliance partners is possibly a typical 
example of a negative factor whose average score does not seem to express its actual 
importance. It would certainly be much more relevant if partners were demanding other 
kind of participation and interaction, the divide between technology producers and 
technology users were less striking, and the power balance between the two were not so 
unbalanced.  
 
Regarding the negative factor “Other”, four out of the eleven executives regarded the 
partners’ dispersion across many European countries as a major negative aspect because it 
increased the transaction costs, including the total cost of projects, caused delays in 
accomplishing tasks, and involved greater logistic difficulties to organise meetings. Quite 
irrelevant in setting up a project, given the modern means of communication, the proximity 
of partners becomes very important during the experimental stage because it requires 
interaction, close monitoring of results, and a rapid decision-making process. 
 
Other structural aspects were equally important. Regular meetings with all partners was the 
preferred form of interaction, which usually took place every six months, the minimum 
imposed by the EC. But, as one executive pointed out, there is no great advantage in 
spending two or three days attending a three-hour meeting when no other incentives exist, 
such as visiting the partner’s premises, because the access to the meeting’s technical 
reports is guaranteed. Progress meetings tend to be less appealing if they involve only the 
presentation of intermediate results; the discussion becoming too technical greatly restricts 
the participation of many technology users. 
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The research alliances under analysis join together firms with RTD performers. The latter 
are engaged to carry out research on the firms’ behalf but are paid for by the EC. As 
mentioned above, in cases of poor commitment or unequal treatment of partners by the 
RTD performers, firms do not seem to have enough power or know-how to defend their 
rights and compel RTD performers to behave professionally. 
 
6.4 OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF ALLIANCE PERFORMANCE 
 
This section addresses the issue of alliance performance. Executives were asked to assess 
six statements concerning the satisfaction with the performance of the alliances (C1.1 and 
C1.2), the expected consequences for firms (C1.3 and C1.4), and the intentions of their 
firms about participation in future alliances (C1.5 and C1.6). The average scores are 
presented in Figure 6.6.  
 
In general, the results are relatively high and reflect a positive appreciation of the alliance 
outcomes, but interpreting them is not straightforward. Some answers are conditional, 
because they were given on the condition that the alliance success would lead to the 
successful exploitation of its outcomes, which in many cases depend on factors not under 
the firm’s control. Frequently, the alliance partners’ perception about the degree to which 
the objectives were attained differs, which is surely a consequence of a subjective question, 
but it may also be symptomatic of asymmetric information among partners if the 
divergence (and sometimes contradiction) of opinion is taken into consideration. Perhaps 
the alliance partners on the periphery of the alliance, those less connected and performing a 
minor role, were ill-informed about the progress of the alliance and did not adjust their 
expectations. Another possible explanation is that the assessment of alliance performance 
was made according to the initial expectations of firms, which are likely to be different. 
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Figure 6.6 Overall assessment of the performance of alliance 
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Key: 
C1.1 Overall we are satisfied with the performance of this alliance; 
C1.2 The alliance has realised the goals we set out to achieve; 
C1.3 Now we have a competitive advantage over our direct competitors; 
C1.4 This project has/will have a positive impact on the firm performance. 
The firm will certainly use interfirm cooperation on a more regular basis: 
       - C1.5 if European Union funding is available; 
       - C1.6 even without European Union funding 
Notes: (n) Number of observations. (s) Sample standard deviation.  
Source: Table A2.5 in Appendix 2. 
 
Twenty-eight executives (67%) were satisfied or completely satisfied with the alliance 
performance (i.e. C1.1 = 4 or 5)73 and no one admitted being totally unsatisfied with it. 
Only twenty-three executives (55%) agreed that the alliance has achieved most or all the 
objectives set out initially (i.e. C1.2 = 4 or 5), and three others admitted that none of the 
objectives were achieved. The satisfaction with the alliance often depends on the 
accomplishment of both technical and economic objectives. Normally, executives would 
not classify an alliance as successful if its outcomes could not be exploited. Interestingly, 
this “rule” was relaxed in three cases. The executives were satisfied with the alliance 
performance but the alliance outcomes will not be exploited because during the alliance 
execution the market conditions changed in two of the cases, and an alternative (and better) 
technical solution was found in the other case.   
 
There is a substantial and positive correlation between variables C1.1 and C1.2 (r = 0.782) 
but there are other factors that explain the level of satisfaction with the alliance besides the 
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 See Table A2.5 in Appendix 2 for the breakdown of the answers by category. 
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fulfilment of its objectives. Apart from those firms that were not concerned with the 
common objectives, goal-achievement was the point of reference for the alliance 
performance assessment. 
 
Table 6.3 presents a comparison between variables “satisfaction with the performance of 
the alliance” and “realisation of the goals set out to achieve”. Twenty-five executives rated 
equally both variables (scores ranging from two to five), denoting the strong relationship 
between the two. In all five cases where C1.1 < C1.2, the executives affirmed that the 
alliance achieved all its objectives but they were not completely satisfied because of any 
specific aspect they did not appreciate (e.g. attitude of partners, delays in setting up the new 
equipment or change of expectation). One of the firms was not interested in the objectives 
of the project.   
 
Table 6.3 Level of satisfaction with the alliance vs. degree to which the objectives were 
attained 
 C1.1 < C1.2 C1.1 = C1.2 C1.1 > C1.2 Missing 
Frequency 5 
(11.6%) 
25 
(58.1%) 
12 
(27.9%) 
1 
(2.3%) 
Source: Interviews (question C1). 
 
Twelve executives rated higher their level of satisfaction with the alliance performance 
than the goals that were achieved (C1.1 > C1.2) and all the latter scores are equal to or 
lower than 3, meaning that the eleven alliances they represent did not achieve satisfactory 
results. At least two factors explain the executives’ position. On the one hand, they 
recognise the worth of the acquired know-how and other direct benefits despite the low 
performance of alliances. On the other hand, some indirect and unexpected benefits have 
been achieved. In favour also is the low cost of participation in the alliances, which was 
easily counter-balanced by the benefits achieved. 
 
As regards the consequences for firms, the relationship between the firm’s level of 
satisfaction or the degree to which the objectives were attained and the expected impact on 
firm’s performance (C1.4) is not that strong, r = 0.531 and r = 0.601 respectively. Perhaps 
these results are not in harmony with what one would expect but there is an explanation for 
this. Some projects will not proceed to the following stages (i.e. exploitation of results), 
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others did not reach the objectives but the firms got unexpected benefits, and some benefits 
are quite difficult to assess in terms of firm performance. There is however some kind of 
connection between these variables, given that only exceptionally was the expected impact 
on firm performance scored higher than the other two variables, meaning that an expected 
impact on firm performance appears to reflect only partially the level of satisfaction with 
the performance of the alliance. 
 
Not all research projects were meant to generate a competitive advantage for the partner 
firms. Table 6.4 compares the initial expectation of firms concerning a possible 
competitive advantage with the actual advantage. Eleven executives said that the project 
aimed primarily at resolving specific technical problems of their firms and any competitive 
advantage would only indirectly be achieved. In eight cases, the potential advantage would 
be temporary because imitation would be hardly possible to prevent, or there were plans to 
diffuse the new knowledge. Eventually, five of those eleven firms mentioned above were 
indeed able to strengthen their competitive position; conversely, of those twenty-four firms 
expecting to get competitive benefits from the alliance, eleven were not able to do so. 
 
Table 6.4 Competitive advantage: initial expectation vs. actual advantage 
Initial expectation Actual advantage 
C1.3. Now we have a competitive advantage over our 
direct competitors 
 
A5. Did this project intend to place  
your firm in a position ahead of 
competition? 
Disagree 
(C1.3 = 1 or 2) 
Neutral 
(C1.3 = 3) 
Agree 
(C1.3 = 4 or 5) 
Missing 
No 11 ⇒ 4 2 5 0 
Yes, temporarily 8 ⇒ 2 3 1 2 
Yes 24 ⇒ 12 1 11 0 
                       Total 43 ⇒ 18 6 17 2 
Sources: Interviews (questions A5 and C1). 
 
Regarding the question of whether firms intend to enter future alliances, the high average 
scores in Figure 6.6 are indicative that there is a great deal of interest in doing so. Thirty-
four executives (81%) affirmed their firms are interested in taking part in future alliances if 
EU funding is available (i.e. C1.5 = 4 or 5) and twenty-nine others (69%) even without it 
(i.e. C1.6 = 4 or 5)74. Despite the similarity of results (i.e. strong intention to enter future 
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 Initially, it was expected that these variables could be used as a proxy to measure the level of satisfaction 
with the alliance but variables C1.1 and C1.5 appear to be totally independent from each other (r = 0.0). 
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alliances), these figures do not have the same meaning because the latter has a number of 
restrictions attached. In general, the limited financial and research capabilities of these 
firms constrain the size and sort of research projects they are able to carry out alone (or 
with RTD performers). Funding under the CRAFT programme gives small firms the 
opportunity to access the research resources needed by taking part in joint research projects 
at a bearable (sometimes low) cost.  
 
To many executives the availability of EU funding is not a determinant condition to enter 
alliances, the interest in the project being much more important. One executive of a very 
small firm even said, “Being at the ‘head’ of research of an important technology for the 
firm relegates factors such as cost and source of funding to a second order of importance.” 
However the availability of funding substantially eases the decision-making process to 
enter alliances and often lessens the firm’s demands about the project and/or the partners. 
Therefore, the attractiveness of this kind of alliance is understandable because the potential 
benefits can easily exceed the costs. Without funding the interest in research alliances 
slightly decreases in general but the number and sort of restrictions on participating 
increase considerably: the size and type of projects become more important and must be 
adjusted to the firm’s availability of resources; the technical and financial aspects have to 
be carefully pondered; the quality of partners matters more. Without EU funding some 
firms are not interested in (international) research projects at all. 
 
6.5 DETERMINANTS OF PERFORMANCE 
 
This section is aimed at understanding the type and significance of the benefits that SMEs 
achieved with the research alliances. The benefits are subdivided into direct benefits - those 
benefits that are directly related to the project goals - and indirect benefits - those benefits 
that go beyond the project goals75. Benefits are here interpreted as determinants of 
performance; that is, inputs which are expected to produce an effect on firm’s outputs (i.e. 
on the indicators of performance). Therefore, executives were asked to express on a five-
point importance scale the expected effect on firm performance of each benefit achieved. 
                                                 
75
 The terminology used here is similar to that of the Beta (1993) study. However, while the Beta study 
understood the benefits as performance indicators (i.e. sales and cost reductions), the benefits here are 
considered determinants of performance. 
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“We [the firm] always learn something with this kind of project, although sometimes it is 
rather difficult to understand the importance of it to the firm”. This expression, heard in 
various interviews, illustrates how difficult it was for executives to comprehend the exact 
importance of many benefits, namely those of an intangible nature (e.g. a new friendship). 
 
6.5.1 Direct benefits 
 
The direct benefits are displayed in Figure 6.7 according to the frequency of firms that have 
achieved them. Perhaps, the most striking aspect that comes out concerns the relative 
breadth of benefits. The acquisition of experience in interfirm cooperation was considered 
a benefit to thirty-four firms while only one firm hired qualified personnel (and then just 
for the research period). 
 
Figure 6.7 Direct benefits achieved from alliances 
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Key:   
C2.1 Developed or improved a product/service;  
C2.2 Developed or improved a production process; 
C2.3 Learned about/had access to the partner firms’ 
technology; 
C2.4 Learned about/had access to the RTD 
performers’ technology; 
C2.5 A patent was granted to the partner firms (or 
an application for a patent has been submitted); 
C2.6 Specific technical training was (has been) 
given to employees; 
C2.7 Hired qualified personnel; 
 C2.8 Gained experience in interfirm cooperation; 
C2.9 Benefited from temporary personnel; 
exchanges between partner firms; 
C2.10 Acquired new machinery that incorporate 
new technology; 
C2.11 Acquired other equipment that incorporate 
new technology; 
C2.12 Improved /built a new plant/facilities; 
C2.13 Created or improved the R&D department; 
C2.14 Other; 
Source: Table A2.6 in Appendix 2. 
 
It is possible to identify two sets of benefits with different attributes. One set, comprising 
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the five most common benefits, involves interaction among partners and is chiefly centred 
in the research period. The remainder benefits, the other set, have in common a relatively 
low frequency (all below 26% of firms), many of them have a physical nature (equipment, 
facilities) and typically occurred later in the alliance implementation stage and especially in 
the post-alliance period (only exceptionally did the firms need to acquire equipment for the 
research activities). The achievement of the latter set of benefits depends more on the firm 
and less on the alliance itself and, unlike the former, relies heavily on the alliance 
outcomes. Unsuccessful alliances naturally restrain firms from acquiring equipment, giving 
training to employees or registering a patent, but do not limit the ability of firms to learn 
from partners or get experience in joint projects. Hence, three factors explain the low 
frequency of most of the direct benefits (second set): unsuccessful projects, successful 
projects which do not involve such benefits, and successful projects where the firms 
voluntarily decided not to exploit the outcomes. 
 
It is not surprising that the acquisition of experience76 in interfirm alliances has been the 
most common benefit. Perhaps surprising is why only thirty-three firms have achieved that 
kind of benefit since half of the remaining firms had no prior experience in cooperative 
projects. Gaining experience in cooperative research projects was an explicit goal to a 
minority of firms only; eventually, it became an important benefit to a large number of 
them because of their interest in entering new alliances. About 70% of all firms had access 
to the partner firms’ and R&D performers’ technology (C2.3; C2.4), but it does not 
necessarily mean there was a huge transference of technology between the alliance 
partners. Indeed, some firms attempted to prevent any unintended transference of important 
knowledge to competitor partners. As explained elsewhere, many research projects 
involved technologies and know-how outside the competencies of technology users and 
they do not necessarily need to master them in order to use the alliance outcomes. RTD 
performers’ technology is embodied in systems, machinery, products and other alliance 
outcomes, and many technology users were chiefly interested in their functionality rather 
than learning how to produce them. This limits the usefulness of certain know-how 
acquired from alliances.   
 
                                                 
76
 Although the “acquisition of experience” is an intrinsic benefit of the very act of cooperating, it can also be 
regarded as an indirect benefit since it is not linked with the project goals.  
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Figure 6.7 shows how many firms achieved a given benefit but still leaves unknown its 
expected impact on firm performance and whether that impact varies from firm to firm. 
Figure 6.8 shows the expected impact of the direct benefits on firm performance. There is 
no relationship between the number of firms that achieved a given benefit and its average 
expected impact on firm performance. That is, the average scores of the direct benefits are 
unrelated to the number of firms who achieved them. In a number of alliances, despite the 
successful development of a new product, production process or both, firms will not 
exploit the alliance outcomes at all or will do so partially. Firms had access to the partners’ 
technologies but, if not related to the firm’s competencies, this is of limited use. Therefore, 
in such cases the expected impact of these benefits on firm performance is rather small. On 
the contrary, when there is intent to exploit the alliance outcomes, the expected effect on 
the performance of the firms tends to be very significant. This duality explains the 
relatively low average scores and high standard deviations of benefits such as “Developed 
or improved a product” or “Learned about/had access to the partner firms’ technology”. 
 
Figure 6.8 Expected impact of direct benefits on firm performance 
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Key: See Figure 6.7 above. 
Notes: (n) Number of observations. (s) Sample standard deviation.  
Source: Table A2.6 in Appendix 2. 
 
The post-alliance benefits tend to be highly important to firms that achieve them. 
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Acquiring new machinery, building a new plant or facilities, giving technical training to 
employees, investing in R&D or applying for a patent are the kind of determinants of 
performance that firms expect to have a significant effect on the indicators of performance.   
 
6.5.2 Indirect benefits 
 
The generation of indirect benefits appears to be a normal and potentially important 
alliance outcome. Only two firms did not achieve any benefit of this kind, though one of 
them admitted not having any interest in the project. Conversely, three executives affirmed 
that the importance of the indirect benefits achieved with the alliance exceeds that of the 
direct benefits, and only in one of the cases was the alliance unsuccessful. The indirect 
benefits can be classified in at least three different types as follows. 
 
Information- and knowledge-based benefits. Probably the most frequent, this type of 
benefit materialises when firms make use of the information or knowledge not related to 
the project obtained in the course of the relationship. Such benefits demand individual 
action of firms if they are to be really effective. Obtaining new ideas or new skills from 
partners, getting new knowledge about the competitors or improving the management skills 
are examples of this type of benefit. These are benefits not easily quantifiable because in 
most cases it is difficult to capture the (marginal) variation on the indicators of 
performance. 
 
Perception-based benefits. Improving the firm’s image, enhancing its visibility or making 
new friendships are typical examples of benefits that fit in this group. Firms have a 
perception of the benefit but they are hardly capable of identifying or quantifying its 
consequences until any other benefit occurs (e.g. a commercial transaction or an invitation 
to enter new projects) and a causal link is possible to be established. Many benefits in this 
group are related to the alliance outcomes. A successful alliance is likely to enhance the 
visibility of the research project and raise the expectations of partners about possible 
benefits.  
 
Transaction-based benefits. This kind of benefit takes place when the alliance partners 
decide to establish commercial relations with each other or they establish a formal (or 
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informal) relationship to carry out further research together. 
 
Figure 6.9 shows the frequency of firms which achieved indirect benefits. Like the direct 
benefits, the relative breadth of the indirect benefits varies considerably, ranging from 
three-quarters of firms who acquired experience on how to prepare and implement a (joint) 
research project, to only three firms which have established commercial relations. The 
former is a quite surprising finding if one takes into consideration the low participation of 
firms in structuring the research projects, with some of them delegating to the local RTD 
performers such a task. What firms have really learned about the organisation and 
implementation of (joint) projects will be better assessed in future projects, especially if 
they take the lead. 
 
Figure 6.9 Indirect benefits achieved from alliances 
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Key:   
C2.15 Obtained new ideas from partner firms to 
improve existing products/production processes; 
C2.16 Obtained new ideas from RTD performers to 
improve existing products/production processes; 
C2.17 Had access to new techniques and skills (other 
than those related to the project); 
C2.18 Became a supplier of partner firms; 
C2.19 Became a customer of partner firms; 
C2.20 The firm is applying the knowledge acquired in 
other products/services; 
C2.21 Improved firm's image/reputation/credibility; 
C2.22 Improved firm's visibility/exposure; 
C2.23 Got experience on how to prepare and 
implement a (joint) research project; 
 C2.24 The firm is using the knowledge/experience 
gained to develop other research projects; 
C2.25 Improved management skills/practices; 
C2.26 Received proposals for new joint projects from 
national firms; 
C2.27 Received proposals for new joint projects from 
foreign firms; 
C2.28 Learned about an unfamiliar market/customer 
needs; 
C2.29 Developed a formal/informal network to 
exchange technical information; 
C2.30 Found new ways of having access to technical 
information; 
C2.31 Improved the knowledge about competitors; 
C2.32 Other 
Source: Table A2.6 in Appendix 2. 
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About two-thirds of the executives believe that the alliance produced a real improvement in 
the firm’s image, and about 45% of them consider that it enhanced the firm’s visibility in 
the environment it operates.77 Several firms provided information to substantiate their 
perception but not all of them were able to do so. In general, participating in a joint 
research project with firms from other countries, R&D institutions and universities is 
believed to benefit the firm’s image because it transmits an innovative posture of firms to 
the environment where they operate. This is deemed very important to enhancing the firm’s 
credibility to their customers and suppliers. The participation in EU-sponsored R&D 
projects is also believed to enhance their visibility and credibility at a European level, to 
both firms and EU institutions. Some firms mentioned as well that it might benefit their 
position within the (multinational) group they belong to. Three examples illustrate the 
point and diversity of benefits. One firm proved unintentionally to have the best product 
amongst its international partner firms and, after the alliance, became the supplier of an 
important multinational firm. This happened despite the failure of the alliance (see Case 
study K in Chapter 7). Another firm affirmed it had achieved more benefits with the 
demonstration of the novel equipment to competitor firms than with the equipment itself. 
Yet another firm benefited from references in the press to the project success which 
associated the firm with the project’s innovative features.  
 
The participation in European projects enhances the visibility of firms, and consequently 
they are likely to receive proposals for new joint projects, especially when funding is 
available. Firms received twice as many proposals from foreign firms than from Portuguese 
ones, which may have to do with the multinational nature of projects. Some of the 
proposals were from former alliance partners.    
 
Twenty executives said they have found new ways of gaining access to technical 
information and twelve others affirmed they had developed a formal or an informal 
network to exchange technical information. Indeed, these two types of indirect benefits are 
not essentially different from each other. The former basically means that the firms have 
established contacts with people, firms and R&D institutions which are regarded as an 
“open door”, potentially important for accessing technical information in the future. In the 
                                                 
77
 One firm believes it had improved its image outside the alliance but surely not to the alliance partners, 
because it lost the interest in the project while being implemented.  
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latter situation, all but one of the cases are informal relationships among alliance partners 
who knew each other before this project, some for a long time. Thus, the major difference 
appears to be the degree of knowledge and trust among the alliance partners. In both 
situations, firms ascribe great importance to contacts in general and with R&D institutions 
in particular. 
 
Figure 6.10 Expected impact of indirect benefits on firm performance 
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Key: See Figure 6.9 above. 
Notes: (n) Number of observations. (s) Sample standard deviation.  
Source: Table A2.6 in Appendix 2. 
 
Figure 6.10 shows the average importance of indirect benefits for firm performance. There 
is a significant correlation between the number of firms which achieved a particular benefit 
and its average importance (r = 0.671)78, meaning that the most common benefits tend to 
                                                 
78
 It excludes the variable “Other” because it contains benefits of a different nature to which specific firms 
tended to ascribe greater importance. 
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be very important for the firm performance as well and vice-versa.  
 
An important finding is that the experience obtained about how to prepare and implement a 
(joint) project (C2.23) is far from being the most important indirect benefit despite being 
the most common. On average, firms do not expect it will have a great effect on 
performance even though they are very interested in participating in future alliances. This 
probably means that firms are interested in being involved in alliances but not so 
enthusiastic about leading the process. Indeed, one executive clearly stressed this. The 
improvement in the image of firms (C2.21) is another interesting point. It is not just one of 
the most common indirect benefits but also the one with the highest expected effect on firm 
performance. A similar situation happens with the skills and techniques that firms had 
access to (C2.17). This benefit was common to a large number of firms which greatly value 
the knowledge acquired. 
 
6.6 CONCLUSION 
 
The chapter is concerned with the alliance implementation process and outcomes. It 
addresses the importance of the investment to the participating firms, examines the 
negative factors affecting the cooperation process and the alliance outcomes, assesses the 
alliance performance, and analyses the benefits that firms achieved from alliances. 
 
The data show that unlike the research investment, which was subsidised, the post-research 
investment necessary for exploiting the alliance outcomes is important and may impede 
firms from doing so. The amount of resources allocated to the research activities was in 
general not very significant and the participation in these projects affected neither the 
firm’s normal activities, nor the implementation of other projects. The relatively small 
amount of resources required from firms to participate in the alliances greatly facilitated 
their decision to enter them but it is likely it has relaxed their demands and commitment to 
the project. This probably explains why many firms participated in alliances which the 
executives affirmed were not strategically important (see Chapter 5). 
 
There were many and diversified negative factors in the alliance implementation process 
which affected the attainment of better results. They explain many unsuccessful alliances 
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and thus the ineffective use of resources. The extensive list of negative factors has been 
reduced to six Factors by means of factor analysis, each of them representing a group of 
negative factors. The six Factors are “Commitment of partners”, “Cultural aspects”, “Lack 
of internal resources”, “Unperceived risk”, “Communication problems”, and “Structural 
problems”. The commitment of partners appears to be the major negative factor of 
cooperation, but the interdependence of factors makes it difficult to single out a particular 
Factor and suggests an integrated interpretation of results. Many of the negative aspects of 
cooperation are rooted in the initial circumstances in which the research alliances were 
formed, thus confirming the concerns raised in the previous chapter about the weaknesses 
of alliances. 
 
In general, the results show a relatively high level of satisfaction with the performance of 
the research alliances. No firm was completely unsatisfied with it. The firm’s level of 
satisfaction usually reflects the degree to which the alliance objectives were attained, but 
the overall higher score of the former indicates that the latter does not explain the whole 
satisfaction of firms. In analysing the satisfaction with the alliance one has to take into 
consideration the relatively small contribution required of firms, and the importance they 
attribute to some of the indirect benefits achieved. Just about half of the firms considered 
that the alliance achieved most or all the objectives set out initially. Most firms have an 
interest in participating in new alliances, both with and without EU funding; however the 
latter has a number of restrictions and projects must be adjusted to the firm’s financial and 
research capabilities. 
 
The vast majority of firms attained direct and indirect benefits from the alliances, even 
those firms whose project has failed. Most firms gained experience in interfirm 
cooperation, had access to the partners’ technology, and developed or improved a product 
or production process. These direct benefits derive from the interaction among partners and 
are chiefly centred within the research period. Other benefits, such as the acquisition of 
novel machinery, systems and patents normally require the success of the alliances, and 
thus were not so common. The generation of indirect benefits appears to be a normal and 
potentially important outcome of alliances. The most common benefits include gaining 
experience in preparing and implementing joint projects, having image and reputation 
improvements, obtaining new ideas from partner firms, and having access to new 
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techniques not related to the alliance objectives.      
 
The findings of this chapter and those of the previous one help towards a better 
understanding of the impact of alliances on firm performance that will be addressed in the 
next chapter. 
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7 IMPACT ON FIRM PERFORMANCE 
 
 
 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter attempts to bridge technology alliances with firm performance, by focusing on 
the ability of the participating firms to turn the alliance outcomes into economic benefits. 
The chapter aims to understand the extent to which the Portuguese SMEs had performance 
improvements due to participation in the CRAFT R&D alliances and to examine the link 
between alliance success and firm performance.  
 
The structure of the chapter is the following. First, it looks at the measurement of the 
impact on several indicators of performance, both using a five-point importance scale and 
the variation in percentages. Second, it focuses on the ability of firms to exploit the alliance 
outcomes and identifies the factors impeding them from materialising the potential benefits 
into performance according to their level of importance. The chapter proceeds with a 
discussion of the relationship between the satisfaction with the performance of alliances 
and the impact on the performance of participating firms. Finally, it looks retrospectively at 
the conditions in which the alliances were formed and implemented, which affected the 
alliance outcomes and the possibility for firms to benefit from them. 
 
7.2 IMPACT MEASUREMENT 
 
Before proceeding to the detailed analysis of this matter, a few remarks are important at 
this point. An attempt has been made to capture the variation between the expected impact 
on the performance indicators, as predicted by firms at the beginning of the relationship, 
and the real impact on those indicators, resulting from the exploitation of the alliance 
outcomes. In several cases, though, the latter data could not be collected at the time of the 
interview because the alliance outcomes were not being exploited yet. Thus, in such cases 
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the collected information refers to the “updated expected impact” and not the “real impact” 
on the performance indicators as initially sought. In fact, only a few of those firms that 
have reported an actual positive effect on firm performance (i.e. D1.18 > 1) were able to 
provide data on the “real impact” since in most situations there is a time lag (that can be 
long) between the end of the alliance and the moment of receiving economic benefits from 
its outcomes (e.g. time for scaling up a prototype, for building a new plant). It is possible 
that some firms will achieve a smaller amount of benefits than they are currently expecting, 
particularly those firms which are not in a position to guarantee all the necessary conditions 
for the successful exploitation of the alliance outcomes. Consequently, in these cases the 
“real impact” scores are likely to indicate the upper limit of the expected variation on the 
performance indicators. 
 
One important difficulty occurred with alliances that had ended a long time ago (one year 
or more). In those few cases the interviewees had to be persuaded to recall the initial 
expected impact on the performance indicators.  
 
7.2.1 Expected vs. real impact on performance indicators  
 
The study uses eight performance indicators to assess the effect of R&D alliances on firm 
performance, including conventional and non-financial indicators to better capture the 
phenomenon. Thus, five of them are conventional performance indicators - productivity, 
production costs, sales, profit and market share - and the remaining three are non-financial 
indicators which despite being increasingly important for assessing the new competitive 
reality of firms still lack a generalised measurement system - customer satisfaction, 
product/service quality and environment damage. A ninth variable - overall impact - has 
been used to assess the general effect on firm performance as opposed to the assessment of 
a specific aspect which the former indicators were intended to address. A list of 
performance indicators was provided in advance and the interviewees were asked to rate 
them on a five-point importance scale and then in percentage terms.79 
 
                                                 
79
 The BIE’s (1995) study pursued a similar methodological approach in that it asked firms to indicate how 
much their “key” arrangement affected performance indicators in percentage terms (see Chapter 2). The 
sample is less homogeneous than the one in this study because firms could choose the “key” arrangement and 
the arrangements examined were of several kinds. 
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As expected, not all the performance indicators in the list were pertinent to every firm, 
either at the beginning of cooperation, or at the end of it. Indeed, the performance 
indicators were relevant to each firm in a particular combination, which could be different 
even in the case of alliance partner firms of similar activities. The objectives of projects 
provide a rough indication about the type of performance indicators most likely to be 
affected but this is far from linear, and the firm’s specific characteristics and interests are 
certainly important factors to take into account as well. The performance indicators were 
rated “irrelevant” when they were not expected to change. Figure 7.1 classifies the 
expected impact on the performance indicators as “Irrelevant” or “Important”. The latter 
includes all observations which are associated with a positive expected impact at least in 
some degree. Two firms were not much interested in the alliance objectives and, therefore, 
were not expecting to achieve performance improvements from the beginning. A possible 
third firm could have been included in this group because it entered the alliance for other 
reasons than the project itself, but even so the firm was expecting a slight impact on 
performance.  
 
The analysis of the expected performance benefits at the beginning of the relationship helps 
in understanding the actual performance improvements, but this has not been of much 
concern in the previous literature. Generally, the expected impact on performance is 
associated with the initial importance attributed to the projects. However, in some cases, 
projects deemed “Moderately important” were expected to have a very important impact on 
performance. This sounds inconsistent and it is possible that the executives were 
influenced by the alliance outcomes. The major justification for this fact is that businesses 
were not dependent on the success of the projects but would benefit considerably with the 
alliance outcomes if successful (see, for instance, Case study D in Chapter 5).  
 
Figure 7.1 shows that to obtain profit was the most common expected performance benefit, 
but in many cases it was the consequence of some expected impact on other indicators such 
as the increase in productivity or reduction in production costs. Generally, when the 
production costs and/or productivity were the intended goals, often involving an innovation 
in the production process, firms were much less concerned about indicators such as 
“Product quality” or “Customer satisfaction”. If the latter indicators were the goal, namely 
when the project involved the development of a new product, the former indicators of 
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performance tended to be less important or not important at all. With the exception of those 
projects which aimed at diminishing environmental damage, typically to deal with 
environmental waste resulting from the production process, often this performance 
indicator has not been considered a goal in itself but something the project has also a 
positive impact on.  
 
Figure 7.1 Expected impact on the performance indicators 
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Notes: Number of answers based on the number of observations of question D1: (a) of category 
“1-Irrelevant”; (b) of categories “2-Slightly important”, “3-Moderately important”, “4-Very 
important” and “5-Extremely important”. 
Source: Table A2.7 in Appendix 2. 
 
Figures 7.2 and 7.3 present the results of a hierarchical cluster analysis on the expectations 
about the impact on the performance indicators at the beginning and at the end of the 
alliance, respectively. They indicate the existence of four clusters for the “Expected 
Impact” (EI) values: 1-(Sales, Profit); 2-(Customer satisfaction, Market share, Product 
quality); 3-(Productivity, Production Costs); 4-(Environmental damage). Concerning the 
“Real Impact” (RI) values, only three clusters are formed since clusters 1 and 2 are blended 
into a single cluster, forming a now more compact cluster. In both cases, the indicator 
“Environmental damage” is clearly an outlier, i.e. it did not join until very late, thus 
confirming its different importance in the context of the performance indicators. In both 
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cases, the variable “Environmental damage” clusters with the variables “Productivity” and 
“Production costs”, showing that the former often involves changes in the latter. 
 
Figure 7.2 Dendogram for hierarchical cluster analysis (EI scores) 
 
                    
Notes: Cluster method: Ward’s method. Distance measure: Euclidean distance. 
Source: SPSS 9.0 for Windows output using the EI scores of question D1. 
 
Figure 7.3 Dendogram for hierarchical cluster analysis (RI scores) 
 
 
 
Notes: Cluster method: Ward’s method. Distance measure: Euclidean distance. 
Source: SPSS 9.0 for Windows output using the RI scores of question D1. 
 
Figure 7.4 compares the average scores of variables “Expected Impact” and “Real Impact”, 
which represent the executives’ expectations about the impact on the indicators of 
performance at the beginning and at the end of the alliance (the latter should read the 
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moment the interviews were carried out), respectively80. The EI average values are 
relatively small, mainly as the result of the high number of “Irrelevant” observations. The 
correlation between the number of firms expecting an important impact on the indicators of 
performance (see Figure 7.1) and the EI average scores (see Figure 7.4) is quite strong, r = 
0.924. This means that the average importance of the performance indicators varies 
positively with the number of firms expecting a positive impact on the performance 
indicators. The higher the latter, the higher tends to be the former.  
 
Figure 7.4 Impact on the performance indicators 
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Key:   
D1.1 [D1.10] Productivity (increase) 
D1.2 [D1.11] Production costs (decrease) 
D1.3 [D1.12] Sales (increase) 
D1.4 [D1.13] Profit (increase) 
D1.5 [D1.14] Product quality (improve) 
 D1.6 [D1.15] Customer satisfaction (improve) 
D1.7 [D1.16] Market share (increase) 
D1.8 [D1.17] Environmental damage (reduction) 
D1.9 [D1.18] Overall impact (improve) 
Notes: (n) Number of observations - only (EI,RI) groupings. (s) Sample standard deviation. (cv) 
Coefficient of variation (=s/mean). 
Source: Table A2.7 in Appendix 2. 
                                                 
80
 See Table A2.7 in Appendix 2 for the breakdown of the answers by category. 
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The sample standard deviation (an absolute measure of dispersion) values of all but 
“Overall” and “Profit” variables went down as between Expected Impact and Real Impact, 
while the coefficient of variation (a relative measure of dispersion) values went up across 
the entire set of performance indicators. The average scores have decreased but the relative 
dispersion of observations has increased, meaning that the average scores decreased at a 
higher rate than those of the sample standard deviation. The RI values are relatively more 
dispersed than those of the EI. For the variables “Overall impact” and “Profit”, the 
observations are effectively more dispersed than they were at the beginning of the alliances.  
 
Figure 7.4 clearly shows a substantial decrease in the average scores from period one to 
period two across the whole range of the performance indicators. Most important, it shows 
that the executives were able to distinguish both periods and assess the change in their 
expectations. The assessment of change in the firm’s expectations has not been of concern 
in previous studies which addressed the question of firm performance through alliances, 
though it is an important matter and the change noticeable in Figure 7.4 is big enough not 
to be ignored. Generally, the expectation of firms about the impact of the alliance on the 
performance indicators did not happen.  
 
As is observable in Table 7.1, which presents the variation in the number of answers per 
category and per indicator between the two periods, every single category higher than two 
(i.e. “Slightly important”) of every performance indicator has registered a smaller number 
of answers in the latter period of analysis, denoting a downward adjustment in the 
executives’ expectations. Conversely and consequently, the figures in column two 
represent the additional number of firms (in relation to those in Figure 7.1) expecting an 
irrelevant impact on the performance indicators at the end of the alliances. 
 
Twelve firms are now expecting an irrelevant impact on performance. According to the 
data presented in Table 7.2, which focuses on the variable “Overall impact”, twenty 
Portuguese firms achieved a smaller impact on performance than that initially expected; 
these firms were partners in sixteen different projects, more than half of the research 
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partnerships under analysis.81 Fifteen firms considered that the results achieved basically 
correspond to what was previously foreseen and only five admitted a positive variation in 
the amount of expected benefits. 
 
Table 7.1 Net difference between the RI and EI number of answers  
 
1-Irrelevant 2-Slightly 
important 
3-Moderately 
important 
4-Very 
important 
5-Extremely 
important 
n 
Productivity 5 1 -2 -3 -1 39 
Production costs 9 -2 -1 -5 -1 39 
Sales 8 1 -4 -4 -1 40 
Profit 9 -1 -3 -4 -1 39 
Product/service quality 8 2 -3 -5 -2 40 
Customer satisfaction 7 3 -3 -6 -1 40 
Market share 7 2 -3 -5 -1 40 
Environmental damage 9 -1 -4 -1 -3 40 
Overall impact 10 7 -13 -4 0 40 
Notes: (n) Number of observations - only (EI,RI) groupings. For each performance indicator and each answer 
category, the net difference is obtained by subtracting the EI to the RI number of answers. 
Source: Table A2.7 in Appendix 2 and interviews (question D1). 
 
Table 7.2 Overall impact on the performance of firms: real vs. expected impact 
 RI < EI RI = EI RI > EI Missing 
No. of firms satisfying the condition 20  (46.5%) 15  (34.9%) 5  (11.6%) 3  (7.0%) 
No. of alliances these firms are from 16 13 4 3 
Notes: (RI) Real impact. (EI) Expected impact. 
Source: Interviews (question D1). 
 
The downward movement in the firms’ expectations described above has a variety of 
causes, as the case studies presented in this chapter and in Chapter 5 attempt to show. 
Several research alliances ended up with poor technical results that do not permit any 
economic application of the new knowledge acquired (see Case study E in Chapter 5); 
other alliances achieved interesting and useful technical results, however smaller than 
expected due to problems faced during the research activities or just because the 
technology under development reached its physical limit (see Case study M in Box 7.3 
below). Technology-related causes are common to about 60% of those 20 cases where RI < 
EI. In the other two cases, despite the technical success of the alliances, the small size of 
                                                 
81
 In Table 7.2, the sum of the second row, 36, is higher than the number of alliances under analysis, which is 
30. This is evidence that the alliance outcomes do not have a similar importance to all the partner firms of a 
particular alliance. Indeed, there are several factors influencing the ability of firms in identifying potential 
advantages and having access to them. With firms naturally different from each other and having different 
sets of objectives, their ability to perceive and/or appropriate the alliance outcomes tend to vary as well.  
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the firms impedes them from taking full advantage of the potential benefits generated by 
the alliance. The dependence on external factors not under the firms’ control, such as 
market conditions or the customers’ decision on whether to get technologically updated, is 
a great obstacle to the ability of four firms to benefit from their alliances (see Case study F 
in Chapter 5). Finally, one firm lost interest in the project in the course of its execution and 
the EU cancelled another project (see Case study B in Chapter 5). 
 
In general, when alliances achieved results comparable to the initial expectations, the 
executives scored variables RI and EI identically, but at least four out of these fifteen 
executives affirmed the alliance achieved only partially the goals set out at the beginning. 
Unplanned benefits in the course of the relationship or the fulfilment of particular 
objectives, sometimes those firms were really concerned about, compensated for the 
weaker technical results achieved, leading these four firms to keep the same score, though 
on different grounds (see Case study K in Box 7.1). Only five firms reported that the real 
benefits surpassed the initial expectations, and two of them believe that the impact on 
performance will be extremely important. This is the result of positive effects on some 
performance indicators that were not expected to change (i.e. the “Productivity” or the 
“Production costs”), better commercial benefits than expected, or achievement of indirect 
unplanned benefits (see Case study C in Chapter 5). 
 
Box 7.1 Case study K  
 
An R&D project was set up to improve the quality control and performance of retreaded tyres. 
The alliance included three different aims (or projects): i) to develop a machine for thoroughly 
scanning the tyres to retread and present results in a way that any unskilled worker could 
interpret. It failed mainly due to the complexity of software programming. ii) to develop an 
item of equipment for testing tyres in conditions as close to real as possible. The alliance 
partners were pessimistic about possibility of achieving this objective and did not commit 
entirely to the project. iii) to develop a new, environment-friendly water-based glue which is 
used in the production process. The project was under way when they found out that there was 
already a product with such characteristics.  
This project was oversized to be entirely accomplished within a two year period, and atypically there were 
twenty alliance partners in total (firms and RTD performers). This was the very first experience in 
cooperation of the Portuguese retreaded tyres SME, and it lacked specific technical knowledge or 
qualified people to participate actively in the research activities and assess the RTD performers’ quality 
and the quality of research being done. The firm did not accept any other Portuguese competitor in the 
alliance and the alliance partners refused a firm’s proposal to include a Portuguese RTD performer who 
could help the firm. “We were given the technical reports from our alliance partners but we had no 
technical competence to assess them”, concluded the firm’s manager.  
The firm’s level of satisfaction is the result of two different outcomes. On the one hand, the 
technical outcomes were rather poor and the firm will not get any economic benefits. On the 
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other hand, unintentionally and surprisingly the firm’s products were successfully tested against 
those of its alliance partners and proved to be of higher quality. Just after the alliance the firm 
became a supplier of a multinational tyre firm, which the manager believes is an indirect 
consequence of that unplanned benefit and the firm’s better image and higher external 
visibility.  
Source: Interview. 
 
Figure 7.5 looks at the category level variations of the variable “Overall impact” between 
the two periods. An important fact that comes out is the shift of about 43% of the 
observations from the categories “Very important” and “Moderately important” to the 
categories “Slightly important” and “Irrelevant”. The category “Moderately important” lost 
thirteen observations, falling from the top to the bottom rank in terms of its relative 
importance. The overall real impact on firm performance is much smaller than what most 
of the firms thought it would be. For twelve of them that impact is expected to be irrelevant 
and for another fifteen is only slightly important. As will be demonstrated below, such 
small or zero impact on firm performance does not necessarily mean alliance failure or 
dissatisfaction with the alliance outcome (see Case study L in Box 7.2 below). Puzzling 
and perhaps inconsistent is the fact that those twelve firms who reported D1.18 = 1 also 
claimed having had some direct and indirect benefits and were confident that such benefits 
would have a positive effect on performance. 
 
Figure 7.5 Overall impact on firm performance - breakdown of the answers 
by degree of importance 
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Source: Table A2.7 in Appendix 2. 
 
One possible explanation for that inconsistency comes out through the analysis of the 
method used by several executives to score the overall impact on performance. They 
estimated the answer to the overall impact on firm performance as a kind of an “average 
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score” of the answers given to the previous performance indicators. Since the questions 
about the alliance benefits and about the performance indicators were asked separately and 
in different contexts it might have hindered the link that should have been established 
between the two. Presumably, those twelve interviewees answered questions D1.9 and 
D1.18 without establishing such a link. Perhaps a more convincing explanation, as we will 
see below, lies in the visible difficulty felt by many executives to identify and quantify 
small intangible benefits.  
 
Box 7.2 Case study L  
 
A foundry SME with 150 employees entered an R&D alliance for the first time, aimed at 
improving the technological process of production of castings (ceramic method). This firm is 
part of an international group, which is also its main source of technological inflows. The 
interest of the alliance for the firm was more in the possibility of establishing international 
contacts with firms and research institutions and getting experience in cooperation than the 
potential outcomes of research. Its general manager explains: “The project was of marginal 
importance because we were not expecting any technological breakthrough or even a major 
technological improvement. It was important to be there and follow closely the research being 
done but we were not expecting great economic benefits.” The firm wanted to “release” itself a 
bit from the parent-firm’s dependence. The alliance was considered technically successful but 
the results are essentially advantageous for the production of big pieces (bigger than 4 kg), 
which represents a very small percentage of the total production. “One has to make many 
calculations to adopt the new process for the production of small pieces”, he argued.  The firm 
is nevertheless satisfied with the alliance performance, especially because it has achieved its 
own objectives. 
  
Source: Interview. 
 
7.2.2 Impact on the performance indicators in percentage terms 
 
Almost all executives were able to assess the impact on the performance indicators on a 
five-point importance scale. Would they be able to “translate” those scores into a more 
objective and comparable measure, for instance in percentages? The executives were 
challenged on that matter and the results are shown in Table 7.3. The exercise has been 
only partially successful but the findings are meaningful.82 Of those executives expecting 
an overall positive impact on firm performance (D1.18 > 1), only a part of them were 
capable of giving an adequate answer and just one executive provided a complete answer. 
                                                 
82
 Apparently, the BIE (1995) study was more successful in obtaining data about changes in percentage terms. 
The fact that respondents were allowed to choose their “Key” arrangement (i.e. “the most important 
cooperative relationship a firm has established” (BIE, 1995: 145)) and the data referred to a period of three 
years prior to the survey possibly created better conditions to increase the answer rate. 
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Table 7.3 Variation of the performance indicators in percentage terms 
Project D1.18 Performance indicators 
No. scores D3.1 D3.2 D3.3 D3.4 D3.5 D3.6 D3.7 D3.8 D3.9 
1 5 20 20 15 5 ? ? ?  ? 
6 5   ? ? ? ? ? 70 15 
11 5 10 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
15 5 ? ? 35 15 ? ? 10 ? 20 
7 4 20 5 15 ? 10 20 10  25 
8 4 20 5 15 ? 10 20 10  25 
12 4 30 15 25 7.5 10 10 20 5 10 
19 4 50 15 40 15 50 ? 70  40 
31 4   ? ? ? ? ?  ? 
41 4 0 25  0.1 ?   20 20 
13 3 25 18 20 ? 15    15 
18 3  15  5 ? ? ? ? ? 
26 3         ? 
2 2  ?  ?    ? ? 
9 2   1 ?  ?  ? ? 
14 2  ?      ? ? 
17 2   ?      ? 
21 2 ? ?  ? ? ?  ? ? 
23 2 ? ?  ?    ? ? 
24 2 5 4 6 ? 2 60 2 ? ? 
28 2     ? ?  ? ? 
29 2         ? 
32 2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 ? ? 10 ? ? 
33 2  ?  ?     ? 
34 2         ? 
35 2 ?    ? ? ?  ? 
39 2 ? ?       ? 
43 2 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
 % of no responses 37.5 47.4 33.3 65.0 66.7 76.5 50.0 80.0 71.4 
Key:   
D3.1 Productivity (increase) 
D3.2 Production costs (decrease) 
D3.3 Sales (increase) 
D3.4 Profit (increase) 
D3.5 Product/Service quality (improve) 
 D3.6 Customer satisfaction (improve) 
D3.7 Market share (increase) 
D3.8 Environmental damage (reduction) 
D3.9 Overall impact (improve) 
Notes: The table includes only those observations for D1.18 > 1. (?) Answer not provided. (blank cell) 
Answer not expected (because RI = 1 in question D1). 
Source: Interviews (question D3). 
 
Furthermore, there is an unbalanced distribution of the answers in relation to the 
importance of the expected overall impact on firm performance. The executives felt much 
less comfortable in providing answers for smaller expected impacts (i.e. when D1.18 = 2 or 
3). The nature of the alliances does not appear to be an acceptable justification for their 
inability to answer this question because the research projects were very problem-solving 
orientated and the alliance outcomes were to be exploited straight after the research phase, 
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provided the necessary conditions to do so could be met. Executives provided two major 
reasons for not answering the question. On the one hand, the expected variation was rather 
small and the cause-effect link was very difficult to establish, thus impeding any attempt to 
quantify it accurately. On the other hand, some of them admitted they simply do not know 
how important that effect will be, however in some cases not all elements were available 
for calculating it. 
 
As regards the relative answer rate per performance indicator (bottom row in Table 7.3), 
the variables “Environmental damage” and “Customer satisfaction” got the lowest answer 
rate, both less than 25%, while the variables “Productivity” and “Sales” achieved the 
highest rates, 66.3% and 62.5% respectively. These figures suggest that the assessment of 
the impact on the conventional performance indicators is less complicated, perhaps because 
the non-financial indicators still lack an adequate and reliable measurement technique or 
because they are not systematically assessed yet. By comparing the subjective assessment 
of the overall impact on firm performance against the variation in percentage terms (i.e. 
variables D1.18 and D3.9), there may be noticed some inconsistency between the two. For 
instance, projects 6 and 13 were given the same overall variation in percentage terms (D3.9 
= 15%), but the corresponding overall impacts were assessed rather differently (D1.186 = 5 
and D1.1813 =3). 
 
The available data are perhaps insufficient for strong statistical inferences, but are 
sufficiently significant to realise the potential benefits firms can get by participating in a 
research alliance of the kind under analysis, if technically successful and the outcomes are 
exploited. Table 7.4 attempts to compare some characteristics of those projects which the 
executives expect an impact on performance greater than “Slightly important” (i.e. D1.18 > 
2). All the projects for which the executives were able to provide data on the overall impact 
on performance (D3.9) involve important innovations, some of them about to be patented, 
and firms had no in-house expertise (and other research resources) to carry them out alone. 
These firms achieved a competitive advantage with significant impact on their performance 
as the figures available indicate (in three cases the numbers are based on real achievements, 
not updated expectations). Unlike the research costs, the investment necessary to exploit 
the alliance outcomes is considerable. 
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Table 7.4 Some characteristics of the projects reporting a real impact on firm 
performance greater than “Slightly important” 
Project number 
 1 6 11 15 7 8 12 19 31 (*) 41 13 18 26 
Goal-achieve-
ment (C1.2) 5 5 5 5 4 4 5 5 5 4 4 5 2 
Number of 
partners 9 9 12 5 8 8 7 7 16 18 9 13 20 
Impact on 
performance 
(C3.9) 
? 15% ? 20% 25% 10% 40% ? 20% 15% 15% ? ? 
Importance of 
Post-alliance 
Investment 
Very Very Sligh 
tly Very 
Im 
por 
tant 
Im 
por 
tant 
Very Very 
Insi 
gnifi 
cant 
Im 
por 
tant 
Sligh 
tly 
Insi 
gnifi 
cant 
Im 
por 
tant 
Prior know-
ledge about 
partners (**)  
Little Good Little Good Good Good Fair Good Fair Little Little Fair Little 
Prior 
experience = 0 = 0 < 3 ≥ 3 < 3 < 3 ≥ 3 = 0 ≥ 3 = 0 ≥ 3 = 0 = 0 
Notes: (*) Admittedly not a complex project. (**) “Good” and “Fair” refer to the level of prior knowledge of 
at least one alliance partner.  
Source: Compiled from fieldwork. 
 
7.2.3 Measurability of the performance variation  
 
An important question deriving from the data above relates to the measurability of 
performance variation. To what extent can firms associate performance variations with 
benefits achieved from alliances? While there are some “inputs”, e.g. a new type of 
production equipment, that may have a relatively straight measurable impact on the 
performance indicators, other types of “inputs”, e.g. new knowledge about competitors, are 
not that simple to establish a cause-effect link with performance. As we have seen before, 
all executives were able to identify a number of direct and indirect benefits achieved from 
alliances and they were able to assess impacts on performance on a five-point importance 
scale, but only a few of them were able to provide a more objective assessment, i.e. the 
variation of the performance indicators in percentage terms. All benefits are important to 
the performance of firms but it appears that the causes for performance variations cannot 
be always tracked down, because of the difficulties of isolating cause-effect relations. 
 
Many of the benefits achieved by the firms had a very small influence on the performance 
indicators and any attempt at measuring that impact was strongly discouraged by the 
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opportunity costs involved.83 For instance, obtaining ideas from partner firms was one of 
the most common indirect benefits which many executives were prepared to detail, but 
only a few of them could assess the benefits in terms of performance. There were small 
changes in the production process that could hardly be quantified. The CEO of a shoe-
making firm said, “The alliance has reached its objectives, we have now a competitive 
advantage and there was an impact on performance. However, it is very difficult to 
quantify such impact because, in part, this impact is on intangible factors of 
competitiveness, such as comfort in workplace, image, visibility and quality.” This is likely 
to be the main reason why all the executives reporting an overall impact on performance 
smaller than “Moderately important” were unable to quantify that variation in percentage 
terms (see Table 7.3 above). It looks as if there is a threshold in the variation of 
performance for which the quantification becomes relevant. None of the figures provided 
by the executives for the overall impact on performance is lower than 10%. 
 
Another aspect concerning the measurement of performance is the relative difficulty of 
assessing different types of benefits. In general, the executives’ perception about the impact 
on performance of tangible inputs, such as equipment, facilities or products, is more 
accurate than that of intangible inputs, such as improved image, enhanced visibility or 
experience in cooperation. Among the latter type of inputs, those directly related to the 
firm’s production activity (e.g. new technology) tend to be better assessed than those of a 
more general nature (e.g. improving knowledge about competitors). The small expected 
consequences on performance and the difficulty of assessing intangible benefits are 
probably the explanation for the fact that 12 executives reported no expected impact on the 
firm performance but affirmed having had some direct and indirect benefits. Measuring the 
impact on firm performance is not always feasible or even possible. It depends on the type 
and amount of variation of the determinants of performance. The Beta (1993) study, the 
only known study which attempted to quantify all economic effects in currency units, could 
not quantify about one-third of all identified effects. 
 
7.3 ABILITY OF FIRMS TO EXPLOIT THE ALLIANCE OUTCOMES 
 
The ending of a technology alliance is not the end of the process it implies. At the end of 
                                                 
83
 We have seen in Chapter 6 that firms were not very keen to assess the benefits in great detail. 
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the research period, partner firms normally have new knowledge and prototypes but they 
still need to have the capability to exploit the alliance outcomes and, de facto, materialise 
the potential benefits generated together. This intermediate stage between the research and 
exploitation of results is very important, even crucial in some cases, and cannot be taken 
for granted because it involves the risk of failure. Such risk was not taken into account at 
the beginning of the relationships, and even at the end some firms seemed not to be fully 
aware of it. Depending on the specific characteristics of projects, this intermediate stage 
may involve a great deal of collaboration of part or all of the former partners. Some 
projects end naturally at the end of the research period, others require further actions such 
as building adequate facilities, scaling up prototypes, meeting market requirements, 
obtaining technical assistance in setting up the new capability or financial resources. Not 
all of these factors are always under the firm’s control. 
  
Table 7.5 presents a variety of factors which might influence the ability of firms to exploit 
and benefit from the alliance outcomes (entries are ordered according to variable D1.18). 
The analysis focuses chiefly on the outcomes related to the alliance objectives, thus 
excluding any other indirect benefits firms may have achieved. Those factors have been 
divided into three categories, each of them having a different prospect of turning the 
research results into economic benefits. The three categories of factors are as follows: 
 
“None”-type factors. To those firms included in this category, the possibility of achieving 
economic benefits is extremely low. This comprises 35% to 42% of all firms, depending on 
whether some of the firms falling in the other categories who expressed the intention of not 
exploiting the alliance outcomes are excluded or not.  
 
The most important factor in this category is the poor technical results achieved by 
alliances that do not allow any economic use of the knowledge acquired (unless further 
research is carried out, in some cases). Also in this category are those firms who entered 
the alliance for other reasons than the project itself, and those who realised over its 
execution that the expected outcomes did not suit their interests. The EU cancelled one 
project and one firm participated in the alliance basically to confirm its own research 
findings, i.e. confirm the limitations of a specific production technology (see Case study M 
in Box 7.3 below).   
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Table 7.5 Prospect of exploiting alliance outcomes - relevant factors 
Project C1.1 D1.18 Outcome Prospect of attaining economic benefits 
No.   exploitation None Limited Conditional 
   Yes No a b c d e f g h i j k l 
6 5 5               
15 5 5               
1 4 5               
11 4 5               
7 4 4               
8 4 4               
12 5 4               
19 5 4               
31 4 4               
41 4 4               
13 4 3               
18 4 3               
26 3 3  Ο             
2 5 2               
9 3 2               
14 4 2               
17 4 2               
21 2 2               
23 4 2               
24 4 2               
28 3 2               
29 2 2  Ο             
32 3 2               
33 4 2               
34 2 2               
35 5 2               
39 4 2               
43 3 2               
3 2 1  Ο             
4 4 1               
5 3 1               
10 2 1  Ο             
16 2 1  Ο             
22 4 1  Ο             
25 2 1  Ο             
30 4 1  Ο             
36 5 1               
37 4 1               
38 4 1               
42 3 1  Ο             
20 3 ?               
27 5 ?               
40 ? ?               
Key: 
[a] Poor technical results (its economic use is hardly feasible); [b] Research results have just validated the firm’s prior 
knowledge; [c] Firm’s interest/commitment gradually vanished over the project execution or there was no interest in the 
its outcomes at all; [d] The EU cancelled the project; [e] Research outcomes were smaller than expected (but positive); 
[f] Firm is too small to benefit fully from the alliance outcomes; [g] Firm (or a Group’s firm) developed a better 
alternative process/product meanwhile; [h] Market conditions have changed or are different from expected; [i] 
Dependence on external factors or on the former partner firm(s); [j] Insufficiency of financial resources (to exploit the 
results immediately) or the cost of the equipment (not known yet) is important in the decision to acquire it or not (when 
it is marketed); [k] Lack of resources to exploit the results independently; [l] Firm (or the partners) needs to set up a new 
plant or to make changes to the production layout; 
Notes: These factors were relevant at the time of the interviews. In the column “No”, the symbol () means 
that the alliance outcomes are not being exploited but that possibilities exist, while the symbol (Ο) means that 
such possibilities do not exist, normally due to poor technical results. 
Source: Compiled from fieldwork. 
 
 183 
Box 7.3 Case study M  
 
A project was set up to improve the application of copper alloys in manufacturing injection 
moulds for plastics. The use of copper parts in moulds instead of stainless steel may increase 
the production of plastic products up to 20% because copper cools down faster but stainless 
steel lasts much longer. This alliance included a total of 18 partners, four of which were local 
competitor mould-making Portuguese SMEs. One of these firms makes moulds for its plastic 
unit and had done research to improve the performance of copper in moulds prior to this 
project. This was the first time the firm entered an alliance and the CEO explains how 
important it was. “The expectation about the alliance outcomes was small given our own 
research results. Even so, we entered the alliance hoping that any of the alliance partners could 
contribute something better than what the firm had already achieved. However, the strongest 
expectation was that the results would confirm only what the firm already knew.” Basically, the 
firm entered the alliance to confirm its own results and learn from the partners but something 
unexpected happened. “We contributed to the project with knowledge we got from our own 
research without getting anything useful from the alliance. This only facilitated the sharing of 
information and knowledge with partners who had much less knowledge about the use of 
copper than us. This was an advantage for our competitors”, he concluded. Indeed, the firm did 
not benefit from the alliance but its local partner firms did (two of them were interviewed). The 
firm is relatively satisfied because the alliance attained its objectives and it could confirm the 
results of prior research. The firm will not have performance benefits, not because the use of 
copper is not good, but because it has no absolute advantages over stainless steel.  
 
Source: Interview. 
 
“Limited”-type factors. These factors somewhat impede firms from fully taking advantage 
of the alliance outcomes, or the technical results achieved fell far below the initial 
expectations, though they are positive and useful. 16% to 19% of the firms fall within this 
category, because a firm decided not to exploit the alliance outcomes for the moment but 
perhaps it may be interested to do so in the future.  
 
It happens when the firm’s small size (in terms of production capacity) is an obstacle to the 
entire exploitation of the new technology, which may lead the firm not to exploit it at all 
(see Case study N in Box 7.4). In such circumstances there is a minimum size required for 
the new technology to be cost-effective. This category also includes those cases where the 
new technology is useful only to a fraction of the firm’s range of products or processes, and 
those cases where the alliance outcomes were positive but smaller than expected initially 
due to the technological complexity of the project or limitations of the technology. Two 
firms regarded this last aspect as not necessarily a bad thing because they are now 
technically prepared to explain to their customers the limits of the technology and suggest 
the best possible solutions.  
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Box 7.4 Case study N  
 
A CRAFT alliance was set up to develop a clean technology to eliminate the waste from the 
tanning and footwear industries. The leather waste would be burned under controlled 
conditions, generating heat to warm up water, and the chromium subsequently removed from 
the resulting ashes in order to become inert. Three Portuguese firms of different sectors entered 
the alliance. A shoe-making firm with 300 employees adopted the new technology to burn the 
leather waste, which permitted a substantial increase in productivity, especially in wintertime, 
and had many indirect benefits as a result of many contacts with competitor firms who became 
interested in the new process. A tanning firm with 30 employees could not adopt the new 
process because it does not produce enough leather waste to make the new process 
economically feasible. A chemical SME was supposed to treat the ashes but the firm entered 
the alliance for other reasons and was not really interested in doing so. Furthermore, the 
alliance did not find an economic solution for the logistic problems of collecting the ashes and 
separating the different types that exist.   
 
Source: Interview. 
 
“Conditional”-type factors. To the firms included in this category, the attainment of 
economic benefits is normally postponed because it is dependent upon further actions to be 
taken either by the firm itself or by a third party, or by both of them. It sometimes depends 
also on the evolution of the economic context in which the firm does business. This 
category comprises 30% to 35% of all the firms in this study, with varying degrees of 
dependence and risk of failure. 
 
The range of factors in this category is very diversified, including: firms which have no 
sufficient means to acquire the novel equipment immediately; the decision to acquire the 
novel equipment depends on its cost-effectiveness (cost not known in some cases); the new 
(industrial) equipment, production system or (industrial) product has yet to be produced 
and marketed by a third party, frequently a partner firm; a new specific plant has yet to be 
built or the firm’s production facilities layout has to be modified; there are important 
logistic problems of collecting the raw material; the market conditions are different from 
expected in terms of the raw material prices, production price, market size, etc.; or firms 
need technical assistance from RTD performers or further research needs to be carried out 
(see Case study O in Box 7.5 below). In many situations, the potential economic benefits 
and the time for having access to them are dependent on circumstances that basically 
escape the firm’s control, hence increasing the risk of not achieving the intended 
objectives. The risk is not negligible, and frequently the firms in this category were not in a 
position to guarantee the successful exploitation of the alliance outcomes, although they 
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were optimistic about that. One executive even concluded, “There is the feeling that the 
partner firms are too small to implement the project only by themselves; it would be 
advantageous if a bigger firm shows interest in the project.” 
 
There is a remaining group of firms, about 12% of the total, that does not fit in any of the 
above categories. These firms successfully went through the intermediate stage and were 
already exploiting the alliance outcomes at the time of the interviews (see, for instance, 
Case study C in Chapter 5).   
 
There are two other aspects worth stressing about the data in Table 7.5. Those nine cases 
identified as having had poor technical results (symbol Ο) correspond to eight research 
alliances, about 27% of the total under analysis. By analysing the scores of variables 
“satisfaction with the alliance performance” (C1.1) and “overall impact on firm 
performance” (D1.18), one realises that smaller scores for the latter variable do not imply 
smaller scores for the former, even in the case of poor technical results. That is, many of 
the firms expecting a small or zero impact on performance are nevertheless satisfied with 
the performance of alliances, meaning they value a great deal the intangible benefits 
eventually achieved even though such benefits are not easily quantifiable in terms of 
performance. 
 
Box 7.5 Case study O  
 
A construction sector firm (with 300 employees) was the prime proposer of a CRAFT alliance 
formed to study the use of ceramic waste in concrete products. This project was seen primarily 
as an opportunity to work with the university, coming in second place its economic potential 
and the fact that it was environmentally friendly. Eventually, the project was technically 
successful and drew the attention of the local media that gave visibility to the project. The firm 
greatly benefited from its association with an innovative and “more ecological” project. 
According to its CEO, the project will be implemented within a year but two important 
problems have no solution yet: first, there is no guarantee that the ceramic waste (in Portugal) 
is sufficient to supply a plant which will be built specifically for that purpose; second, the 
logistic conditions for collecting and selecting the ceramic waste are not met yet. The 
expectation was high but the firm was aware of the risk involved in the implementation of the 
project.     
 
Source: Interview. 
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7.4 SATISFACTION WITH THE ALLIANCE AND IMPACT ON FIRM 
PERFORMANCE  
 
Is there a contradiction between the reported degree of satisfaction with the alliance 
performance and the overall positive impact on performance? Does the positive assessment 
of the former necessarily imply the latter consequence? Figure 7.6 compares the answers to 
both variables. It shows that these variables apparently do not match with each other and 
even suggests that there is some contradiction between the two. While about two-thirds of 
the interviewees positively assessed the performance of alliances (i.e. C1.1 = 4 or 5) and 
none of them was completely unsatisfied with it, one gets quite the opposite picture reading 
the overall impact of alliances on firm performance, as two-thirds of the answers indicate 
that such impact is irrelevant or slightly important (i.e. D1.18 = 1 or 2). Only seven firms 
were not satisfied with the alliance but many more were expecting a small or no impact on 
their performance. However, as we have seen before, all the executives expecting a slightly 
important effect on performance were unable to convert it into a percentage variation. 
 
Figure 7.6 Alliance performance assessment vs. overall impact on firm performance 
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are considered as missing observations.   
Source: Table C1 and Table D1, both in Appendix 2. 
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In explaining the results, one cannot rule out some inconsistency84 between the answers 
since the two questions were asked in different contexts, but its explanatory power is likely 
to be minimal. There are several other explanatory factors in support of the hypothesis that 
alliance success, measured here by the degree of the firm’s satisfaction, does not 
necessarily imply better firm performance.  
 
Taking into consideration the answers of fourteen executives who were satisfied with the 
alliance performance (i.e. C1.1 = 4 or 5) but reported a small or zero impact on the firm 
performance (i.e. D1.18 = 1 or 2), it seems unlikely that there is a strong correlation 
between these two variables. The following factors summarise the circumstances on which 
the executives based their answers. 
 
Dependence on external factors. The alliance may have achieved technical success but the 
subsequent economic success depends on external conditions not under the firm’s control. 
For instance, it may happen when the performance (or the use) of an improved 
component/system relies on the performance of the equipment where it is to be fitted. If the 
existing equipment is not able to take full advantage of the improved component or if the 
firms (customers) do not update their equipment, the commercial success of that improved 
component is unlikely to happen. On the other hand, alliances may have achieved technical 
success, for instance a new product, however due to changes in the economic context 
occurring in regard to the project’s execution, it is no longer feasible to proceed to 
industrial production while the current conditions remain unaltered. For example, the raw 
material price of a new product may have risen so much that the product is no longer 
competitive even before it is launched (see Case study F in Chapter 5). The manager of a 
machinery and equipment sector firm said: “The actual results will be smaller than 
expected because, to take full advantage of this technology, our customers [firms] need to 
upgrade their machinery and many will not do it. The culture in this sector [textiles] still 
regards price as more important than quality.” 
 
Dependence on internal factors. Firms lack the minimum size required to benefit fully from 
                                                 
84
 Indeed, there appears to exist some inconsistency because twelve executives affirmed that the overall 
impact on firm performance is irrelevant (cf. variable D1.18) but fifteen others disagreed with the statement 
related to a possible positive impact on firm performance (cf. variable C1.4, Table A2.5 in Appendix 2). 
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technically successful projects due to the economies of scale they involve (see Case study 
N in Box 7.4 above). 
 
Limited use. When alliances do not achieve technical success or only do so partially, some 
firms may nevertheless be satisfied with the progress achieved and the new knowledge 
acquired, even if it is insufficient to make changes in the production process or the results 
have a very limited application on products/production processes. The impact on firm 
performance is sometimes insignificant or just slightly important because the scope of 
some research projects was very small indeed and, therefore, the potential to induce change 
was rather limited. In both cases firms may get additional satisfaction with the alliances in 
the light of other benefits not directly connected with the objectives of the alliances. 
 
Different objectives. Firms tend to be satisfied if their own objectives, normally different 
from those of the alliance, are attained. For instance, some firms used alliances as a means 
to confirm results of research carried out internally, to establish international contacts, to 
get experience in inter-firm cooperation, or just to participate in joint projects that include 
partners from their business area (see Case study L in Box 7.2). The quality director of a 
chemical SME said, “It is an obligation to participate in projects of this kind, involving 
firms of our area of business.”  
 
In assessing the success of a technology alliance through taking the perspective of a partner 
firm, it is not just the collective technical achievements and the economic benefits directly 
arising from the use of the new knowledge that matter. The fulfilment of individual 
objectives and the attainment of unplanned (or indirect) benefits are important as well. The 
relative weight that each success element has in the assessment equation differs from firm 
to firm, as do the reasons for individual satisfaction. Being satisfied with the alliance 
outcomes does not necessarily mean that firms expect a positive impact on performance. 
 
7.5 FIRM PERFORMANCE AND ALLIANCE CONDITIONS 
 
For a better understanding of the consequences of the research alliances on the 
performance of participating firms it is convenient to take into consideration the 
circumstances in which the research alliances were formed and implemented. There is no 
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way of assuring the “best possible results” even when alliance partners follow religiously 
all the literature’s “prescriptions” to avoid the many pitfalls of alliances, but failing to 
observe them increases the prospect of attaining worse results than expected. Chapter 5 
identified a number of potential strengths and weaknesses of alliances which could have an 
influence on alliance performance. In Chapter 6, most of such weaknesses emerged in the 
analysis of the negative factors of cooperation, which has shown their negative impact on 
alliance outcomes and the ability of the Portuguese SMEs to achieve better benefits.  
Retrospectively, one can thus identify several critical factors in the cooperation process that 
weakened the potential for achieving greater benefits, first jointly and then individually. 
These factors are presented below according to three dimensions: actors, alliance structure 
and collaborative programme. 
 
Actors. The (lack of) commitment of partners is regarded in the literature as an important 
aspect of cooperation and has been identified in Chapter 6 as one of the most negative 
factors which affected the alliance outcomes. The fact that many projects were neither 
important nor urgent to several firms (see Chapter 5) influenced negatively their 
commitment. Most firms did not take full advantage of what was on offer, i.e. the 
possibility of having access to research resources at a low cost to set up a project to suit 
their interests. Instead, they accepted to participate in projects structured by somebody else 
with little contribution on their part. Though this strategy has advantages because firms 
have access to structured projects that they probably would not have enough knowledge or 
competence to structure by themselves, its drawbacks may be quite substantial as well 
since firms cannot customise the research projects to entirely suit their needs and choose 
the partners (firms and RTD performers) to work with. The CEO of a tanning SME who 
entered a project already structured said, “As there was in the alliance no other partner firm 
with similar characteristics in terms of size and product specificity, it was not possible to 
direct the research activities towards the resolution of the firm’s specific problems, which 
were different from the other tanning firms.” By setting up their own projects, firms would 
likely be much more committed and have more realistic expectations about the outcomes 
and the ability of exploiting them. This explains why only 12 firms considered the project 
both urgent and very important, while 18 firms admitted that the project was neither urgent 
nor very important.  
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Arguably, the Portuguese firms would benefit from a more energetic participation in the 
alliances, however their lack of resources (know-how, people, financial), capability to set 
up joint research projects and experience in similar alliances are possible explanations for 
their acceptance of smaller roles. That means they also accepted a smaller influence on the 
alliances. By accepting participation in someone else’s projects, firms accepted also 
working with unknown partners. Considering that only in a small number of cases were 
there preparatory meetings with all partners for the sake of discussing the project and 
getting to know each other, this was a risky game, which some executives regretted. 
 
The RTD performers were an important part in the whole process of cooperation because 
the technical success of most projects chiefly relied on what they were capable of doing. 
The poor commitment and professional attitude of some of them eventually jeopardised the 
alliance outcomes and the ability of firms to achieve better benefits. 
 
Alliance structure. The alliance structure is likely to have had some influence on the 
alliance performance. Firms and RTD performers complement each other and getting them 
together for a research project is, in principle, advantageous. When there is a clear divide 
between technology users and technology producers, as happened in several alliances, the 
power within the alliance becomes very unbalanced and the interaction among the partners 
quite poor. This is not immediately or necessarily a bad thing in itself if the objectives set 
out at the beginning are achieved, but when the control over the alliance is too unbalanced 
the risk of misbehaviour is high. In some cases the firms felt powerless to deal with 
unexpected situations of RTD performers’ misconduct. Poor interaction among alliance 
partners means the specific nature of alliances is being adulterated and the potential 
contribution of partners is not being maximised. As a result, the alliance outcomes tend not 
to reflect the joint capability. 
 
In general, the research alliances had a relatively high average number of partners. This 
again is not necessarily a bad factor, particularly when each partner contributes something 
unique and makes itself important to the joint undertaking. However, it requires a better 
coordination effort and is likely to increase substantially the transaction costs, especially 
when it involves partners from several different countries. Despite the fact that one-third of 
all alliances under analysis had more than twelve partners, the number of partners has not 
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been considered a major problem because the partners had very defined roles (some of 
them of marginal importance) and most projects were structured in way that did not require 
intense interaction among the partners. Even so, some executives mentioned the logistic 
problems faced in arranging meetings suitable to everyone and the problems associated 
with distance when it came to performing tests. 
 
Collaborative programme. This research is primarily focused on firms and then on 
alliances; however, these are EU-sponsored technology alliances whose characteristics 
have influence on their structure, implementation conditions and the ability of firms to 
exploit the outcomes. Two important structural aspects emerge. First, the CRAFT 
programme has characteristics resembling the old linear model of development and 
diffusion of technology. The implicit model, i.e. the model in which the alliances actually 
take place, provides evidence that points to the linear model, such as the divide between 
different types of partners, the stream of knowledge that is mainly (sometimes totally) 
unidirectional from the technology producers to the technology users, and the lack of de 
facto (genuine) interaction between all the alliance partners in several cases. Second, unlike 
the research investment, which was subsidised, the post-alliance investment necessary to 
exploit the alliance outcomes is important and often represents a significant constraint for 
the participating firms (see, for instance, Case study C in Chapter 5). The low cost of 
participation in an international research project attracts SMEs and often relaxes their 
demands and commitment, but it may also represent a pitfall because they may not have 
adequate financial capability to exploit the alliance outcomes. 
 
7.6 CONCLUSION 
 
The chapter discusses the importance of technology alliances for the participating firms’ 
performance and uncovers some difficulties faced by firms to turn alliances into 
performance. The successful reported cases, though quite few, illustrate the potential 
benefits SMEs can achieve with the CRAFT model of partnering. In fact, it allows SMEs 
to access the research resources needed to implement a research project tailored to suit 
their specific needs at a relatively low cost. If well adjusted to the firm’s needs and well 
implemented, these cooperative research projects can provide substantial benefits for the 
participating firms, if technically successful and provided the conditions to exploit the 
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alliance outcomes can also be met. Besides the risk of failure that every kind of alliance 
involves, i.e. the risk of not attaining the objectives set out to achieve, there is an additional 
and sometimes significant risk related to the ability of firms to exploit the alliance 
outcomes, i.e. materialising the potential benefits in firm performance. 
 
There is considerable evidence to affirm that alliance success, measured here by the degree 
of firm’s satisfaction or even by the degree to which the objectives were attained, does not 
necessarily imply better firm performance. However, better firm performance normally 
requires at least the partial fulfilment of the alliance objectives. In general, the real impact 
of the alliance outcomes on the firms’ performance indicators fell far behind the initial 
expectations, and for more than 60% of all firms the real impact is expected to be irrelevant 
or only slightly important. However, such a small or zero impact on the performance of 
firms does not necessarily mean alliance failure or dissatisfaction with the alliance 
outcomes. The outcomes of some technically successful alliances will not be exploited but 
the firms were satisfied.85 Of the firms reporting an overall impact on performance lower 
than “very important”, only one executive was able to “translate” that impact into a 
percentage variation, suggesting that the effect on firm performance is hardly quantifiable 
below a certain level. Some executives identified benefits they were not able to assess in 
terms of performance variation. The same way, the Beta (1993) study was unable to 
quantify one-third of all identified economic effects. 
 
The ending of a technology alliance is not the end of the process it normally implies. After 
the research period, partner firms still have to have the capability to exploit the alliance 
outcomes and, de facto, materialise the potential benefits generated together. Depending on 
the specific characteristics of projects, this intermediate stage between the research period 
and the exploitation of results may involve a great deal of collaboration of former partners 
and may require further actions not under the firm’s control. It involves the risk of failure. 
Such risk was not taken into account at the beginning of the relationships, and even at the 
end some firms seemed to be not fully aware of it, even knowing they were not in a 
position of guaranteeing the successful exploitation of the alliance outcomes. There are 
                                                 
85
 Studies that attempt to associate the intensity in the use alliances with firm performance, such as the 
Hagedoorn and Schakenraad’s (1994) study, fail to understand the firm’s level of satisfaction or even 
understand whether alliances achieve their objectives. 
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several factors with varying degrees of influence on the time and ability of firms for turning 
the research results into economic benefits, including (without being exhaustive): poor 
technical results, indifference about the common purpose, small size of firms, cost-
effectiveness of the new technology, unsuitable market conditions, or the new (industrial) 
equipment, production system or product has yet to be produced by a third party. From 
30% to 35% of the firms were in such a condition. Previous research which analysed the 
issue of firm performance through alliances did not address the issue of risk involved at the 
intermediate stage and the ability of firms to turn alliance outcomes into performance. 
Even the EU research programmes such as CRAFT seem to assume a certain automatism 
between technically successful projects and exploitation of results. 
 
A number of structural factors explain a great deal of the low performance of many of the 
research alliances. Many firms were not demanding enough at two crucial periods of the 
cooperation process, namely the negotiation and project implementation stages. They 
accepted playing a minor role without any significant contribution, not only in structuring 
the project but in many cases also at the implementation stage, and did not seek a strong 
interaction among all the partners. The commitment of partners, or more precisely the lack 
of it, has been identified as a major negative factor of cooperation, which affected the 
attainment of better results. Many projects were neither important nor urgent to the 
Portuguese firms. On the other hand, some RTD performers did not commit themselves 
professionally to the projects and others took advantage of their dominant position. The 
CRAFT programme’s implicit model allows a clear divide between technology producers 
and technology users and does not stimulate convincingly the interaction among all the 
partners. It contains characteristics strongly resembling the linear model of development 
and transfer of technology. 
 
This chapter attempted to capture the impact of R&D alliances on firm performance. The 
next chapter addresses the issue of organisational learning from alliances, aiming to 
complement the understanding of the alliance-performance link. 
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8 LEARNING THROUGH ALLIANCES 
 
 
 
 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis set out to establish the impact of R&D alliances on firm performance. It did this 
by looking at a sample of firms from the EU-funded CRAFT programme. Although these 
alliances were policy-induced and, hence, were not brought about by a market imperative 
to innovate on a collaborative basis, the study does present some useful, generalisable 
conclusions. In particular, since these were SMEs that may not have had the capacity to 
conduct R&D in the first place, it is possible to look specifically at the impact upon the 
propensity to learn and innovate of these alliances. 
 
We have seen in the preceding chapters that, apart from a small number of firms, the real 
direct impact of the alliance outcomes on the performance indicators appears to be very 
low. The general expectation about the impact on performance decreased substantially 
between the beginning and the end of the relationships. Paradoxically, there is a relatively 
low proportion of firms unsatisfied with the alliance performance and a low proportion of 
firms who did not achieve direct and indirect benefits. This implies that firms may have 
benefited in ways not immediately reflected in performance, which in turn poses the 
question of organisational learning and competence acquisition through alliances, which 
can be viewed as a different way of understanding performance. Learning and competence 
acquisition go beyond the direct or immediate impact on the performance indicators and 
are likely to have a more lasting effect on performance, even if it is sometimes difficult to 
assess that effect.  
 
As pointed out in Chapter 2, alliances are considered a good mechanism for the transfer of 
knowledge and skills, especially tacit knowledge. They allow firms to learn from partners 
and renew their competencies. The alliances under analysis are not learning alliances, 
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whose raison d'être is the internalisation of new skills (Doz and Hamel, 1998); they do not 
configure a “race to learn” (Hamel, 1991) either. Certainly, these alliances require 
organisational learning, because new knowledge is the product and the goal of alliances 
(Ciborra, 1991: 59), but the learning objectives of SMEs were rather less ambitious and 
chiefly project-bounded. The discussion that follows attempts to understand the issue of 
organisational learning and competence accumulation, bearing in mind, however, the 
strong limitations of the methodology employed to address the matter in great detail. It is 
too early to assess fully the learning outcomes and, therefore, it is not possible to 
understand how much firms have learned through alliances. Rather, the aim here is to 
interpret the cooperation process from the viewpoint of learning and competence 
acquisition, two aspects particularly important for a better understanding of the 
performance implications of alliance participation, especially in the dynamic capability 
acquisition context.  
 
The methodology employed here was not designed to address the issues of organisational 
learning and knowledge transfer comprehensively. Therefore, this chapter is more 
inferential, more speculative, but even so is an important reflection on issues arising out of 
the research findings that helps towards a better understanding of the impact of alliances on 
firm performance. Based on the advantages of alliances as a mechanism to learn and 
acquire knowledge from partners and the internal conditions necessary to do so developed 
in Chapter 2, this chapter first attempts to show that firms have learned in many ways and 
then analyse the barriers to learning.  
 
8.2 LEARNING AND KNOWLEDGE TRANSFER 
 
This section attempts to show that firms acquired information and knowledge86 through 
cooperation, even in the case of unsuccessful alliances. The amount of learning and the 
type of knowledge acquired from alliances vary across the sampled firms, apparently with 
no common pattern. Based on information from the interviews, one can identify at least 
four different categories of learning, as follows: 
 
                                                 
86
 Knowledge and know-how are used here interchangeably. 
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Information and knowledge transfer. Most firms were able to access the technology of both 
the RTD performers (most of them academic) and partner firms, as Table 8.1 shows, and 
believe this will have a positive impact on performance. The number of firms who obtained 
new ideas to improve existing products or processes is rather smaller than the number of 
firms who had access to the technology of partners, especially the case of RTD performers. 
This is because some alliances involved technologies unrelated to the firms’ core activities, 
which limited their ability to learn. SMEs regard the information and knowledge acquired 
as an important outcome of alliances and understand its value, even when its immediate 
use is not possible for some specific reason (for example, technical failure of the project). 
 
A high proportion of firms revealed an initial intent to learn from partners, that is, they 
regarded the alliance as an opportunity to learn from partner firms and RTD performers 
(see Figure 5.10, question A7.7). Many executives mentioned as an advantage of alliances 
the possibility of joining together firms with different competencies. The general manager 
of a ceramics SME believes that “The contribution (ideas) of different firms was extremely 
important to push the technology a step forward.” Such learning intent referred essentially 
to the opportunity to access information and knowledge related to the project; only a small 
number of firms regarded the alliance as a means to acquire knowledge that went beyond 
the project, though apparently with no clear strategy to achieve that. Despite not having any 
strong intent, firms were nevertheless receptive to learning from alliance partners. For 
instance, visiting the premises of the firm hosting a meeting was considered very 
important. One executive even questioned the desirability of spending two or three days to 
attend a three-hour meeting in a different country if there was no possibility to visit the host 
firm’s premises. There are advantages in attending the meetings but since the firm would 
have access to the meeting’s technical information anyway, such advantages were not 
perceived as being substantial enough to merit the effort.  
 
There are several factors which allow one to conclude that learning has taken place. The 
general perception of firms is that this kind of project allows them to acquire useful 
knowledge and information, even in the case of unsuccessful projects. “We [the firm] 
always learn something with this kind of project”, some executives concluded. More 
specifically, just about a quarter of all firms are using the knowledge acquired through the 
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alliance in other products/services, which indicates that not just the acquisition but also the 
assimilation and utilisation of knowledge has taken place. In several cases, the transference 
of technology was embodied in machinery, systems or industrial products (inputs to 
production), but the participation in the project allowed firms to acquire privileged 
information and knowledge not available to other users. One firm emphasised the fact of 
being now better prepared to analyse the firm’s own technical problems and two others 
stressed that they have now sufficient technical competence to explain to their customers 
why certain technical solutions do not work. 
 
Table 8.1 Learning from partners 
 Number of 
firms 
Average 
score (*) 
Learned about/had access to the partner firms’ technology 31 2.74 
Learned about/had access to the RTD performers’ technology 30 2.93 
Obtained new ideas from partner firms to improve existing 
products/production processes 
23 2.78 
Obtained new ideas from RTD performers to improve existing 
products/production processes 
14 2.79 
Had access to new techniques and skills (other than those related 
to the project) 
25 3.08 
Note: (*) Average importance in terms of expected impact on performance attributed by firms on a five-point 
importance scale. 
Source: Figures 6.7, 6.8, 6.9, and 6.10 in Chapter 6. 
 
Additionally significant is the number of firms who say they have learned about an 
unfamiliar market and improved their knowledge about competitors. An illustrative 
example refers to a firm whose product proved to be better than the competitor partners’ in 
the course of the research activities. As a consequence of this unplanned information about 
the competitors, the firm became a supplier of a multinational firm. In another case, in the 
course of the technical studies done for the project, a firm became aware that a local 
competitor already had a technical solution for the problem which led to the formation of 
the alliance. The alliance allowed the firm to get to know their competitors better. 
 
Despite the evidence that some transfer of information and knowledge has occurred, it does 
not imply that all firms will have the ability or opportunity to benefit from such new 
knowledge. Indeed, in cases where the acquired technology is not related to the firm’s core 
competencies and the project was technically unsuccessful, the possibility of having 
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performance benefits is quite small.  
 
Experience in cooperation. According to Ciborra (1991), the participation in alliances 
allows firms to learn how to set up and fine-tune alliances per se. The findings in the 
previous chapters provide some support for claiming that prior experience positively 
influences the ability of firms to capture benefits (or avoid problems) from interfirm 
alliances. Learning about interfirm cooperation is likely to be one major benefit achieved 
by most firms. The opportunity to learn was substantial because for a high proportion of 
firms this was their very first experience of cooperation, and the proportion becomes even 
higher if only firms with prior experience in joint R&D projects involving international 
partners are accounted for. It is not so surprising that acquiring experience in interfirm 
alliances was the most common benefit reported by firms; this could be expected to be very 
useful since most of them are interested in participating in future alliances, with or without 
EU funding. About two-thirds of the executives claimed to have acquired experience on 
how to prepare and implement a joint research project. However, the initial contribution of 
firms in structuring the projects and the type and intensity of interaction among partners 
may have limited the opportunity of firms to acquire experience about structuring and 
implementing joint projects.  
 
To most firms, almost everything was new: setting up a common project, participating in a 
R&D project, interacting with other firms and RTD performers and interacting with 
partners from several different countries, most of them unknown. It was a major challenge, 
full of opportunities to learn. For the inexperienced SMEs to cope with such a novel 
environment, some organisational innovation must have taken place, namely at the 
management and technological levels. An alliance is itself an organisational innovation 
(Ciborra, 1991). Interacting with alliance partners in a joint innovative project is essentially 
different from running a firm (or a project) independently and introducing innovations 
supplied by the market (markets are regarded as one of the most important sources of 
innovation).    
 
Learning has occurred at the implementation stage when several firms became aware of the 
many potential pitfalls of cooperation. For instance, many firms realised that the choice of 
partners (firms and RTD performers) and information about their objectives is extremely 
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important and sometimes critical for the success or failure of a relationship. They also 
understood that it is important to devote enough time to structuring a joint project and 
taking care over the formal aspects of the relationship. A negative experience is also a great 
opportunity to learn (‘learning by failing’), and some firms will be better prepared to 
participate in future alliances. Others came to realise that technical success alone is 
necessary but not sufficient to exploit the alliance outcomes successfully. 
 
Consciousness about intangible benefits. Almost all the firms attributed great importance 
to intangible factors such as image improvement and contacts, and they were certain that an 
alliance could be a means to achieve this. The participation in a research project with 
international partners is believed to enhance the visibility of firms in the national and 
international context and within the group they belong to. Firms believe that it sends a 
positive message to the external world about their innovative intent. They like to be seen as 
innovative firms, who are concerned about product quality and customer satisfaction, but 
the importance of this varies with the firm. For instance, for the mould-making firms this is 
important because they have many multinationals as customers, but for the tanning firms 
the price remains more important to customers. The contacts established with foreign firms 
and RTD performers represent a doorway to accessing technical know-how and 
information in the future, something that would be hardly possible outside the framework 
of an alliance, according to some executives. Many firms recognise the importance of 
being connected to a network but they were especially satisfied with the opportunity to 
work with RTD performers, particularly universities.  
 
Change in routines. The participation in alliances produced some organisational changes. 
Some firms regarded the alliance as an opportunity to break organisational routines and 
eliminate “bad habits” within the firm. An executive said, “An important benefit of this 
alliance was a break with the routinised and closed posture of the firm, which has opened 
up to research and relationships with other firms and institutions.” The last point shows 
that firms are keen to work with other firms and RTD performers. To many of them, 
interfirm collaboration represents a new way of having access to technical information. It is 
a different source of technology which they are interested to make use of. Firms were open 
to new ideas and new ways of doing things. For instance, one firm uses alliances to give 
“training” to its personnel; that is, give them the opportunity to contact other people, other 
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cultures, other countries, and thus open up their perspectives on things, something they 
cannot learn from manuals. Other firms mentioned the opportunity to “leave” the narrow 
environment where they operate. Yet another firm regarded the alliance as an alternative 
source of knowledge that could favour its position within the international group it belongs 
to by way of creating a two-way flow of technology transfer.  
 
Unexpected changes in routines also occurred. The top management of at least four firms 
became aware of the importance of an R&D department to perform research and be able to 
participate in R&D projects. These firms modified their attitude towards R&D, which is a 
sign of innovation and learning. 
 
8.3 BARRIERS TO LEARNING 
 
The previous section attempted to show that firms learned from the alliances and 
accumulated information and knowledge which might have a positive impact on their 
future performance. But that does not represent all the learning opportunities offered by the 
alliances. Indeed, many learning opportunities were lost or foreclosed from the very 
beginning, however not all of them were the fault of the firm or its inability to learn. The 
barriers to learning categorised below are deeply rooted in the conditions in which the 
alliances were formed, the characteristics of partners and the relationship between them, as 
presented in Chapters 5 to 7. 
 
Alliance structure. The alliance design influences the ability of firms to learn from partners. 
When there is a strong interaction among alliance partners, there are better conditions for 
organisational learning to take place. In many of the CRAFT R&D alliances under analysis, 
there was a clear divide between technology producers and technology users that did not 
favour the interdependence of partners. On the contrary, some firms (negatively) 
emphasised their independence from the technology producers. On the other hand, a 
substantial number of firms had a well-defined role and often performed activities which 
did not require a great deal of interaction with the alliance partners (for instance, carrying 
out in-house tests). A “linear”-type structure of technological development characterised 
many relationships, creating learning asymmetries among partners and especially limiting 
the opportunity to learn for those firms located around the periphery of alliances. The way 
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most alliances were formed may explain this to a certain extent. As we have seen in 
Chapter 5, many firms were “invited” to participate in a structured project with little 
opportunity for negotiation. The structure of most alliances was prepared for the transfer of 
explicit knowledge (for instance, written documents or machinery), but much less prepared 
for the transfer of tacit knowledge between partners, which is often organisation-
embedded, much less transparent than explicit knowledge (Lei, 1997) and requiring a much 
closer interaction to be transferred. 
 
The number of alliance partners may have had a negative effect on learning. A large 
alliance has the potential to generate greater learning opportunities given the larger number 
of contributions, but it also creates additional coordination problems and may require better 
defined roles of partners in order to be manageable (Killing, 1988), thus limiting 
interaction. Since larger alliances tended to involve partners from a larger number of 
countries, communication problems arose as an additional obstacle to effective learning. 
The communication problems were generally regarded as unimportant but perhaps they 
were underestimated due to incomplete perception of the phenomenon. In their study about 
the participation of Finnish firms in EU programmes, Luukkonen and Hälikkä (2000: 114) 
found that 67% of the firms regarded “Cultural differences in communication and working 
methods” as a problem at least to some degree. In general, to overcome the problem of 
multi-language in alliances, the talks were conducted in English. It is difficult to assess the 
extent to which it affect the ability of non-native English speakers to learning, but 
“[k]nowledge encoded in an unfamiliar language is, for practical purposes, inaccessible” 
(Doz and Hamel, 1998: 217).  
 
The dispersion of partners was said to cause problems at the experimental stage because 
this requires the close monitoring of activities and a rapid decision-making process. This 
was most relevant when the experiments and the analysis of results were carried out in 
completely different sites, far away from each other. In a number of alliances, both the 
distance and number of partners influenced the flow of information and knowledge 
between them. 
 
The project’s structure also created certain barriers to learning and to technology transfer. 
One could find projects that were oversized for the time and resources available, and 
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projects that were structured to match the needs of specific partners. This became a source 
of problems later on which negatively affected the firms’ learning expectations. An atypical 
example relates to a given project which was structured for a two-year period research but 
part of it alone took a partner firm more than eight years to develop. 
 
Posture of partners. Many barriers to learning are direct consequences of the partners’ 
attitude towards the alliance. Even considering the difficulties of many SMEs in putting 
together a joint research project and the opportunity to work with certain institutions, firms 
accepted the participation in alliances perhaps too passively, thus compromising their role 
within the alliance. Besides that, just under 30% of the firms considered the project as 
being both urgent and very important, and many projects would not have been carried out 
without the alliance because they were unimportant or not urgent. This raises the question 
of commitment to the project. The latter group of firms has fewer motives to be fully 
committed to projects and to learning. Indeed, the lack of commitment of partners (firms 
and RTD performers) was identified in Chapter 6 as one of the most important negative 
factors of cooperation. Some firms changed their interest in the project after realising its 
economic potential in the course of its implementation, but it is not difficult to admit that 
the commitment to alliances was largely related to its urgency and importance for firms. In 
one rare case, it is not an exaggeration to say that the firm’s commitment to the project was 
zero; it only “lent” its name to the alliance. 
 
The structure of many alliances did not favour the partners’ interaction, but the partners 
themselves were rather apathetic about creating stronger ties with each other, even between 
firms from the same country. There were stronger connections between partners who knew 
each other beforehand, and between firms and local RTD performers, but most of the 
Portuguese firms restricted their involvement to a minimum. Some firms acknowledged 
that point but other factors are equally important for understanding the lack of commitment 
to promote interaction: no attendance at meetings (often “delegating” it to the local RTD 
performer), lack of active participation in the meetings attended, very limited knowledge 
about the alliance partners (in rare cases, some partners were unknown to each other at the 
end of the relationship!). This explains why only twelve firms said they have created a 
formal/informal network to exchange technical information.  
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Competitor partner firms behaved differently when the project involved knowledge about 
their core activities. The levels of transparency and commitment of competitor partners 
were much higher when their geographic markets did not overlap, but when they did 
competitor partners devised ways of protecting their knowledge against unintended 
disclosure. For instance, in a given alliance the two competitor partners did not supply their 
best product for testing, to protect vital knowledge from being transferred. Some firms 
rejected competitor firms as partners and others are interested in future alliances but not 
with (local) competitor firms. This is consistent with Quintas and Guy’s (1995) results. The 
competitive stance of firms limited the potential for learning within the alliance. 
 
Some RTD performers created barriers to learning when they refused to accept the 
contribution of firms and when they “assumed” that technology users could not provide any 
important contribution to the development of technologies far different from their 
competencies, despite the interest of technology users in a stronger interaction. They barred 
the reverse flow of knowledge. RTD performers also limited the opportunities for learning 
when their commitment to the project was lower than expected and when they created 
learning asymmetries by treating alliance partners differently. One RTD performer even 
refused to demonstrate the new process to the users! The asymmetric distribution of power 
within the alliance and the fact that there is no assessment of the quality of the RTD 
performers’ research by the EU allows room for such kinds of behaviour. 
 
Capability to learn. The lack of resources is an important factor determining the SMEs’ 
ability to learn from alliances. SMEs often lack the time and resources to identify and use 
external sources of scientific and technological expertise (Rothwell and Dodgson, 1991; 
Rothwell, 1991). For small firms, there are barriers to learning from external sources even 
before being involved in actual cooperation. SMEs may not even be able to formulate a 
request for assistance (Delapierre et al., 1988). The identification of areas for cooperation 
and the selection of partners were two important hurdles identified by several executives to 
justify the lack of initiative in setting up joint projects. This also explains why an invitation 
to participate in an international R&D alliance sounds appealing to SMEs, even when the 
alliance objectives and firm’s needs do not entirely match. According to many firms, local 
RTD performers, namely technological sectoral associations, are better positioned and 
qualified to identify areas for cooperation and select suitable partners, because they know 
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the firms’ needs and have access to scientific knowledge. 
 
The human factor is fundamental in the capability of firms to learn from alliances. The lack 
of qualified technical specialists or R&D personnel, common to a large proportion of firms, 
conditioned the SMEs’ ability to make technical changes to the projects, participate in 
meetings, assess the technical competence of firms and RTD performers to carry out the 
research. It conditioned firms’ absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989, 1990; see 
chapter 2 above); that is, the capacity to recognise and assimilate new knowledge from 
alliances. As a rule, the person appointed to the project accumulated it with his/her normal 
duties, in many cases running the firm. SMEs had more difficulties in learning when 
projects involved technologies outside of their competencies. Some RTD performers 
“assumed” that in such cases the firms’ contribution would be unimportant. In the 
meetings, as one executive pointed out, excessively technical discussions would 
necessarily exclude the technology users from participating. One firm was not able to 
exploit the alliance outcomes because it had no in-house competence to read the technical 
dossier produced by the technology producer. Quite often, firms relied on local RTD 
performers to minimise their lack of in-house expertise; however two questions remain 
unanswered: How much can firms learn effectively with this indirect process? How much 
accessible information and knowledge is not being transferred to firms because of this? 
 
Material resources are also important. As expected, the large majority of SMEs did not 
have an R&D department to support the research activities. Most of them could not afford 
having one and in many cases it was not justifiable either. But if SMEs want to participate 
in joint R&D projects, not having a minimal research structure can be problematic or even 
ineffective, especially outside a cooperative framework such as CRAFT. As one executive 
of a firm who created an R&D department after the CRAFT experience pointed out: “Now 
we have a portfolio of research projects and we can define research priorities, something 
we could not do before.” A research structure substantiates the firm’s commitment to 
research and helps to define research priorities. “The R&D departments of firms provide a 
major source of learning in an activity which is central to their continuing existence and 
prosperity” (Dodgson, 1993a: 388).  
 
The costs of carrying out research are often an important constraint for the participation of 
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SMEs in R&D projects. This is not applicable to the case of the CRAFT R&D alliances 
because the EU funded them. However, the post-alliance investment necessary to exploit 
the alliance outcomes was found to be an important constraint, as previous chapters have 
stressed. It affected the exploitation of acquired knowledge in some cases and the transfer 
of embodied technology in others. 
 
Finally, the lack of experience in cooperation was an important factor in the firms’ ability 
to learn. As argued before, firms learned a lot about interfirm cooperation because it was 
essentially new to most of them. So much novelty, however, was possibly an obstacle for 
firms to devise an effective strategy to learn from alliance partners, to acquire technology 
and build up new competencies.     
 
Cultural obstacles. Perhaps the most important cultural barrier to learning was the 
relatively low intent of firms to do so; that is, the propensity to view collaboration as an 
opportunity to learn (Hamel, 1991). Most firms regarded the alliance not as an opportunity 
to learn from alliance partners (i.e. to internalise their skills) but rather as a way of solving 
their own specific problems. Perhaps this was a realistic strategy given the initial 
conditions to participate and the lack of experience in cooperation. It was not apparent, 
however, that the firms have changed their strategy during the implementation phase. 
Indeed, as some executives pointed out, after realising that the project would be a failure, 
partner firms did not look for alternative joint activities and instead became progressively 
less committed to it. As mentioned elsewhere, many firms entered the alliance with little 
knowledge about the partners, their competencies and their objectives. They also 
disregarded the importance of the formal aspects of the relationship. It is difficult to know 
how important this was as a barrier to learning, but some late problems could have been 
avoided or minimised at the initial stage had the attitude of firms been different.  
 
One last point relates to the distinction between individual and organisational learning87. 
We have seen before that some firms were able to use the new knowledge in other products 
and processes, indicating that organisational learning has taken place. However, four firms 
refused an interview because the “right” person to interview (that is, the person who had 
                                                 
87
 For information on the process of learning see, for instance, Dodgson (1993a). 
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been in charge of the project) had left the firm meanwhile and nobody else could replace 
him/her for that purpose. This is a sign that part of the information and knowledge acquired 
from alliances has been retained in individuals instead of being transferred to the 
organisation, which raises the question of individual versus organisational learning. It is 
not possible to estimate how much knowledge was retained in individuals since it depends 
largely on how effective the internal routines to disseminate the knowledge throughout the 
organisation are. But two aspects may have influenced the organisational learning. In 
SMEs, the fact that few people, sometimes one person, accumulate several key functions 
might be an obstacle for the transfer of knowledge into the firm given the confusion 
between individual and organisational knowledge. This is most visible when key people 
leave SMEs. On the other hand, the existence of a research structure facilitates the 
organisational learning because learning requires coordination and effective transfer 
mechanisms (Dodgson, 1993a). As noted before, most SMEs did not have a formal 
research structure.  
 
8.4 CONCLUSION 
 
The analysis of the cooperation process from the viewpoint of the organisational learning 
and knowledge acquisition suggests that the amount of benefits achieved by firms just 
reflects the amount of effort put into alliances. Firms should not expect to get a large 
amount of benefits when they do not put a lot of effort into the relationship or when they 
lack appropriate in-house resources to benefit from R&D alliances, and the EU cannot 
expect large benefits for firms and for the economy just by joining firms and RTD 
performers together. This general observation holds for learning and the ability of SMEs to 
innovate in particular.  
 
The few successful alliances suggest that the CRAFT model of partnering has a great 
potential to generate dynamics of innovation and organisational learning but to be effective 
it requires conditions which could not be found in many cases. On the side of firms, the 
weakness of intent, lack of experience, passivity, novelty of cooperation and lack of in-
house resources affected their ability to learn and build competencies from alliances. 
Besides that, the alliance structure, the alliance outcomes and the ability to exploit them 
also had impacts on the transfer of technology into the firms. These factors conditioned the 
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type and amount of knowledge transferred between partners. Perhaps more important, most 
of it is likely to be explicit knowledge rather than tacit knowledge. 
 
The small impact on the performance indicators of most firms is probably a good indicator 
about the amount of information and knowledge actually transferred into the firms. Most 
firms will not have substantial direct benefits because the transfer and assimilation of 
knowledge was poor. The significant expected impact on performance of some firms is 
essentially due to the transference of embodied technology, such as machinery and systems. 
This is similar in many respects to the traditional way of acquiring technology from outside 
and, arguably, will not have a substantial effect on firms’ absorptive capacity. But firms 
have learned in certain ways and to certain degrees from alliances, especially about 
interfirm cooperation. Its impact on performance is not immediate or even easily 
noticeable, but it may be lasting. 
 
This chapter addressed an important aspect of R&D alliances, that of organisational 
learning and competence-building. Its findings help towards a better understanding of the 
impact of R&D alliances on firm performance, which is the object of this thesis and whose 
conclusions are developed in the next chapter. 
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9 CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
 
 
 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis is concerned with the relationship between R&D alliances and firm 
performance. Empirically, it analyses the impact on performance of a sample of Portuguese 
small and medium-sized manufacturing firms who participated in the EU-sponsored 
CRAFT (1994-98) programme. The thesis aims primarily to capture the firm’s perspective 
but it is aware that the issue has policy implications since the alliances were formed in the 
context of public policy to encourage cooperation. Taking into consideration the limitations 
of the methodology to address adequately the effectiveness of the CRAFT programme or 
the EU RTD policy, some conclusions are presented in this chapter which have policy 
implications. 
 
Currently, there is an enormous pressure on firms of all sizes and from all sectors to engage 
in external relationships. Firms increasingly use alliances as a competitive strategy, 
governments promote and support inter-firm cooperation, and the literature on alliances 
greatly emphasises the potential benefits of cooperation, in particular technology-based 
cooperation. Despite this “favourable environment”, the perceived benefits of technology 
alliances for firm performance are not yet unequivocally supported by empirical studies. 
The successful cases described in the literature are insufficient to explain the phenomenon 
because several studies reported a high failure rates of alliances (e.g. Duysters et al., 1999) 
and the limited number of studies that attempted to link alliances with firm performance 
have not reached consistent results (see Chapter 2). As a result, this issue is largely 
unexplored in the literature on alliances in general and in R&D alliances involving SMEs 
in particular. But, managers, policy-makers and academics cannot be satisfied with the 
potential benefits of alliances; it is fundamental to understand more deeply the actual 
impact of alliances on firm performance.  
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Taking into consideration the facts outlined above, this study was concerned with the 
following main question: Do (successful) technology alliances cause better firm 
performance? The assumption behind this question is that the achievement of technical 
success, here measured by the degree to which the objectives set out the beginning are 
achieved, causes better firm performance. This question has a number of implications 
attached, raising a set of additional questions which the study attempted to provide some 
answers: To what extent do the initial conditions and the alliance implementation process 
affect the alliance outcomes? Does satisfaction with the alliance imply better firm 
performance? To what extent can firms turn technology alliances into performance? and 
What are the factors behind the unsuccessful exploitation of alliance outcomes? In a 
complementary way, the thesis addressed the question of organisational learning, an 
important aspect linking R&D alliances with firm performance. 
 
The findings are based on the experience of 41 Portuguese manufacturing SMEs who 
participated in 30 technology alliances under the CRAFT programme, sponsored by the 
European Union. The data were collected through face-to-face interviews, using a 
questionnaire for guidance. The executives were asked to express the impact of the R&D 
alliance on nine performance indicators, first on a Likert-type scale and then in percentage 
terms.  
 
The chapter proceeds with a discussion of the main findings of the thesis, followed by the 
implications for policy, the generalisability of results and suggestions for further research.  
 
9.2 SUMMARY AND MAIN FINDINGS OF THE THESIS 
 
The thesis can be divided into two main parts. The first part - Chapters 2 and 3 - is 
concerned with some conceptual issues, the theoretical framework, and the context in 
which the CRAFT alliances took place. The second part - Chapters 4 to 8 - presents the 
findings of the empirical research. 
 
An important characteristic which is common to the three major concepts analysed in 
Chapter 2 (i.e. inter-firm alliance, alliance success and organisational performance) is the 
lack of consensus in the literature regarding their definitions and boundaries, for different 
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reasons though. Perhaps more precisely, there are several ways of addressing them. 
Authors have used a profusion of terms to refer to inter-firm alliance, which certainly is a 
consequence of the multiplicity of alliance types and objectives, but it can also be 
interpreted as a lack of “analytical precision” (Chesnais, 1988). The concept has evolved to 
capture the phenomenon’s complexity but without enough effort to integrate all 
contributions because disagreement about its boundaries and wording still persists. It is 
widely accepted in the literature and it is explicitly stated in some definitions that R&D 
alliances represent a subclass of inter-firm alliances, though again there is no consensus 
about a single definition or terminology. In accordance with many authors, government-
sponsored R&D alliances are here considered a subclass of R&D alliances. 
 
It is difficult to find a single definition for alliance success because of the large spectrum of 
alliance types, the multiplicity of purposes and diversity of results. Ultimately, the notion 
of alliance success must reflect the individual perspective of alliance partners, irrespective 
of the common achievements. Concerning the notion of organisational performance, there 
is not a unique set of indicators or a “best way” to measure it. The notion of organisational 
performance is, thus, based on individual preferences of those involved in measuring it. In 
any case, traditional financial indicators seem no longer to suffice because they are 
essentially good at measuring past performance, but rather poor at assessing the firm’s 
future competitive stance. 
 
Based on an extensive literature review, Chapter 2 discusses in detail several different 
perspectives of examining performance in the context of alliances. One perspective is to 
look at the alliance performance, an issue that has been a concern of researchers for a 
relatively long time, especially the assessment of joint venture performance. Several 
approaches have been used to assess the alliance performance, including perceptual 
measures (i.e. the partners’ own assessment), alliance instability, duration, termination, 
mortality rates and financial performance. Each measure does not capture fully the 
phenomenon and not all measures are adequate to assess the performance of all alliance 
types because virtually every alliance has a different set of objectives and outcomes. A 
multidimensional approach is likely to be more effective but, as mentioned above, the 
individual assessment of alliance performance is perhaps essential. A general conclusion 
that can be drawn from prior studies is that the rate of failure is high. For instance, 
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Harrigan (1988) reported that 66.7 % of alliances were considered unsuccessful at least by 
one of the partners. 
 
A second perspective on analysing performance consists in assessing the impact of 
alliances on firm performance. Some studies analysed the stock-market reaction to the 
alliance formation announcements, other studies examined the importance of alliances to 
the firm survival. Another group of studies looked at the relationship between alliance 
intensity and firm performance, normally using statistical methods to find associations 
between the two, but with relative success given the difficulty in proving the cause-effect 
link. Yet another group of studies examined the alliance outcomes and impact on firm 
performance using direct interviews or questionnaires. This approach overcomes the 
causality issue but cannot avoid the problem of subjectivity because it is based essentially 
on perceptual measures.  
 
A different way of analysing performance in the context of alliances is to look at the 
organisational learning and competence-acquisition from alliances. Alliances allow firms 
to implement strategies for learning and innovation more effectively (Ciborra, 1991). They 
may be an avenue for learning and internalising new skills, in particular those which are 
tacit, collective and embedded (Doz and Hamel, 1998). Alliances are considered an 
important mechanism to deal more effectively with technological and market uncertainty 
(Hagedoorn et al., 2000).  
 
Yet another way of analysing performance is to assess the performance of alliances against 
alternative strategies (i.e., go-it-alone, merger, acquisition and licensing). This topic is 
absolutely relevant but was not addressed empirically here. These alternative strategies are 
not perfect substitutes of each other and not all of them are always available to target 
particular objectives. Further, there is no absolute advantage of one strategy over the 
others; each strategy is only relatively advantageous over the others. Several authors 
consider alliances to be a superior alternative in many situations. 
 
The main findings of the empirical research are presented below by way of answering the 
questions formulated in this thesis. 
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a) Do (successful) technology alliances cause better firm performance? 
 
The full answer to this question is divided into four parts. The first part focuses on the 
general results about the impact of technology alliances on firm performance. The first 
point to make is that there is no unique pattern in the results. The successful cases, though 
quite few, illustrate the potential performance benefits that SMEs can achieve with the 
CRAFT model of partnering, if the projects are technically successful and provided the 
firms can meet the necessary conditions to exploit the alliance outcomes. On the other 
hand, the data show that the real impact of alliance outcomes on the performance of firms 
fell far behind the initial expectations across the whole range of the performance indicators, 
and for more than 60% of all firms in the study the real impact is expected not to be 
significant. Should this be classified as failure? The answer is not straightforward. Indeed, 
these results do not necessarily imply alliance failure or dissatisfaction with the alliance 
performance, as we will see below. The variety of situations confirms the difficulties 
involved in assessing alliances discussed in Chapter 2. Of the executives reporting an 
overall impact on performance smaller than “Very important”, only one of them was able 
to translate that impact into a percentage variation, suggesting that the effect on firm 
performance is hardly quantifiable below a certain level. The Beta (1993) study also could 
not quantify about one-third of all detected economic effects, essentially due to lack of 
information. 
 
Second, one should understand whether the Portuguese firms entered the alliances aiming 
to achieve performance improvements or only to achieve other kinds of benefits. If the 
former is not the case, it is hardly useful to make any association between the alliance 
performance and firm performance. Although it is widely recognised in the literature that 
the firm’s objectives may be different from those of the alliance in which it is involved, 
previous studies that addressed the alliance-performance link did not discuss that issue. In 
fact, two firms (5%) were not expecting a positive impact on performance when they 
entered the alliance88 (see Figure 7.1 in Chapter 7), but one of them was expecting an 
extremely important impact on the indicator “Environmental damage”. Both projects did 
                                                 
88
 Another firm could have been included in this group since the executive interviewed said there were no 
plans to exploit the alliance outcomes from the very beginning, although he also considered the project would 
have a slight impact on the firm performance. Essentially, the firm entered the alliance for other reasons. 
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not achieve their objectives, however the executives reported having had some direct and 
indirect benefits. These perceived benefits have no direct repercussion in terms of 
performance, though they can be useful in the future. Not expecting a positive impact on 
performance is not the same as to say that firms were not expecting anything from the 
alliance because they did (e.g. contacts with R&D institutions and other firms, experience 
in inter-firm cooperation). The low cost of participation in the alliances allowed some 
SMEs to pursue essentially particular objectives. Had the cost of participation been more 
substantial then probably the strategy of SMEs would be different. 
 
The third part of the answer focuses on the technical success of alliances, here measured by 
the degree to which the objectives set out at the beginning were attained (C1.2). Table 9.1 
shows how the executives classified the alliances’ technical success. Contrary to what one 
would expect, and even taking into consideration the subjectivity of the assessment, it 
appears that the comparison between the alliance achievements and its objectives is not a 
straightforward assessment because some alliance partners expressed quite different 
opinions on that matter.89 The aggregated answers of all groups exceed the number of 
alliances, which is 30. There are at least three reasons to explain this inconsistency:  
 
• Information asymmetry among partners mainly due to their role in the alliance and 
interest in its outcomes - firms playing a smaller role or being less interested in the 
project appeared to be less accurate in their analysis;  
• Prospect of obtaining economic benefits - firms with smaller prospect of obtaining 
economic benefits tended to assess less positively the outcomes;  
• Different expectation about the benefits, which has chiefly to do with the different 
levels of initial knowledge about the technology to be developed and its potential use. 
 
Therefore, it is difficult to say exactly how many alliances achieved technical success. The 
results indicate that just about 50% of the 30 R&D alliances achieved most or all of the 
objectives set out at the beginning. A large proportion of alliances could not attain success, 
                                                 
89
 The data presented in Table 9.1 has been reduced from five to three categories in order to clarify the 
explanation of the results and emphasise the most important divergences. However, in the categories 
“Disagree” and “Agree” there were also different opinions about the degree to which the objectives were 
attained. 
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thus impeding partner firms from achieving performance benefits. 
 
Table 9.1 Did the alliance achieve its objectives? 
 Disagree Neutral Agree Missing Total 
C1.2 (No. of firms) 14 5 23 1 43 
No. of alliances these 
firms are from 13 4 17 1 35 (≠ 30) 
 A (1,43)      
 B (4,11,17)      
 C (28,30,35)      
 D (13,29)      Di
v
er
ge
n
t 
o
pi
n
io
n
s 
 E (9,34)      
Notes: Disagree  (1. Strongly disagree + 2. Disagree). Agree (4. Agree + 5. Strongly agree). 
Source: Answers to question C1.2. See also Figure 6.6 in Chapter 6 and Table A2.5 in Appendix 2. 
 
The fourth part of the answer focuses on the relationship between alliance success and firm 
performance. Table 9.2 compares the degree to which the objectives were attained (C1.2) 
with the real impact on firm performance (D1.18), as perceived by the executives.  
 
Table 9.2 Alliance success versus impact on firm performance 
Project number 1 6 11 15 12 19 31 18 2 35 27 7 8 41 13 14 24 32 33 39 30 37 38 
C1.2 scores 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
D1.9 scores (expected) 5 5 3 4 4 5 4 3 2 3 ? 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 3 3 4 4 
D1.18 scores (real) 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 3 2 2 ? 4 4 4 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 
Source: Answers to questions C1.2, D1.9 and D1.18. 
 
The main conclusion that comes out from Table 9.2 is that alliance success does not 
necessarily cause better firm performance. The achievement of the alliance’s objectives is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for better firm performance. However, better firm 
performance normally requires at least the partial fulfilment of the alliance objectives. 
There are several firms agreeing with the success of the project who expect a “Slightly 
important” impact on firm performance (D1.1.8 = 2) or no impact at all (D1.18 = 1). As 
Table 7.3 and the discussion on the measurability of performance variation in Chapter 7 
show, those executives expecting a “Slightly important” impact on firm performance were 
unable to quantify that impact in percentage terms, suggesting that such an impact is hardly 
quantifiable. Furthermore, as we will see below, there is a serious risk that some 
technically successful projects will not be exploited by the firms due to circumstances not 
under their control. Of those 23 firms who believe the alliance was successful (i.e. C1.2 = 4 
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or 5), perhaps no more than 50% will have a significant impact on performance. However, 
several firms were not expecting a significant impact on performance anyway (see D1.9 
scores). 
 
The evidence above does not corroborate the working hypothesis formulated in Chapter 4, 
which stated “Firms whose R&D alliance has achieved technical success are expected to 
exploit the alliance outcomes and have a positive impact on performance.” Technical 
success is important but appears to be insufficient to assure any consequent impact on firm 
performance. Some firms may not want to exploit the alliance outcomes, the circumstances 
may have changed or they may not meet all the necessary conditions to do so. Part of the 
firms will not exploit the alliance outcomes and as so will not have performance 
improvements. 
 
b) To what extent do the initial conditions and the alliance implementation 
process affect the alliance outcomes? 
 
These two aspects had an important influence on the alliance outcomes. In some cases they 
essentially explain the poor results achieved. It is always risky to say that the results would 
be better if some of the circumstances were different, because this would imply new 
challenges and new problems. Even so, from the results of Chapters 5 and 6 one can 
identify several critical factors in the alliance process, which weakened the potential for 
achieving greater benefits, first jointly and then individually. These critical factors are 
presented below according to three dimensions: actors, alliance structures and programme. 
The critical factors concerning the programme are presented in the section on policy 
implications. 
 
Actors. Most firms did not take full advantage of what was on offer, i.e. the possibility of 
having access to research resources at a low cost to set up a project to suit their interests. 
This is explained by the lack of experience in similar projects, lack of a portfolio of 
research projects and relative interest of projects to the firms. Most firms accepted 
participating in projects structured by others with little contribution on their part. They had 
access to structured projects they probably would not have enough competence to structure 
by themselves and avoided the transactions costs of forming a research alliance, but it also 
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impeded them from customising the research projects to entirely suit their needs and 
choose the partners to work with. As a result, for a great deal of Portuguese SMEs the 
alliances they were involved with were strategically neither important nor urgent. By 
setting up their own projects, the Portuguese firms would likely be much more committed 
and have more realistic expectations about the alliance outcomes. Firms would benefit 
from a more energetic participation, however the lack of resources (know-how, people, 
financial) and prior experience are possible explanations for them to accept smaller roles, 
and smaller influence on alliances as well. Since most partners were unknown to the firms 
and there were no preparatory meetings, the game was risky.  
 
The RTD performers were an important part of the whole process of cooperation because 
the technical success of most projects chiefly relied on what they were capable of doing, 
i.e. their technological competence and commitment to the project. The poor commitment 
and professional attitude of some of them eventually jeopardised the alliance outcomes and 
the ability of firms to achieve better benefits. The commitment of partners is widely 
recognised in the literature as an important success factor in alliances and has been 
identified as a major negative factor of cooperation (see Table 6.2 in Chapter 6). 
 
Alliance structure. Joining together firms and RTD performers is, in principle, 
advantageous for SMEs because they get access to RTD performers’ technological 
resources. However, when there is a clear divide between technology users and technology 
producers, as often happened in the cases under analysis, the power within the alliance 
becomes very unbalanced and the interaction among partners quite poor. This is not 
immediately or necessarily a bad thing in itself if the project is implemented according to 
plan, but when the control over the alliance is too unbalanced the risk of misbehaviour is 
high. Poor interaction among alliance partners can hardly capture their potential 
contribution to the project and, as a result, the alliance outcomes tend not to reflect the 
joint capability. This affected an important part of the alliances. On average, the R&D 
alliances had a relatively high number of partners. This is justifiable if the contribution of 
each partner is important for the common undertaking, but a higher number of partners 
increases the transaction costs and the coordination problems. The executives did not 
consider the number of partners to be an important negative factor, but there are elements, 
such as the irrelevant contribution of some partners, suggesting the opposite. 
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c) Does satisfaction with the alliance imply better firm performance? 
 
We have seen that attaining the alliance objectives is not sufficient to cause better firm 
performance. The satisfaction with the alliance, i.e. the individual assessment of alliance 
success, is more than the degree to which the alliance has achieved its objectives. It 
includes also the benefits achieved individually, planned or not. For some firms, however, 
only the latter appears to matter. Because a large majority of firms were expecting an effect 
on performance and about two-thirds of them were satisfied with the alliance (see, for 
instance, Figure 7.4), the above question is quite important. And even more since previous 
research has not addressed the question. 
 
In Chapter 7, we concluded that the alliance success, measured by the degree of firm’s 
satisfaction, does not imply necessarily better firm performance. One-third of the 
executives were satisfied with the alliance but were not expecting any significant impact on 
performance. Table 9.3 summarises the justifications provided by these executives to 
explain this apparent contradiction. It supports the argument that neither the technical 
success of alliances nor the individual satisfaction with the alliance appear to be sufficient 
conditions to cause a positive effect on firm performance. 
 
Table 9.3 Satisfaction with the alliance but no impact on performance: reasons 
Alliance 
objectives 
Specific conditions impe-
ding economic success 
Individual aspects of 
satisfaction 
Common aspects of 
satisfaction 
Success 
• Dependence on external 
factors (e.g. market 
conditions) 
• Dependence on internal 
factors (e.g. firm size) 
• Small scope of the 
project 
• Technical progress 
Partial success 
• Limited use of the 
results 
• Technology reached its 
limits 
• Progress achieved and 
the new knowledge 
acquired 
• Unplanned benefits 
Unimportant • Not interested in the 
common results 
• Achievement of 
individual objectives 
• Contacts 
• Experience in 
cooperation 
• External image 
• ... 
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
 
Some factors help to explain this apparent contradiction. On the one hand, the majority of 
Portuguese SMEs did not set up the joint research project they were in and only a few of 
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them provided a substantial contribution to it. As mentioned above, the research projects 
were not strategically important to most firms. On the other hand, the costs of participating 
in the alliances were admittedly small, which explain at least partially the first point. 
Additionally, technology-based cooperation with international firms and RTD performers 
was essentially new to most of the Portuguese SMEs and, therefore, an excellent 
opportunity to learn from partners and get experience in cooperation. These factors 
certainly help towards explaining why one-third of the executives were satisfied with the 
alliance but were expecting a marginal impact on performance. Further research is needed. 
 
d) To what extent can firms turn technology alliances into firm performance? 
What are the factors behind the unsuccessful exploitation of alliance 
outcomes? 
 
Achieving technical success is an important step in any R&D alliance. In most cases, 
however, the transformation of alliance outcomes into firm performance is not an 
automatic process and involves the risk of failure, i.e. the technical success of alliances 
does not imply that (all) firms will have the capability to materialise the potential benefits 
generated together into performance. Depending on the specific characteristics of each 
project, the post-alliance period may involve a great deal of collaboration between former 
partners. Some R&D projects end naturally at the end of the research period, others have 
further requirements, such as scaling up prototypes, building facilities or financial 
resources. Firms cannot always meet such requirements or guarantee factors not under their 
control. 
 
Taking into consideration the situation of the firms who classified the alliance as 
technically successful, Figure 9.1 lists the internal and external factors which can explain 
the unsuccessful exploitation of alliance outcomes. As we have seen in Table 7.5 (Chapter 
7), these factors can be classified according to the firm’s prospect of attaining economic 
benefits and each firm can be affected by one or more factors. Each factor described in 
Figure 9.1 has the potential to increase the costs, diminish the advantages and, more 
importantly, cause failure (i.e. no exploitation of alliance outcomes), but its level of risk 
varies according to the firm’s and project’s characteristics. We are not able to compare the 
relative importance of each factor or quantify how many firms ended up not exploiting the 
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alliance outcomes, but we can say that at least four firms failed to exploit the alliance 
outcomes at this stage due to internal and/or external factors. Another three firms said 
explicitly that the exploitation of alliance outcomes was dependent upon the cost of the 
novel equipment, which has yet to be produced. 
 
Figure 9.1 Factors behind the unsuccessful exploitation of alliance outcomes 
    
Internal factors   External factors 
• Firm’s small size (when the new technology 
involves economies of scale); 
• Financial capability (to acquire the new 
technology, make changes in the production 
process, built a new plant or protect the 
knowledge);  
• Cost-effectiveness of the new technology 
(which is dependent on both the market size 
for this new technology and the relative 
advantages for the firm); 
• Firm’s lack of interest in exploiting the 
alliance outcomes (either decided initially or 
in the course of the relationship); 
• Research outcomes smaller than expected. 
  • Unsuitable market conditions (to launch the 
new product); 
• Dependence on a third party, frequently a 
partner (to produce the novel equipment, 
system or industrial product); 
• Dependence on a third party to implement the 
new technology. 
    
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
 
The results clearly indicate that the process of exploiting the alliance outcomes is not 
automatic and may involve a considerable risk of failure. This is particularly relevant in 
those cases which involve post-alliance activities requiring the participation of others (for 
instance, former partners), demand a considerable amount of resources, or depend on the 
market conditions. 
 
9.3 POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
The subject matter of this thesis is analysed primarily from the firm’s viewpoint. However, 
the empirical study involves R&D alliances sponsored by the European Union and, 
therefore, the research findings have implications at the policy level. This section addresses 
the issue of government policy at two different levels. First, in line with the firm’s 
perspective, it focuses on the structural aspects of the CRAFT programme that somewhat 
affected the achievement of better results. Second, it attempts to understand the 
effectiveness of EU policy on cooperation by assessing the extent to which the CRAFT 
programme’s objectives were achieved. 
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9.3.1 Structural aspects of CRAFT alliances 
 
The CRAFT programme allowed many SMEs to participate in R&D joint projects in which 
they would otherwise not have done (see Chapter 5). Generally, the size of projects 
demanded resources (financial, human, facilities) and competencies that firms alone were 
not capable to provide. Eventually, the EU funding turned many infeasible projects, if 
carried out autonomously by firms, into cost-effective alliances. 
 
The characteristics of the EU-sponsored CRAFT alliances influenced the structure of the 
projects, implementation conditions and the ability of firms to exploit the outcomes. Some 
important aspects come out in the course of this research. First, the CRAFT programme has 
characteristics resembling the old linear model of development and diffusion of 
technology. That is not apparent in the structure and objectives of the programme, but the 
implicit model (i.e. the model in which the R&D alliances actually take place) provide 
evidence that points in the direction of the linear model, such as the divide between 
different types of partners, the stream of knowledge that is mainly (sometimes totally) 
unidirectional, from the technology producers to the technology users, and the lack of de 
facto (genuine) interaction between all the alliance partners. Such a divide between 
technology users and technology producers does not stimulate convincingly the interaction 
among all the partners and, as a consequence, tends not to take advantage of their joint 
potential. 
 
Second, contrary to the general opinion of the executives, the number of alliance partners 
appears to be an important variable. From the EU perspective, larger alliances have the 
potential to be more effective in the sense that a larger number of firms have access to the 
new technology. It also reduces the bureaucratic costs of analysing the applications (fewer 
projects). However, unless essential to the project, a higher number of partners implies 
greater costs and coordination problems for alliance partners, with no apparent advantages 
for firms. For a large alliance under CRAFT, involving partners from several countries, to 
be manageable, partners need very defined roles, but to the detriment of stronger 
interaction among them. The fact that most firms had no experience in inter-firm 
cooperation, especially in R&D projects, created additional problems for SMEs.   
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Third, some RTD performers were not strongly and professionally committed to the project 
during its implementation, which naturally deteriorated the relationship between the 
alliance partners and affected negatively the alliance outcomes. Some firms felt powerless 
to deal with such situations. 
 
Fourth, unlike the research investment, which is subsidised, the post-alliance investment 
necessary for firms to reap the benefits is important and often represents a significant 
constraint. The low cost of participation in an international joint research project attracts 
SMEs and often relaxes their demands, but it may also represent a pitfall because they may 
not have adequate financial capability to exploit the alliance outcomes. 
 
9.3.2 Policy assessment 
 
This study was not designed to understand to any extensive degree the extent to which the 
policy objectives have been met. That line of investigation would certainly complement 
this work, allowing a more detailed understanding of the outcomes of the CRAFT model of 
partnering. Despite the limitations of this study, its findings are nevertheless relevant and 
shed some light on the effectiveness of the EU policy on cooperation. However, any 
attempt to understand the effectiveness of EU policy on cooperation by analysing the extent 
to which its objectives have been met has the potential to be a rather subjective exercise, 
since the policy objectives are identified but not quantified, either in scope or in time. 
 
The specific objectives of the CRAFT programme were three. First, “to promote the 
development of technologies adapted to the needs of SMEs.” Essentially, all the projects 
analysed satisfied this objective to a certain degree; all of them involved the development 
of technologies adapted to the needs of SMEs, although with varying degrees of novelty 
and complexity. Second, “to promote transnational networking and cooperation amongst 
SMEs, and between SMEs, research organisations and large companies.” This objective 
can be best assessed in the future, but one can identify two somewhat contradictory signs 
already. On the one hand, the low level of interaction between alliance partners and the fact 
that less than 30% of firms seem to have developed a network for exchanging technical 
information (most of these firms knew each other before this project) indicate a rather 
limited success in achieving this objective. On the other hand, a large proportion of firms 
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are interested in taking part in future alliances, with or without EU funding, and many of 
them believe they have found new ways of having access to technical information, 
suggesting a more positive effect on networking and cooperation. Only in the future will it 
be possible to assess how these networks evolved, in and out of the context of EU-
sponsored RTD programmes. 
 
Third, “to support SMEs in their efforts to strengthen their capability to absorb and to 
contribute to the development of the technologies they require.” This is, perhaps, the most 
ambitious and important objective, but also the least likely to attain a satisfactory result. It 
implicitly assumes that SMEs have a given level of absorptive capacity (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1989, 1990), that is, the ability to identify, assimilate and exploit knowledge 
from the environment. This assumption may not be adequate. Indeed, Rothwell and 
Dodgson (1991) and Rothwell (1991) argue that SMEs often lack important resources, 
such as qualified technical specialists, that influence their ability to assimilate and further 
develop externally acquired technology. Exposure to external sources of information and 
knowledge needs to be accompanied by the firm’s internal ability to absorb such 
information and knowledge (Soo et al., 1999: 15). A large proportion of the firms analysed 
here do not perform formal in-house R&D and most of the technology they utilise is 
externally produced, thus affecting their absorptive capacity. Quintas and Guy (1995: 346) 
conclude, “Programmes which aim to improve competitive performance through 
technological innovation derived from investment in R&D need to tackle the 
organisational, social and economic and institutional issues which condition the wider 
innovation process.” It would be an exaggeration to affirm that the firms’ ability to 
assimilate and exploit knowledge has changed significantly due to their participation in the 
CRAFT alliances. 
 
Taking into consideration both the financial and technological capability of firms to carry 
out the projects, only a very small number of them could have done them alone (see 
Chapter 5). About 55% of the executives affirmed that the expected benefits from the 
project would not justify its costs if accomplished autonomously, and many have admitted 
they would not participate in the joint project had the EU not financially supported it. From 
an economic point of view, it appears that more than 50% of the projects were not feasible 
and would be rejected even if implemented cooperatively. One can say, therefore, that the 
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EU funding turned many unfeasible projects into cost-effective ones. It allowed the 
implementation of joint projects that would be dropped otherwise.  
 
How strategic were the projects to the Portuguese SMEs? Using the urgency and 
importance indicators as a proxy to assess the strategic nature of projects, projects were 
urgent and very important to less than 30% of the interviewees. Projects were important to 
45% of the executives but not urgent to about 60% of them. A significant number of firms 
did not regard the project as strategic for the business, but it was worth participating 
because, with the EU financial support, the expected benefits would justify the investment. 
It is not possible to give an exact account of the benefits achieved by firms, for instance, 
how much have firms learned and how useful will such knowledge be. The findings show, 
however, that more than 60% of the firms do not expect a significant impact on the 
performance indicators. 
 
The results are not spectacular but they are likely to reflect the consequences of 
inexperienced SMEs lacking appropriate in-house technological resources who decided to 
respond to the EU “inducement” to perform cooperative research with international 
partners. The evidence provided is insufficient to assess the extent to which the EU 
intervention in the innovation process is necessary, relevant or appropriate, partly because, 
ultimately, the decision is political.90 It is, however, a small contribution to understanding 
the performance of EU policy on collaborative R&D.  
 
9.4 GENERALISABILITY OF RESULTS 
 
The findings of this thesis are important to understand the alliance-performance link and 
the difficulties firms may experience in exploiting the alliance outcomes. However, the 
unique characteristics of the sample raise the question of the generalisability of the 
conclusions. To what extent are the conclusions context-bounded? Several factors were 
identified in Chapter 4 which could affect the broad generalisation of the results. 
Concerning the alliance context, it is not possible to assess the extent to which the results 
were affected because these were “government-sponsored” alliances, but we can say that 
                                                 
90
 For further information on the assessment of the EU cooperative research policy see, for instance, the 
special issue of Research Policy (Vol. 27, No. 6, 1998) on EU Research Funding Policy. 
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not all projects were considered of marginal importance, as Sciberras (1987) suggested, and 
some of them will have a significant impact on performance. SMEs did not use the CRAFT 
programme to implement “second rate” research projects because, as seen in Chapter 6, the 
vast majority of them do not perform formal R&D and did not have a portfolio of projects 
to choose from. The fact that about 50% of the projects were economically unfeasible and 
would not be implemented if not financially supported by the EU suggests that the 
conclusions might not hold in the context of “market-driven” R&D alliances. 
 
In relation to the characteristics of firms, although one cannot link the structural 
characteristics of the Portuguese industry with the impact on firm performance because 
only Portuguese firms were analysed, it was apparent that not having the appropriate 
research resources affected the absorptive capacity of firms and lacking adequate financial 
resources affected the exploitation of the alliance outcomes. As regards the alliance type, 
the findings are clearly insufficient for a broad generalisation to all types of inter-firm 
alliances and all types of partner firms, given the specific characteristics of the analysed 
sample.  
 
The findings of the thesis are primarily relevant to joint research projects structured in 
similar settings, but this assertion might be excessively prudent. Further research is needed 
to ascertain if they have a broader generalisation.  
 
9.5 FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
The thesis addressed an issue eminently relevant in the present competitive context of 
firms, particularly small and medium-sized firms. We are now better informed about the 
performance consequences that firms can achieve by participating in EU-sponsored 
technology-based alliances. The specificities and limitations of the study delimited the 
strength of its conclusions but stimulated the discussion and created excellent research 
opportunities. It is important to examine the alliance-performance link in other contexts, 
both government-sponsored and “market-driven” research alliances, and improve the 
methodological approach to collect the detailed data necessary to analyse the issue in 
greater detail. It is also important to understanding better the role of SMEs in international 
R&D alliances, particularly when they lack adequate research resources for the research 
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activities and to assimilate the alliance outcomes. 
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Appendix 
1 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
 
 
A  INITIAL IMPORTANCE OF THE PROJECT 
 
A1 Which of the following statements best describes the initial strategic importance of the 
 
project? 
 [Please tick () the appropriate alternative] 
 
 A1.1 The project was mainly seen as a way of getting experience in interfirm cooperation 
 
 
 A1.2 The project aimed at launching a major new line of business 
 
 
 A1.3 The project aimed at launching a subsidiary line of business (e.g. reusing a by-product) 
 
 
 A1.4 The project was to strengthen the firm’s existing core products/services 
 
 
 A1.5 The project aimed at preventing/diminishing environmental damages 
 
 
A2 At the beginning, how important was the project for your firm? 
[Please tick () the appropriate alternative] 
 
 A2.1 Marginal importance 
 
 
 A2.2 Moderately important 
 
 
 A2.3 Very important 
 
 
 A2.4 Fundamental for the firm survival 
 
 
 A2.5 Other (please specify): ________________________________________________________________
 
A3 How strong was the sense of urgency of this project? Was it an one-off project or was it part  
 
of a long-term strategy? 
 
A4 How do you classify the project’s main goal? 
[Please tick () the appropriate alternative] 
 
 A4.1 To develop a new marketable product/service 
 
 
 A4.2 To improve the features of an existing product/service 
 
 
 A4.3 To develop a new production technology 
 
 
 A4.4 To improve an existing production technology 
 
 
 A4.5 To adapt an existing production technology from other sector(s) 
 
 
 A4.6 Other (please specify): ________________________________________________________________
 
A5 Did this project intend to place your firm in a position ahead of competition? 
 
 
 A1.6 Other (please specify): ________________________________________________________________
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A6 Which of the following alternative strategies could have been used instead of cooperation? 
[Please tick () the appropriate alternatives] 
 
 A6.1 Go it alone (solely using internal resources) 
 
 
 A6.2 Go it alone (in cooperation with R&D performers) 
 
 
 A6.3 Market transaction (e.g. licensing agreement) 
 
 
 A6.4 Merging with other firm 
 
 
 A6.5 Acquiring other firm 
 
 
 A6.6 Other (please specify): ________________________________________________________________
 
A7 How far do you agree with the following statements concerning the option to cooperate  
 
instead of using an alternative strategy? 
[1- Strongly disagree; 2- Disagree; 3- Neutral; 4- Agree; 5- Strongly agree] 
A7.1 The costs of the project were too high for the firm to carry it out alone................................ 1  2  3  4  5 
 
A7.2 Lack of in-house expertise to carry out the project alone ................................................................ 1  2  3  4  5 
 
A7.3 We were expecting to get benefits that go beyond the scope of the project ................................ 1  2  3  4  5 
 
A7.4 The expected benefits would not justify the costs if carrying out the project alone ................................ 1  2  3  4  5 
 
A7.5 The kind of technological solution we were looking for was not available in the 
marketplace ................................................................................................................................
 1  2  3  4  5 
 
A7.6 The risk of failure was too high if carrying out the project alone ................................................................ 1  2  3  4  5 
 
A7.7 We were seeking to learn from our partner firms and R&D performer(s) ................................ 1  2  3  4  5 
 
A7.8 An independent strategy would have taken too much time................................................................ 1  2  3  4  5 
 
A7.9 The scale of the project would not justify a merger or acquisition strategy................................ 1  2  3  4  5 
 
B  STRUCTURAL FACTORS 
 
B1 At the beginning of the project what was the firm's experience on interfirm cooperation? 
[Please tick () the appropriate alternative] 
 
 B1.1 This was the very first time we entered a research cooperative project 
 
 
 B1.2 We do not have much experience (less than three times) 
 
 
 B1.3 We have experience (three or more times) 
 
B2 Did you know some/all of your partners prior to this project? 
[Please tick () the appropriate alternative] 
 
 B2.1 No, we did not know any of them 
 
 
 B2.2 Yes, all of us worked together in a similar cooperative project before 
 
 
 B2.3 Yes, some of us worked together in a similar cooperative project before 
 
 
 B2.4 Yes, we already had commercial relationships with some/all of them 
 
 
 B2.5 Yes, we knew some/all of them but had no commercial relationships before 
 
 
 B2.6 Other (please specify): ________________________________________________________________
 
B3 What kind of participation did your firm have during the preparation and negotiation of the  
 
project? 
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B4 Did the partner firms sign a formal contract prior to the relationship? How important was it  
 
in the whole process of cooperation? 
 
B5 Did the partner firms agree on intellectual property rights before the beginning of the project? 
 
B6 Please describe the type and frequency of interactions (e.g. meetings, visits) between partner  
 
firms and between them and R&D performers? 
 
B7 How important were the following factors in negatively influencing or in limiting the  
 
expected outcomes of the alliance? 
[1- Irrelevant; 2- Slightly import.; 3- Moderately import.; 4- Very import.; 5- Extremely important] 
B7.1 Language/communication problems ................................................................................................ 1  2  3  4  5 
 
B7.2 Number of interactions between the partner firms and R&D performers ( too 
many?,  too few?)................................................................................................................................
 1  2  3  4  5 
 
B7.3 Quality of interactions between the partner firms and R&D performers ................................ 1  2  3  4  5 
 
B7.4 Cultural differences among the partner firms ................................................................ 1  2  3  4  5 
 
B7.5 Difference in size between the partner firms ................................................................................................ 1  2  3  4  5 
 
B7.6 Lack of willingness of partner firms to share know-how................................................................ 1  2  3  4  5 
 
B7.7 Number of alliance partners ( too many?,  too few?)................................................................ 1  2  3  4  5 
 
B7.8 Written contract among the partner firms ( existence?,  non-existence?) ................................ 1  2  3  4  5 
 
B7.9 Prior agreement on intellectual property rights ( existence?,  too weak/ non-
existence?) ................................................................................................................................
 1  2  3  4  5 
 
B7.10 Technological complexity of the project ................................................................................................ 1  2  3  4  5 
 
B7.11 Lack of in-house technological expertise to exploit the project outcomes................................ 1  2  3  4  5 
 
B7.12 Lack of or scarce financial resources to exploit the project outcomes................................ 1  2  3  4  5 
 
B7.13 Lack of or scarce management time................................................................................................ 1  2  3  4  5 
 
B7.14 Lack of experience in similar projects ................................................................................................ 1  2  3  4  5 
 
B7.15 Different expectations/conflicts of interest amongst the partner firms (and/or R&D 
performers) ................................................................................................................................
 1  2  3  4  5 
 
B7.16 Lack of commitment or delay in accomplishing tasks by partner firms (and/or R&D 
performers) ................................................................................................................................
 1  2  3  4  5 
 
B7.17 Miscalculation of the risk involved in the project................................................................ 1  2  3  4  5 
 
B7.18 Inflexibility of the objectives of the research project................................................................ 1  2  3  4  5 
 
B7.19 Lack of expertise of the R&D performer(s) to carry out the research project................................ 1  2  3  4  5 
 
B7.20 Too much optimism at the beginning................................................................................................ 1  2  3  4  5 
 
B7.21 Dependence on the European Union (e.g. funding, regulations) ................................................................ 1  2  3  4  5 
 
B7.22 Other (please specify):________________________________________________________________ 1  2  3  4  5 
 
C  DETERMINANTS OF PERFORMANCE 
 
C1 In assessing the performance of the alliance, how far do you agree with the following  
 
statements? 
[1- Strongly disagree; 2- Disagree; 3- Neutral; 4- Agree; 5- Strongly agree] 
C1.1 Overall we are satisfied with the performance of this alliance ................................................................ 1  2  3  4  5 
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C1.2 The alliance has realised the goals we set out to achieve ................................................................ 1  2  3  4  5 
 
C1.3 Now we have a competitive advantage over our direct competitors................................ 1  2  3  4  5 
 
C1.4 This project has/will have a positive impact on the firm performance ................................ 1  2  3  4  5 
 
The firm will certainly use interfirm cooperation on a more regular basis:           
 
    - C1.5 if European Union funding is available ................................................................................................ 1  2  3  4  5 
 
    - C1.6 even without European Union funding................................................................................................ 1  2  3  4  5 
 
C2 Which of the following possible benefits has your firm achieved as a result of alliance  
 
participation and how important do you believe they are to the firm’s (future) performance? 
[0- Tick this option if it does not apply to your firm; 1- Irrelevant; 2- Slightly important; 3- 
Moderately important; 4- Very important; 5- Extremely important] 
DIRECT BENEFITS FOR THE FIRM (Those benefits that are directly related to the project goals) 
 
0 
 C2.1 Developed or improved a product/service (or a prototype) ................................................................ 1  2  3  4  5 
 
0 
 C2.2 Developed or improved a production process................................................................ 1  2  3  4  5 
 
0 
 C2.3 Learned about/had access to the partner firms' technology................................................................ 1  2  3  4  5 
 
0 
 C2.4 Learned about/had access to the R&D performers’ technology................................ 1  2  3  4  5 
 
0  C2.5 A patent was granted to the partner firms (or an application for a patent has been 
submitted) ................................................................................................................................
 1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
0 
 C2.6 Specific technical training was (has been) given to employees................................ 1  2  3  4  5 
 
0 
 C2.7 Hired qualified personnel................................................................................................ 1  2  3  4  5 
 
0 
 C2.8 Gained experience in interfirm cooperation................................................................ 1  2  3  4  5 
 
0 
 C2.9 Benefited from temporary personnel exchanges between partner firms................................ 1  2  3  4  5 
 
0 
 C2.10 Acquired new machinery that incorporate new technology................................................................ 1  2  3  4  5 
 
0 
 C2.11 Acquired other equipment that incorporate new technology................................................................ 1  2  3  4  5 
 
0 
 C2.12 Improved /built a new plant/facilities................................................................................................ 1  2  3  4  5 
 
0 
 C2.13 Created or improved the R&D department (e.g. new equipment, more staff) ................................ 1  2  3  4  5 
 
0 
 C2.14 Other (please specify): ________________________________________________________________ 1  2  3  4  5 
 
INDIRECT BENEFITS FOR THE FIRM (Those benefits that go beyond the project goals) 
 
0  C2.15 Obtained new ideas from partner firms to improve existing products/production processes ................................................................................................................................
 1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
0  C2.16 Obtained new ideas from R&D performers to improve existing products/production processes ................................................................................................
 1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
0 
 C2.17 Had access to new techniques and skills (other than those related to the project) ................................ 1  2  3  4  5 
 
0 
 C2.18 Became a supplier of partner firms ................................................................................................ 1  2  3  4  5 
 
0 
 C2.19 Became a customer of partner firms................................................................................................ 1  2  3  4  5 
 
0 
 C2.20 The firm is applying the knowledge acquired in other products/services................................ 1  2  3  4  5 
 
0 
 C2.21 Improved firm's image/reputation/credibility ................................................................ 1  2  3  4  5 
 
0 
 C2.22 Improved firm's visibility/exposure (e.g. publicity) ................................................................ 1  2  3  4  5 
 
0 
 C2.23 Got experience on how to prepare and implement a (joint) research project ................................ 1  2  3  4  5 
 
0  C2.24 The firm is using the knowledge/experience gained to develop other research projects................................................................................................................................
 1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
0 
 C2.25 Improved management skills/practices ................................................................................................ 1  2  3  4  5 
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0 
 C2.26 Received proposals for new joint projects from national firms................................ 1  2  3  4  5 
 
0 
 C2.27 Received proposals for new joint projects from foreign firms ................................ 1  2  3  4  5 
 
0 
 C2.28 Learned about an unfamiliar market/customer needs ................................................................ 1  2  3  4  5 
 
0 
 C2.29 Developed a formal/informal network to exchange technical information................................ 1  2  3  4  5 
 
0 
 C2.30 Found new ways of having access to technical information................................................................ 1  2  3  4  5 
 
0 
 C2.31 Improved the knowledge about competitors ................................................................ 1  2  3  4  5 
 
0 
 C2.32 Other (please specify): ________________________________________________________________ 1  2  3  4  5 
 
C3 How far can one say the benefits your firm achieved exceeded initial expectations? Did your  
 
firm implement any specific measures to reap the available benefits and learn from partners? 
 
C4 In your opinion, which direct or indirect benefits would you consider as the most important  
 
to your firm? Why? 
 
C5 Considering the whole investment in this project - preparation and negotiation,  
 
implementation and exploitation of results -, how important to your firm were the following 
categories of costs directly arising out of the project? 
[1- Irrelevant; 2- Slightly import.; 3- Moderately import.; 4- Very import.; 5- Extremely important] 
C5.1 Personnel costs ................................................................................................................................ 1  2  3  4  5 
 
C5.2 Training costs ................................................................................................................................ 1  2  3  4  5 
 
C5.3 Travel and subsistence costs................................................................................................ 1  2  3  4  5 
 
C5.4 Subcontracting costs (e.g. consultancy)................................................................................................ 1  2  3  4  5 
 
C5.5 Acquisition of durable equipment................................................................................................ 1  2  3  4  5 
 
C5.6 Acquisition of consumables................................................................................................ 1  2  3  4  5 
 
C5.7 Computing costs ................................................................................................................................ 1  2  3  4  5 
 
C5.8 Costs of protecting knowledge (e.g. patenting) ................................................................ 1  2  3  4  5 
 
C5.9 Administration/management costs ................................................................................................ 1  2  3  4  5 
 
C5.10 Other specific project costs................................................................................................ 1  2  3  4  5 
 
C6 What type(s) of costs was/were the most difficult for your firm to cope with? Why? 
 
C7 Did your firm implement any specific procedures for measuring the project’s costs and  
 
benefits? 
 
C8 To what extent did the resources (financial, personnel and technological) devoted to this  
 
project impede or postpone the implementation of other projects? Did it affect in any way the 
normal functioning of your firm? 
 
C9 Did the difference in size, the nationality or the role of each partner in the partnership (e.g.  
 
being a prime proposer or not) influence the partners’ ability to capture the benefits from the 
alliance? 
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D  INDICATORS OF PERFORMANCE 
 
D1 At the beginning of the project, how important was its expected impact on each of the  
 
following performance indicators? And, what is the real impact the firm has experienced? 
[1- Irrelevant; 2- Slightly important; 3- Moderately important; 4- Very important; 5- Extremely important] 
  Expected impact 
 
Real impact 
 
D1.1 Productivity (increase)................................................................ 1  2  3  4  5 D1.10 1  2  3  4  5 
 
D1.2 Production costs (decrease) ................................................................ 1  2  3  4  5 D1.11 1  2  3  4  5 
 
D1.3 Sales (increase)................................................................................................ 1  2  3  4  5 D1.12 1  2  3  4  5 
 
D1.4 Profit (increase) ................................................................  1  2  3  4  5 D1.13 1  2  3  4  5 
 
D1.5 Product/Service quality (improve)................................................................ 1  2  3  4  5 D1.14 1  2  3  4  5 
 
D1.6 Customer satisfaction (improve)................................................................ 1  2  3  4  5 D1.15 1  2  3  4  5 
 
D1.7 Market share (increase) ................................................................ 1  2  3  4  5 D1.16 1  2  3  4  5 
 
D1.8 Environmental damages (reduction) ................................................................ 1  2  3  4  5 D1.17 1  2  3  4  5 
 
D1.9 Overall impact ................................................................................................ 1  2  3  4  5 D1.18 1  2  3  4  5 
 
D2 How do you explain the difference between the expected results and the real impact on  
 
performance indicators? 
 
D3 If possible, would you please provide an approximate figure for the real impact on some or  
 
all of those indicators? 
 
D3.1 Productivity ................................................................................................................................ ______ % of increase 
 
D3.2 Production costs ................................................................................................ ______ % of decrease 
 
D3.3 Sales ................................................................................................................................ ______ % of increase 
 
D3.4 Profit................................................................................................................................ ______ % of increase 
 
D3.5 Product/Service quality................................................................................................ ______ % of improvement 
 
D3.6 Customer satisfaction................................................................................................ ______ % of improvement 
 
D3.7 Market share ................................................................................................................................ ______ % of increase 
 
D3.8 Environmental damages................................................................................................ ______ % of reduction 
 
D3.9 Overall impact ................................................................................................................................ ______ % of improvement 
 
E  OTHER INFORMATION  
 
E1  Firm’s CAE (sector of activity): _______________ 
 
E2  Firm’s turnover:    1998: ______________ PTE     or      1999: ______________ PTE 
 
E3  Firm’s number of employees:    1999: ______________  
 
E4  Interviewee’s name: ______________________ Position: _____________________ 
 
E5  Number of partner firms: _______________ 
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 Table A2.1 Previous studies on alliance performance - research methods and technical data 
Reference Alliance type/ Sample size/Period  
Sector/ Firm size/ 
Country (Region) Indicators Data collection method 
Tomlinson 
(1970) 
- Joint Venture 
- n = 71 
- Oil, chemicals, engineering, electrical, 
vehicles, metals, tobacco and food; 
- Mainly large firms;  
- UK, India, Pakistan;  
- Profitability;  
- Performance against scheduled objectives (market, 
cost, international integration, other) 
- Archival data; 
- Interviews; 
Franko (1971) - Joint venture  
- n = 1100; 
- 1961-67; 
- Manufacturing firms;  
- Large firms 
- JV instability (instability of its ownership); 
- Duration;  
- Survival; 
- 1967 Fortune 500 list;  
- Questionnaire; 
- Interviews; 
Killing (1983) - Joint venture 
- n = 37 
- North American, Western Europe, developing 
countries (2); 
- Performance: JV manager's own assessment; 
- Failure: JV liquidation or reorganisation; 
- Interviews; 
 
Harrigan (1988)* - Strategic alliance 
- n = 895; 
- 1974-85; 
- 23 industries; - Venture performance: venture survival, duration; -  
Sponsor-indicated assessments of success  
- Archival data;  
- Interviews,  
- Questionnaire; 
Bleeke &Ernst 
(1989)** 
- Cross-border alliances 
- n = 49; 
- Some industries; 
- Large firms; 
- Success and failure: the achievement of partner's 
objectives and partners recovering their financial costs 
of capital; 
- Unpublished financial results; 
- Interviews; 
Kogut (1989) - Joint venture 
- n = 92; 
- 1975-83; 
- Manufacturing; 
- US-based; 
- JV instability;  
- Termination rates: ventures dissolved or acquired; 
- Information published on the 
Mergers and Acquisitions  
- 3 Questionnaires; 
Geringer & 
Hebert (1991) 
 
 
- International joint venture 
- n = 69 + 48 (US, Canada);  
- 1979-85 (US), 1981-88 
(Canada); 
- Manufacturing; 
- Large firms;  
- US, Canada, other OECD countries; 
 
- Subjective performance measures: parents' 
satisfaction; 
- Objective performance measures: IJV survival, 
stability and duration 
- Secondary sources; 
- Questionnaires; 
- Interviews; 
Chowdhury 
(1992) 
- International joint venture 
- n = 8741 units; 
- 1951-75; 
- Manufacturing subsidiaries; 
- Mainly large firms; 
- Dependent variable: mode of entry 
- Indep. variable: performance criteria (exit rate, 
longevity, stability of ownership status, retention of 
parental control, export sales, factor usage) 
- Harvard Multinational Enterprise 
project; 
 
Parkhe (1993) - Strategic alliance (dyadic) 
- n = 111 partners; 
- 1983-88; 
- Chemicals, machinery, electric and electronic 
equipment, transport equipment; 
- At least with one US partner;  
- Performance assessed through a number of objective 
and subjective measures; 
 
- Funk and Scott's Index of 
corporate change;  
- Questionnaire; 
Dussauge & 
Garrette (1995) 
- Strategic alliance 
- n = 30; 
- 1950-90; 
- Aerospace and defence industry; 
- Large firms; 
- Many developed countries; 
- Subjective judgement: industry analysts + company 
executives; 
- Success: technical quality, economic success 
(commercial success + financial results) 
- Archival data; 
- Questionnaire; 
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 Table A2.1 (Cont.) 
Reference Alliance type/ Sample size/Period  
Sector/ Firm size/ 
Country (Region) Indicators Data collection method 
Yuan & Wang 
(1995) 
 
 
 
- International strategic alliance  
- n = 27 firms 
- High-technology firms;   
- Located in the Hsinchu Industrial Park - 
Taiwan 
- Effectiveness: firm's subjective judgement of the 
achievement of the objectives. 
- Influential factors: company’s basic attributes, 
operational environment, alliance attributes, bilateral 
interaction; company’s attitude; relative capability; 
- Questionnaire; 
Park & Russo 
(1996) 
- Joint venture 
- n = 204; 
- 1979-88; 
- Electronics industry;  
- At least one US-based firm; 
- Duration; 
- Failure; 
- Archival data; 
- Telephone enquiries; 
 
Dussauge & 
Garrette (1997) 
- Strategic alliance 
- n = 197 (between competitors) 
- Manufacturing 
- Large firms 
 
- Outcomes of alliances - three dimensions: its 
evolution over time, the strategic consequences for each 
partner; its impact on the intensity of competition  
- Secondary sources; 
- Firm contacts; 
Reuer (1997) 
 
- International joint venture 
- n = 272; 
- 1985-95; 
- Large firms; 
- Dyadic IJV with at least one US partner; 
- IJVs instability: termination rates; -  Announcements in the Lexis-
Nexis or Predicast's Funk and 
Scott Index databases; 
Saxton (1997) - Alliance (dyadic)  
- n = 98 partner contacts 
- Chemicals and allied products;  
- Canada, US, UK, Germany, France, Japan, 
Malaysia, India; 
- Dependent variable: alliance outcomes;  
- Indep. variables: reputation; similarity between the 
partners; prior relationships 
- Questionnaire; 
Glaister & 
Buckley (1998) 
- International alliances 
- n = 75 UK partners; 
- 1980-89; 
- Manufacturing; Tertiary sector; 
- Large firms;  
- Western Europe, US, Japan; 
- Measures of performance: subjective level of 
satisfaction, Objective measures (survival, stability, 
duration); 
- Announcements in the Financial 
Times; 
- Questionnaire; 
Notes: (*) This study is based on Harrigan’s previous works. (**) See Bleeke and Ernst (1993a). 
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
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 Table A2.2 Previous studies on firm performance through alliances - research methods and technical data 
Reference Alliance type/ Sample size/Period  
Sector/ Firm size/ 
Country (Region) Indicators Data collection method 
Berg et al. (1982) - Joint venture 
 
- Chemical industry - After-tax rate of return on investment;  
McConnell & 
Nantell (1985) 
 
- Joint venture 
- n = 136; 
- 1972-79; 
- Several companies; 
- Large firms; 
- US companies; 
- Common stock returns; 
- JV announcements; 
- Firms listed on the American or 
New York Stock Exchange; 
- Announcements in the Wall 
Street Journal Index; 
Woolridge & 
Snow (1990) 
- Joint venture  
- n = 197; 
- 07/72-12/87; 
- 102 industries; - Investment announcements;  
- Stock prices; 
- Announcements in the Wall 
Street Journal; 
 
Koh & 
Venkatraman 
(1991) 
- Joint venture 
- n = 175; 
- 1972-86; 
- Manufacturing, non-manufacturing; 
- Large and small firms; 
 
- JV Announcements;  
- Stock market reactions; 
 
- Announcements in the Wall 
Street Journal Index; 
 
Beta (1993) - Consortium; 
- n = 50 (176 firms); 
- Large and small firms; 
- Western European countries; 
- Direct and indirect economic effects (mainly 
expressed in terms of sales and cost reductions); 
- Interviews; 
Hagedoorn & 
Schakenraad 
(1994) 
- Strategic  technology partnering  
- n = 397; 
- 1980-87; 
- Manuf. firms: Inf. technologies & electronics, 
mechanical engineering, processing industries; 
- Large firms; 
- Europe, US, Japan; 
Economic performance (avg. share of net income): 
sectoral features, national circumstances, size of firm 
(avg. worldwide employment and turnover), innovative-
ness (patent intensity), intensity of strategic partnering. 
- CATI database – “literature-
based alliance counting”; 
BIE (1995) - Cooperative Business 
Arrangements; 
- (1286 firms); 
- Clothing and footwear, engineering, IT&F, 
scientific and medical, food and beverages; 
- Performance measures (employment levels, turnover, 
profits, productivity, exports); 
- Competitiveness measures (technology, quality, price, 
customer service); 
- Survey; 
- Some interviews; 
Mowery, Oxley 
& Silverman 
(1996) 
- Alliance 
- n = 792; 
- 1985-86; 
- Dyadic alliances at least with one US partner; 
- Large firms; 
- Citation patterns in a firm's patent portfolio: cross-
citation rate  
- Technological capabilities; 
- CATI database; 
- The 1985 edition of Who Owns 
Whom; 
- Micropatent database; 
Rosenfeld (1996) - Networks; - Several sectors; 
- Small firms; 
- US; 
- Benefits; - Interviews; 
- Questionnaires; 
- Archival data; 
Singh & Mitchell 
(1996) 
- Interfirm agreement (no JVs) 
- n = 693; 
- 1961-91; 
- Hospital software systems industry;  
- Large and small firms; 
- US; 
- Performance measure: business survival (i.e., a firm's 
participation in the industry) 
- Archival data;   
- Interviews;  
- Questionnaire; 
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 Table A2.2 (Cont.) 
Reference Alliance type/ Sample size/Period  
Sector/ Firm size/ 
Country (Region) Indicators Data collection method 
Barlow et al. 
(1997) 
- Partnering  
- n = 5; 
- Construction industry;  
- Large and small firms; 
- UK; 
- Benefits and problems; - Interviews; 
Human & Provan 
(1997) 
- Network  
- n = 2 (60+77 firms) 
- Wood products industry; 
- US; 
- Transactional outcomes;  
- Transformational outcomes; 
- Interviews;  
- Questionnaires; 
Singh (1997) - Alliance  
- n = 693 (248 firms); 
- 1961-91; 
- Hospital software systems industry;  
- Large and small firms; 
- US; 
- Performance measure: business survival (i.e., a firm's 
participation in the industry) 
- Archival data;   
- Interviews;  
- Questionnaire; 
Tripsas (1997) 
 
- Informal know-how trading, 
strategic alliances, long-term 
supplier relationships   
- n = 3 firms; 
- 1886-1990; 
- Typesetter industry;  
 
- Firm survival; - Secondary sources;  
- Company archives;   
- Multiple interviews; 
Schmitz (1998) 
 
- Vertical and 
horizontal co-operation;  
- n = 65; 
- Cluster – footwear industry;  
- Small firms;  
- Sinos Valley – Brazil; 
- Performance index; 
- Co-operation index - both indexes constructed based 
on several variables (qualitative information); 
- Archival data;  
- Questionnaire;   
- Interviews; 
Benfratello & 
Sembenelli 
(2000) 
- Research joint ventures; 
- (411 firms); 
- 1992-96; 
- 21 manufacturing sectors; 
- European Union;  
- Labour productivity; 
- Total factor productivity; 
- Price cost margin; 
- EU data-sets; 
- Amadeus database (release 44, 
May 1998); 
Stuart (2000) - Alliances (5 types); 
- 1600 dyadic alliances; 
- 1985-1991; 
- Semiconductor industry; 
- Small and large firms; 
- US, Europe, Japan and other Southeast Asian 
countries; 
- Ex post performance, measured either as a rate of 
innovation or as a rate of sales growth; 
- Dataquest consultancy firm; 
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
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Table A2.3 How far do you agree with the following statements concerning the option to 
cooperate instead of using an alternative strategy? 
Variable 1-Strongly disagree 
2-Disagree 3-Neutral 4-Agree 5-Strongly 
agree 
Missing Total 
A7.1 2 6 3 6 23 3 43 
A7.2 2 2 4 14 19 2 43 
A7.3 1 14 8 15 2 3 43 
A7.4 2 10 5 11 13 2 43 
A7.5 1 3 9 15 12 3 43 
A7.6 2 6 3 15 15 2 43 
A7.7 1 1 7 17 15 2 43 
A7.8 2 3 2 14 19 3 43 
A7.9 0 3 1 9 28 2 43 
Key: See the questionnaire in Appendix 1. 
Source: Interviews (question A7). 
 
Table A2.4 How important were the following factors in negatively influencing or in 
limiting the expected outcomes of the alliance? 
Variable 1-Irrelevant 2-Slightly important 
3-Moderately 
important 
4-Very 
important 
5-Extremely 
important 
Missing Total 
B7.1 25 10 4 2 1 1 43 
B7.2 19 11 6 4 2 1 43 
B7.3 22 8 5 6 1 1 43 
B7.4 27 13 1 0 1 1 43 
B7.5 27 14 1 0 0 1 43 
B7.6 21 10 6 3 2 1 43 
B7.7 27 8 5 2 0 1 43 
B7.8 29 7 4 1 1 1 43 
B7.9 26 9 5 1 1 1 43 
B7.10 16 10 8 7 1 1 43 
B7.11 26 9 5 2 0 1 43 
B7.12 26 7 4 5 0 1 43 
B7.13 20 11 5 6 0 1 43 
B7.14 19 11 6 4 2 1 43 
B7.15 17 12 6 4 3 1 43 
B7.16 13 12 9 4 4 1 43 
B7.17 26 9 6 1 0 1 43 
B7.18 31 9 1 1 0 1 43 
B7.19 26 11 2 1 2 1 43 
B7.20 19 7 11 3 2 1 43 
B7.21 26 11 3 2 0 1 43 
B7.22 0 1 2 5 3 32 43 
Key: See the questionnaire in Appendix 1. 
Source: Interviews (question B7). 
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Figure A2.1 Importance of the negative factors - for firms not satisfied with the 
alliance performance (C1.1 ≤ 3) 
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B7.22   [n=5,s=0.55]
B7.21 [n=15,s=1.03]
B7.20 [n=15,s=1.22]
B7.19 [n=15,s=1.30]
B7.18 [n=15,s=0.83]
B7.17 [n=15,s=1.03]
B7.16 [n=15,s=1.28]
B7.15 [n=15,s=1.22]
B7.14 [n=15,s=1.32]
B7.13 [n=15,s=1.18]
B7.12 [n=15,s=1.19]
B7.11 [n=15,s=0.99]
B7.10 [n=15,s=1.30]
B7.9   [n=15,s=1.06]
B7.8   [n=15,s=1.20]
B7.7   [n=15,s=0.83]
B7.6   [n=15,s=1.28]
B7.5   [n=15,s=0.64]
B7.4   [n=15,s=1.08]
B7.3   [n=15,s=1.35]
B7.2   [n=15,s=1.32]
B7.1   [n=15,s=0.98]
N
e
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tiv
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fa
c
to
rs
Average score
1-Irrelevant 2-Slightly important 3-Moderately important 
4-Very important 5-Extremely important
 
Key: See the questionnaire in Appendix 1. 
Notes: (n) Number of observations. (s) Sample standard deviation. 
Source: Table A2.4 and Table A2.5, both in Appendix 2.  
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Figure A2.2 Importance of the negative factors - alliances that achieved the 
objectives (C1.2 > 3) 
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B7.17 [n=23,s=0.63]
B7.16 [n=23,s=1.22]
B7.15 [n=23,s=0.79]
B7.14 [n=23,s=0.95]
B7.13 [n=23,s=0.94]
B7.12 [n=23,s=0.99]
B7.11 [n=23,s=0.84]
B7.10 [n=23,s=0.98]
B7.9   [n=23,s=0.90]
B7.8   [n=23,s=0.62]
B7.7   [n=23,s=0.94]
B7.6   [n=23,s=0.62]
B7.5   [n=23,s=0.45]
B7.4   [n=23,s=0.45]
B7.3   [n=23,s=0.95]
B7.2   [n=23,s=1.03]
B7.1   [n=23,s=1.10]
N
e
ga
tiv
e
 
fa
c
to
rs
Average score
1-Irrelevant 2-Slightly import. 3-Moderately import. 4-Very import. 5-Extremely import.
 
Key: See the questionnaire in Appendix 1. 
Notes: (n) Number of observations. (s) Sample standard deviation.  
Source: Table A2.4 and Table A2.5, both in Appendix 2. 
 
Table A2.5 In assessing the performance of the alliance, how far do you agree with the 
following statements? 
Variable 1-Strongly disagree 
2-Disagree 3-Neutral 4-Agree 5-Strongly 
agree 
Missing Total 
C1.1 0 7 8 19 8 1 43 
C1.2 3 11 5 12 11 1 43 
C1.3 8 10 6 15 2 2 43 
C1.4 8 7 9 14 4 1 43 
C1.5 1 2 5 28 6 1 43 
C1.6 1 2 10 24 5 1 43 
Key: See the questionnaire in Appendix 1. 
Source: Interviews (question C1). 
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Table A2.6 Which of the following possible benefits has your firm achieved as a result of alliance 
participation and how important do you believe they are to the firm’s (future) performance? 
Variable 0-Did not 
achieve it 
1-Irre-
levant 
2-Slightly 
important 
3-Moderately 
important 
4-Very 
important 
5-Extremely 
important 
Missing Total 
C2.1 21 5 2 6 5 2 2 43 
C2.2 17 3 4 4 9 4 2 43 
C2.3 10 3 8 15 4 1 2 43 
C2.4 11 5 1 15 9 0 2 43 
C2.5 30 0 1 4 4 2 2 43 
C2.6 33 0 1 2 4 1 2 43 
C2.7 40 1 0 0 0 0 2 43 
C2.8 7 3 1 16 12 2 2 43 
C2.9 38 0 0 2 1 0 2 43 
C2.10 30 0 0 1 8 2 2 43 
C2.11 35 0 0 2 4 0 2 43 
C2.12 33 0 0 3 4 1 2 43 
C2.13 32 0 0 4 5 0 2 43 
C2.14 37 0 0 0 3 1 2 43 
D
ire
ct
 
be
n
ef
its
 
C2.15 18 5 4 6 7 1 2 43 
C2.16 27 2 3 5 4 0 2 43 
C2.17 16 1 6 10 6 2 2 43 
C2.18 38 1 1 0 1 0 2 43 
C2.19 38 1 1 1 0 0 2 43 
C2.20 31 3 3 1 3 0 2 43 
C2.21 14 2 4 10 9 2 2 43 
C2.22 22 3 2 8 6 0 2 43 
C2.23 13 5 7 11 5 0 2 43 
C2.24 27 1 3 6 4 0 2 43 
C2.25 31 2 2 4 2 0 2 43 
C2.26 34 2 1 3 1 0 2 43 
C2.27 28 2 1 7 3 0 2 43 
C2.28 26 1 2 7 4 1 2 43 
C2.29 29 1 2 5 4 0 2 43 
C2.30 21 1 1 13 5 0 2 43 
C2.31 29 2 5 3 1 1 2 43 
In
di
re
ct
 
be
n
ef
its
 
C2.32 35 0 1 2 3 0 2 43 
Key: See the questionnaire in Appendix 1. 
Source: Interviews (question C2). 
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Table A2.7 At the beginning of the project, how important was its expected impact on each of the 
following performance indicators? And, what is the real impact the firm has experienced? 
Variable 1-Irrelevant 2-Slightly important 
3-Moderately 
important 
4-Very 
important 
5-Extremely 
important 
Missing Total 
D1.1 19 5 7 6 3 3 43 
D1.2 13 9 7 9 2 3 43 
D1.3 17 5 7 7 5 2 43 
D1.4 10 8 8 9 5 3 43 
D1.5 15 4 10 8 4 2 43 
D1.6 16 2 7 12 4 2 43 
D1.7 19 3 6 10 3 2 43 
D1.8 16 6 10 4 5 2 43 E
x
pe
ct
ed
 
im
pa
ct
 
D1.9 2 8 16 11 4 2 43 
D1.10 23 6 5 3 2 4 43 
D1.11 21 7 6 4 1 4 43 
D1.12 25 6 3 2 4 3 43 
D1.13 19 7 5 4 4 4 43 
D1.14 22 6 7 3 2 3 43 
D1.15 23 5 4 5 3 3 43 
D1.16 26 5 3 4 2 3 43 
D1.17 25 5 6 2 2 3 43 
R
ea
l i
m
pa
ct
 
D1.18 12 15 3 6 4 3 43 
Key: See the questionnaire in Appendix 1. 
Source: Interviews (question D1). 
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Appendix 
3 
STATISTICAL OUTPUTS 
 
 
 
 
RESULTS OF FACTOR ANALYSIS - SPSS 9.0 OUTPUTS 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics
1.6667 1.00406 42
2.0238 1.19935 42
1.9524 1.20876 42
1.4524 .77152 42
1.3810 .53885 42
1.9286 1.17687 42
1.5714 .88739 42
1.5238 .94322 42
1.6190 .96151 42
2.2143 1.20032 42
1.5952 .88509 42
1.7143 1.06578 42
1.9286 1.09082 42
2.0238 1.19935 42
2.1429 1.26050 42
2.3810 1.28694 42
1.5714 .83060 42
1.3333 .65020 42
1.6190 1.03482 42
2.0952 1.20587 42
1.5476 .83235 42
B7.1
B7.2
B7.3
B7.4
B7.5
B7.6
B7.7
B7.8
B7.9
B7.10
B7.11
B7.12
B7.13
B7.14
B7.15
B7.16
B7.17
B7.18
B7.19
B7.20
B7.21
Mean Std. Deviation Analysis N
 
Communalities
1.000 .870
1.000 .800
1.000 .511
1.000 .741
1.000 .737
1.000 .621
1.000 .817
1.000 .783
1.000 .828
1.000 .793
1.000 .779
1.000 .761
1.000 .774
1.000 .795
1.000 .871
1.000 .565
1.000 .750
1.000 .721
1.000 .691
1.000 .737
1.000 .675
B7.1
B7.2
B7.3
B7.4
B7.5
B7.6
B7.7
B7.8
B7.9
B7.10
B7.11
B7.12
B7.13
B7.14
B7.15
B7.16
B7.17
B7.18
B7.19
B7.20
B7.21
Initial Extraction
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
 
KMO and Bartlett's Test
.575
554.489
210
.000
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling
Adequacy.
Approx. Chi-Square
df
Sig.
Bartlett's Test of
Sphericity
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Total Variance Explained
6.463 30.774 30.774 6.463 30.774 30.774 4.014 19.115 19.115
2.871 13.670 44.444 2.871 13.670 44.444 3.373 16.063 35.178
2.166 10.313 54.757 2.166 10.313 54.757 2.649 12.613 47.791
1.513 7.203 61.960 1.513 7.203 61.960 2.103 10.014 57.805
1.403 6.680 68.640 1.403 6.680 68.640 1.777 8.460 66.265
1.206 5.741 74.381 1.206 5.741 74.381 1.704 8.116 74.381
.914 4.354 78.735
.902 4.296 83.030
.739 3.519 86.550
.531 2.528 89.077
.454 2.160 91.237
.370 1.763 93.000
.320 1.523 94.523
.294 1.401 95.923
.247 1.176 97.100
.203 .966 98.066
.145 .689 98.755
9.791E-02 .466 99.221
7.489E-02 .357 99.578
4.552E-02 .217 99.794
4.316E-02 .206 100.000
Component
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative %
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
 
 
Rotated Component Matrixa
.839      
.760      
.721      
.719      
.586      
.558      
.532    .521  
 .838     
 .830     
 .799     
 .608     
  .807    
  .708    
  .692    
  .683    
   .741   
   .722   
 .523  .657   
    .902  
     .810
     .630
B7.15
B7.20
B7.6
B7.16
B7.14
B7.3
B7.19
B7.8
B7.9
B7.4
B7.21
B7.11
B7.5
B7.12
B7.13
B7.10
B7.17
B7.2
B7.1
B7.7
B7.18
1 2 3 4 5 6
Component
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
Rotation Method: Quartimax with Kaiser Normalization.
Rotation converged in 11 iterations.a. 
 
 
 
 
